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Abstract  
 
 The Malthusian Paradox: Weapons Rhetoric Before the Bomb is a longitudinal case study 
of weapons rhetoric leading up to WWII. It examines how influential weapons rhetors negotiated 
a technological conundrum that I call the “Malthusian Paradox.” The Malthusian Paradox is the 
commonplace belief that while technology will destroy humanity, technology also provides 
humanity’s only means of preservation. The Malthusian Paradox not only clarifies what Thomas 
R. Malthus thought about populations and political economy at the end of the 18th century in 
London, but it also clarifies an enduring pattern of deliberation about technology’s effects on 
overpopulation, globalization, and war. This scheme of ideas began to inform how rhetors 
navigated weapons discourse, and in turn, the proliferation of the Paradox in weapons rhetoric 
reiterated and re-inscribed the concept such that it has acquired an aura of permanence, 
immutability, and inescapability. The Malthusian Paradox thus refers not just to a person, but 
also to the conundrum he presented to modern society, the manner of thought it germinated, and 
a persistent technology rhetoric – all of which have a continuing history. Thereby, the Paradox 
has become a foundational figurative and argumentative principle of technology. 
 I argue that the Malthusian Paradox can be construed as a gauge to compare and assess 
the strategies and tactics of weapons rhetors communicating in discrete historical contexts across 
time. I therefore implement a longitudinal case study that combines close textual analyses of 
specific documents with historical analyses of how weapons and their compatible technological 
logics developed. I suggest that analyzing how weapons rhetors negotiate the Malthusian 
Paradox grants insight into how people have invented the current technological conditions, 
understand war, formulate ideologies, and get anxious about weapons. The case studies examine 
Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), accused Haymarket bomb conspirator 
August Spies’s courtroom address (1886), Amos A. Fries’s and Clarence J. West’s army 
textbook Chemical Warfare (1921), and selected correspondence and Manhattan Project memos 
of nuclear physicist Leo Szilard. As rhetoric and the Paradox smashed into each other over the 
historical development of weapons, certain overriding strategies have emerged, demonstrating 
that many of the rhetorical tactics and strategies associated with the Bomb and modern-day 
terrorism have much older origins. These overriding strategies function as windows into what 
might be thought of as the dominant network of weapons discourse that help to constitute their 
political and ideological presence in the world, and bring populations “before the Bomb.”
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Paradox and Weapons Rhetoric 
 
 
 
“The good craftsmen seemed to me to go wrong as much as the poets: because they practiced 
their technai well, both thought themselves wise in other, most important things, and this error of 
theirs obscured the wisdom they had.”  —Socrates1 
 
 At about 9 o’clock in the morning of April 19, 1995, a truck bomb ripped into the Alfred 
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion traveled at 7,000 mph and its force 
of 74,000 pounds equaled the force of a magnitude 4 earthquake.2 The primary explosive agent, 
ammonium nitrate fertilizer, decimated the entire building’s façade. The bombers, Timothy 
McVeigh and Terry Nichols, constructed the bomb by loading 108 fifty-pound bags of the 
fertilizer, three 500-pound drums of nitromethane fuel, and some ammonium nitrate/diesel fuel 
oil (ANFO) explosives into a rental truck.3 They killed 168 and injured 680. The surprise attack, 
which came in response to the U.S. government’s 1993 raid of the Branch Davidian compound 
outside Waco, TX became, in an instant, a shocking reminder of the dual uses of synthetic 
fertilizer. The bombers did not so much convert fertilizer into a weapon as they did implement 
one of ammonium nitrate’s primary uses – causing massive explosions.  
 German chemist Fritz Haber, who in 1918 won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, began 
researching how to make nitrogen fertilizers in the early 20th century to help agriculture. Haber 
said of his discovery that “improved nitrogen fertilization of the soil brings new nutritive riches 
to mankind” to the extent that “the chemical industry comes to the aid of the farmer who, in the 
good earth, changes stones into bread.”4 In 1911, the technology to mass produce ammonium 
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nitrate must have seemed to Haber like an unequivocal boon for humanity. However, once WWI 
broke out, Faber applied his ingenuity to not only feeding a hungry wartime population but also 
exploding the enemy. By inventing an industrial process that combine nitrogen and hydrogen to 
create ammonia, he helped accomplish both feats. The “Haber Process,” later refined by Carl 
Bosch, supplied Germany with a significant portion of the ammonium nitrate it needed to arm 
itself for four years of catastrophic warfare. Moreover, Haber’s chemical acumen prepared him 
to oversee the first successful German chemical warfare attack with chlorine at Ypres, April 22, 
1915. In 1916 he became the director of Germany’s Chemical Warfare Service and his Leune-
Werke, a vast chemical factory complex, provided Germany with munitions and fertilizer as the 
primary producer of each.5 Thus, the same chemist whose technology empowered a massive 
increase in agricultural production in the 20th century also empowered the widespread 
development of military explosives, the German push to inaugurate chemical warfare, and 
ensuing international arms races. The huge expenditures on German chemical plants, especially 
to produce “dual use” nitrates, propelled the expansion of the military-agricultural technology.6 
And in 1995 ammonium nitrate both exploded Oklahoma City’s Murrah Building and nourished 
the monoculture of Oklahoma’s cash crop – wheat. It nurtured, and then it destroyed. It continues 
to do both.7  
 The history of nitrate fertilizer demonstrates how technology places limits upon political 
agency and how political agency can become reinvented with technological innovation. Haber, 
well-situated in the German military command, helped to facilitate one of the bloodiest wars of 
all time and pushed Europe to the brink of collapse. McVeigh and Nichols, in contrast, blew up a 
lone bomb. Confronted with the overwhelming military force of the U.S., McVeigh’s and 
Nichols’s truck bomb could not destroy the government they despised. The death and destruction 
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they perpetrated in Oklahoma City may remain a potent symbol to a harried paramilitary 
American subculture, but despite its explosive success, for everyone else, the attack symbolizes 
the depravity of terrorist tactics and implicit support of governmental anti-terror operations. 
McVeigh and Nichols exploded the most powerful bomb they could construct with objects ready 
at hand, and by doing so indicated the impossibility of attaining their political goals. In the 20th 
century, both states and revolutionaries possessed the same weapon. In WWI ammonium nitrate 
helped to determine whether or not belligerent states could preserve themselves amidst “world 
war.” But for the terrorists McVeigh and Nichols, the truck bomb represented the maximum limit 
of their revolutionary political agency.  
 Yet, the ingenuity of the bomb itself—the appropriation of commonplace industrial 
products—has not resulted in the weapon’s vilification, in contrast to, for example, the 
calumniation of hydrogen bombs. To disparage the mass production of ammonium nitrate, 
nitromethane, and rental trucks would be to disparage three of the fundamental bases of the U.S. 
economy—agriculture, chemistry, and transportation. To bar the products of German war 
technology from common use would threaten large populations with starvation.8 So, should 
people live in fear of fertilizer, or use it as definitive proof that humanity can invent technology 
to sustain itself? Not only fertilizer, but all technologies confront people with this dilemma, 
requiring assessments of their advantages and disadvantages. 
 I call the extreme version of this technological conundrum the “Malthusian Paradox.” 
The Malthusian Paradox is the commonplace belief that while technology will destroy humanity, 
technology also provides humanity’s only means of preservation. According to the British 
political economist Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus, technology serves us by sustaining a 
growing population. However, technology sustains humanity so well that a global population 
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crisis will explode, a crisis exacerbated by a merciless war for resources. So, technology serves 
us until it kills us, and only what kills us can save us.9 As an ideology, the Paradox perpetuates 
the innovation, production, and deployment of dangerous technologies for the purposes of 
securing humanity from famine, plague, and war. As an anxiety, the Paradox presents the 
world’s population with the permanent threat of catastrophe, even annihilation. As a rhetoric, the 
Paradox constrains and opens up the inventive scope of how people communicate about 
technology.10 
 Rhetorical scholars have long been concerned about the successes and failures of nuclear 
advocacy and dissent throughout the Cold War, as well as the proliferation of more recent 
weapons systems, such as missile defenses and biological weapons.11 But, little rhetorical 
attention has been given to pre-WWII weapons discourse, much less the Malthusian Paradox. I 
suggest that examining how rhetors negotiated the Paradox provides further insight into the 
rhetorical norms of weapons discourse that post-Hiroshima rhetorical scholarship has taken up, 
such as “nukespeak,” “strategic deception,” and “bio(in)security.”12 The value of the Paradox to 
rhetorical scholarship thus derives from its role as a concept that facilitates and constrains 
rhetorical invention across the historical and future trajectories of war and violence. In short, 
analysis of the Paradox shows how it can be construed as a gauge to compare and assess the 
strategies and tactics of weapons rhetors communicating in discrete historical contexts across 
time. In this way, I aim to develop historical case studies of the Malthusian Paradox in order to 
both buttress rhetorical scholarship about post-WWII weapons and re-imagine how to understand 
and critique the ongoing endeavors of weapons advocates and dissenters. 
 The Malthusian Paradox not only clarifies a particular person’s thoughts about 
populations and political economy at the end of the 18th century in London, but it also clarifies 
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an enduring pattern of deliberation about technology’s effects on overpopulation, globalization, 
and war. This scheme of ideas began to inform how rhetors navigated weapons discourse, and in 
turn, the proliferation of the Paradox in weapons rhetoric reiterated and re-inscribed the concept 
such that it has acquired an aura of permanence, immutability, and inescapability. The 
Malthusian Paradox refers to not just a man, but also the conundrum he presented to modern 
society, the manner of thought it germinated, and a persistent technology rhetoric – all of which 
have a continuing history. Once technology became conceived as fraught with both benefits and 
dangers, the Paradox came to take a central role in any rigorous attempt to address how people 
use machines. Thereby, the Paradox has become a foundational figurative and argumentative 
principle of technology. Philosophies and histories of technology, interpretations of modernity, 
culture, society, civilization, industry, economics, and politics all must address the Paradox. For 
these reasons, I use Malthus’s iteration of the Paradox as the conceptual frame to begin 
examining weapons rhetorics.  
 Malthus did not originate the Paradox; it has influenced humanity’s conception of 
technology since at least ancient Greece and has a “complex rhetorical ancestry.”13 Protagoras’s 
cosmogony, as reproduced by Plato, demonstrates technology has long made humanity think 
about its preservation and destruction at the same moment by tying human survival to 
technological achievement. Protagoras depicted both how weapons fail to assure survival and 
how technology, in the form of political organization and law, could assure survival. The sophist 
recounted how people “were devoured by wild beasts, since they were in every respect the 
weaker, and their technical skill, though a sufficient aid to their nurture, did not extend to making 
war on the beasts, for they had not the art of politics, of which the art of war is a part.”14 Even 
when gathered together for protection, early humans would kill each other, which made Zeus 
 
 
6 
 
fear “the total destruction of our race.”15 The fate of Protagoras’s human world seemed to rest on 
its technological capacity to either preserve itself or cause its own demise by failing to withstand 
war and nature. Ancient technology did not guarantee survival. Neither did it produce self-
extermination, but the concept that the innovation of technologies could empower one population 
to exterminate another or preserve itself in the face of annihilation became a norm of technology 
discourse.  
 This ancient problem filtered into the 20th century’s “technological society,” according to 
Jacques Ellul. His essay, “The Technological Order,” proposed four technological rules that 
reiterate the Paradox:  
 1. All technical progress exacts a price; 
 2. Technique raises more problems than it solves; 
 3. Pernicious effects are inseparable from favorable effects; and 
 4. Every technique implies unforeseeable effects.16 
 
Ellul further asserted that, “It cannot be maintained that technical progress is in itself either good 
or bad. In the evolution of Technique, contradictory elements are indissolubly connected.”17 As 
much as any machine comprises part of the vast system of technology that infuses human 
activity, it cannot claim to be a pure boon or detriment to everyone. Some technologies comprise 
a greater threat, of course, so their “pernicious and favorable effects” confront humanity with 
larger speculative impacts on the world. 
 In another recent reiteration of the Paradox that somewhat resembles the pervasiveness of 
Ellul’s four rules, sociologist Ulrich Beck’s “risk society” manages the uncertainty that 
accompanies dangerous technologies. According to Beck, “modern” humans face a high 
probability that they will exterminate their own species with chemical, nuclear, genetic, and 
ecological technologies.18 Although industrialization spurred the development of beneficial 
technologies that, in a type of circular reasoning, then legitimated their invention, those once-
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beneficial technological projects now confront humanity with disaster. Beck therefore contended 
that the risk society with its myriad problems must use “risk logic” to distinguish “between risks 
and threats” in order to organize politics and formulate policy.19 Risk analysis, which delineates 
the positive and negative trade-offs caused by technology, re-inscribes the tension between 
preservation and destruction for both local communities and the entire earth depending on the 
risk and threat level ascertained during technology policy debates. With destruction looming 
everywhere, Beck argued that savvy technological political design could stave off disaster if the 
dilemma gets solved. But, it never does. Thus, the Malthusian Paradox appears on many levels of 
technology rhetoric.  
 Despite these ancient origins and current permutations, I dub this paradox “Malthusian” 
because Malthus confronted it at a critical moment that witnessed the brutal subordination of 
huge masses of people to machines in the factory and liquidation on the battlefield. Malthus 
provides a rich cultural and conceptual approach to technology: he rejected technological 
utopias, condensed earlier anxieties about the extinction of civilizations with their own 
technologies, and anticipated late 19th and early 20th century anxieties about human extinction 
with the new weapons born out of industrialization. In short, Malthus’s importance to an 
evaluation of the Paradox as it relates to weaponry derives from his implication that the survival 
of the entire human species is at stake during global warfare. Malthus concerned himself with the 
technological fate of large populations, and this study aims to do likewise, which makes Malthus 
both a compelling starting point and Malthusianism a compelling conceptual frame. 
 I suggest that of countless dangerous technologies weapons best exemplify the Paradox. 
Weapons are the technologies that tend to have the greatest direct impact on whether or not a 
particular society gets preserved or annihilated, both during wartime and during peacetime 
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through deterrence. And, peace always degenerates into war. War perhaps best exemplifies that 
destruction begets creation and creation begets destruction. In one of his earliest writings, 
political philosopher Michael Bakunin invoked the “spirit of revolution” to depict the perpetual 
movement back and forth between war and peace. He wrote, “Let us therefore trust the eternal 
Spirit which destroys and annihilates only because it is the unfathomable and eternally creative 
source of all life. The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too.”20 And, according to 
Hannah Arendt, the goal of well-reasoned violent action is peace through victory, and this peace 
justifies the use of violence and its rationalization in the first place. This circling of reason and 
violence around each other serves to “dramatize” conflict.21 To state that peace and violence 
comprise the basic poles of warfare oversimplifies one of the most complex and over-determined 
human activities, but the interplay of creation, destruction, and preservation cannot be ignored 
when analyzing the tools of war.22 The Paradox perseveres from ancient to contemporary 
warfare, and it pervades weapons discourse. It adds a technological layer to the already vexed 
strategic and moral aspects of weapons production that makes debating and deliberating weapons 
and war such a complicated task. When rhetors advocate or resist a given weapon, they tend to 
negotiate the paradoxical conundrum that confronts them all. Their language butts up against it at 
each inventive turn whether they acknowledge the Paradox or not. 
 Weapons rhetoric grants particular insight into the Paradox as the magnitude of death and 
destruction caused by military technology increases. The stakes – revolution, civilization, 
perpetual peace, and extermination – are higher with weapons than they are for other devices. As 
Lewis Mumford wrote, “Real orgies of destruction, vast collective eruptions of hate, became 
possible only when civilization provided the technical means of accomplishing them.”23 The fate 
of larger and larger populations relies on weapons, and part of this reliance involves how people 
 
 
9 
 
communicate about weapons as they get deployed in rhetoric as well as on battlefields. 
Technology does not kill alone. Language is violent and language motivates violence. For 
French philosopher Paul Virilio, violence is inherent in communication, and the “information 
bomb,” or “weapon of mass communication,” is not a mere metaphor.24 Rather, a “weapon of 
mass destruction is subject to the weapon of a form of mass communication that overrides it in 
every way – the audiovisual impact (in real time) outstripping by a long shot, through its globe-
spanning propagation velocity, the material impact, precisely targeted, of precision-guided 
explosive missiles.”25 Rhetoric facilitated the 20th century’s magnitude of killing in innumerable 
ways by persuading people to take up arms or creating the political conditions in which people 
were forced to take up arms—through the ideological construction of political economies, 
religious dogmatism, patriotism, nationalism, and hatred; through military strategists, 
commanders, and drill sergeants; through politicians, policy, technocracy, and diplomacy; 
through the mass media; through burgeoning weapons industries and capitalist expansion; 
through the militarization of science, engineering, and universities; and through the marketing 
and selling of weapons to individuals and states on a global scale. As rhetoric and weapons 
justified and resisted each other, some weapons became symbolic, and such symbols influenced 
the appearance of new weapons and the rhetoric used to depict them. Weapons and words circled 
around each other throughout all of these activities, professions, and concepts, and at each 
deliberative moment, people wondered about whether weapons would cause humanity’s 
extinction or its ultimate preservation. To speak or write about weapons has required imagining 
how rhetoric helps to spur people towards peace or extermination.    
 I argue that analyzing how weapons rhetors negotiate the Malthusian Paradox grants 
insight into how people have invented the current technological conditions, understand war, 
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formulate ideologies, and get anxious about weapons. Each of the following case studies details 
how advocates of weapons—whether dynamite bombs, mustard gas, or the atomic bomb—
expressed the Paradox and how they rhetorically negotiated it. As rhetoric and the Paradox 
smashed into each other over the historical development of weapons, certain overriding 
strategies have emerged, demonstrating that many of the rhetorical tactics and strategies 
associated with the Bomb and modern-day terrorism have much older origins. These overriding 
strategies function as windows into what might be thought of as the dominant network of 
discourse about weapons of mass destruction that help to constitute their political and ideological 
presence in the world, and bring populations “before the Bomb.” 
 The following section describes the conceptual organization of the ensuing chapters and 
my method of rhetorical analysis. Then, I preview the case studies that examine Malthus’s 
“principle of population” (1798), accused Haymarket bomb “conspirator” August Spies’s 
courtroom address (1886), Amos A. Fries’s and Clarence J. West’s army textbook Chemical 
Warfare (1921), and selected correspondence of nuclear physicist Leo Szilard in the years 
leading up to and following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I conclude by arguing for 
the importance of this research. 
 
Analytical Method and Argumentative Organization 
 To show the Paradox’s ongoing influence on weapons rhetoric, I examine important 
documents that appeared at specific technological moments during a historical period that begins 
with the confluence of new large-scale warfare and theories of overpopulation in the late 18th and 
early 19th centuries and ends with the successful testing of nuclear weapons in the midst of 
WWII. Because sometimes many decades elapsed between the appearances of these documents, 
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I use a type of rhetorical analysis that John Angus Campbell dubbed a “longitudinal case study.” 
In the remainder of this section, I explain Campbell’s method and how it fits this project. 
Second, I explain how the case study chapters are organized to take advantage of this method. 
Then, I explain how the texts and rhetors I examine fit within the framework of the longitudinal 
case study. 
 According to Campbell, a longitudinal case study studies the “kairotic occurrences” that 
“become self-constitutive chapters in the anthology of meaning we call history.”26 Campbell 
conceived that juxtaposing and combining Michael Leff’s discrete close textual analysis with 
Michael Calvin McGee’s ideographic analysis provides a way to connect analyses of 
chronologically disparate texts to create an overarching historical claim. According to Campbell, 
a close textual analysis unfolds “in a specific situation and discloses its meaning within textual 
time,” and an ideographic analysis unfolds and gathers “meaning over centuries,” so that a 
synthesis of the two methods creates a “House of the Middle Way.”27 Whereas McGee’s method 
considers the “rhetorical artifact as but a partial expression of a larger cultural whole,” because 
“it reminds us that invention is grounded in history and history is a matrix of possibilities,” 
Leff’s method focuses on “the local stability of the text” in question.28 Campbell concluded that 
the “house of the middle way” shows that “meanings . . . tend to stabilize along specific 
rhetorical-cultural axes.” In turn, “we come to understand the rhetorical meaning in larger 
historical-interpretive patterns.”29   
 My research has a similar goal – to understand how the current relationship between 
humanity and weapons became rhetorically and technologically constituted in a span of 
approximately 150 years by performing close textual analyses of specific rhetorical artifacts. 
Each instance of weapons rhetoric that I examine took up popular attitudes and arguments about 
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dangerous technologies, reinvented them, and radiated the updated versions outward to influence 
further innovation. I therefore concur with Campbell’s assertion that in a longitudinal case study, 
“Each construction absorbs the meanings of its context and bodies those meanings forth in a 
local explosion of rhetorical energy.”30 Such “local explosions” indicate both the enduring 
influence of the Paradox on technology rhetoric and the sometimes stable and sometimes 
changing historical trajectory of weapons rhetoric. To paraphrase Campbell, my project offers an 
account of how specific weapons and weapons advocates created rhetorical situations as they 
moved across time, and how weapons rhetoric radiated into the present from key discursive 
epicenters.31 
 John Durham Peters’s Speaking into the Air, provides a recent example of scholarship 
that performs a longitudinal case study.32 The book locates important and formative instances of 
modern communication in specific texts in a “conscious anachronism.”33 Peters traced the idea of 
communication from ancient Greece through the Bible, German philosophy, radio technology, 
and attempted contact with aliens. To justify his method, Peters cited Walter Benjamin, who, 
rather than conceiving of history as linear and progressive, suggested that historical materialists 
should “blast open the continuum of history,” and leave “it to others to be drained by the whore 
called ‘Once upon a time’ in historicism’s bordello.”34 Instead of perceiving people and events as 
emerging from straight lines, Benjamin argued that historical materialists should perceive 
moments and lives as merging constellations. He wrote:  
 Historicism contents itself with establishing a causal connection between various 
 moments in history. But no fact that is a cause is for that very reason historical. It became 
 historical posthumously, as it were, through events that may be separated from it by 
 thousands of years. A historian who takes this as his point of departure stops telling the 
 sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. Instead, he grasps the constellation which 
 his own era has formed with a definite earlier one.”35 
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To perform this critical approach, the historical progression from chapter to chapter in Peters’s 
Speaking into the Air is nominally linear, but also chronologically disrupted and dispersed such 
that the meaning of “communication” derives from a comingling of Plato, Jesus, and the SETI 
program. I use a longitudinal case study in a similar fashion, to also agree with technology 
scholar Carl Mitcham’s assertion that “The history of technology is not nearly so linear and 
progressive as technological history implies.”36 I suggest that the Malthusian Paradox can best be 
understood as a disrupted and dispersed idea that amalgamates the ideologies, anxieties, and 
rhetorics that attend the historical materialization of population management, dynamite bombs, 
mustard gas, and atomic bombs.  
 In order to demonstrate the “absorption” and “bodying forth” of weapons rhetoric, I 
recount both how weapons rhetors grasped backward at rhetorical tactics and strategies to 
reinvent or redeploy them, and how they came up with new means to better fit new weapons. To 
do this, I have organized the case study chapters to tell both a synchronic rhetorical account of 
specific moments in the history of weapons and to tell a diachronic account of weapons rhetoric 
across time. Each chapter first introduces the topic and rhetor under examination. Second, each 
chapter explains how each rhetor expressed the Paradox, and considers how each weapon’s 
functions and destructive effects meshed with each iteration of the Paradox. Each of these 
sections indicates the ideological context that undergirded the plausibility of each weapon’s 
rhetorical and physical deployment. Third, each chapter posits an important element of weapons 
rhetoric that can be observed across time. Fourth, each chapter performs a textual analysis of 
each rhetor’s vital documents. Each chapter also considers how each iteration of weapons 
rhetoric radiated outward into several predominant societal, cultural, economic, and 
technological “logics” that have become some of the central guiding rationales that justify the 
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current technological and military conditions. Thus, each textual division meshes not only with 
the other sections in each chapter, but with each section across chapters to point toward an 
overall longitudinal assessment of weapons rhetoric. 
 In the case studies that follow, the sections that demonstrate how one rhetor expressed the 
Paradox in relationship to a specific weapon or technology show how, with Malthus, the primary 
concern was imagining the fate of large populations as they descended into a global war caused 
by the cyclical success and failure of agricultural technology; how Spies, in the face of violent 
state suppression, participated in a common international dynamite discourse; and how Fries and 
West attempted to reshape public opinion about chemical warfare by defining weaponized gas as 
the “humane” way to annihilate enemies. Szilard’s confrontation with “deterrence” agglomerated 
all of these concerns into an ideological anxiety about weapons that helped to undergird foreign 
policy during the Cold War. 
 The sections that posit important elements of weapons rhetoric focus on specific 
characteristics that together constitute an overarching concept of what weapons rhetoric is. In the 
chapter about Malthus I include an examination of the concept of rhetorical paradox. In the 
chapter about Spies I describe the basic activity of “bomb talking” that both advocates and 
detractors used to deliberate weapons. In the chapter about Fries and West, I describe how 
rhetorical amplification seemed especially apropos in an era characterized by WWI’s destruction 
and anxiety about chemical warfare. In the chapter that analyzes Szilard’s correspondence, I 
describe how the philosophy of pragmatic idealism helps to frame a model of communication 
that well fits the diverted goals of weapons advocates. Thus, weapons rhetoric consists of, in part 
at least, both a common discourse of bomb talking that possesses a cluster of commonplace 
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rhetorical tactics and arguments, and the pragmatic means to work toward unattainable ideal 
goals. 
 Within each chapter I explore a cluster of powerful “logics” that are embedded within the 
Paradox, each of which is "paradoxical" in its own right. Logics, such as industrialization, 
overpopulation, total war, mass production, the democratization of technology, deterrence, 
escalation, inevitability, and mutual assured destruction became arguments and rhetorical 
commonplaces that rhetors can draw from to deliberate new technologies because they appear to 
have an already proven rationale or legitimacy. These logics have supported and energized the 
normalization of military culture. 
 The sections that perform close textual analyses examine how each rhetor absorbed, 
ignored, or invented new tactics and strategies while negotiating the Paradox. Thus, some 
concepts, logics, arguments, and rhetorical tactics appear and disappear in the analysis in order to 
constitute a foundation for understanding weapons rhetoric. Statistical proofs, for example, 
appear as a primary rhetorical means to support both Malthus’s “principle of population” and 
Fries’s and West’s attempt to prove that chemical weapons are more humane than other 
weapons. The importance of deterrence likewise fades in and out of the narrative; while 
deterrence was a supporting logic of chemical warfare, it became a guiding ideological principle 
of nuclear policy. As the Cold War thawed, deterrence’s importance to foreign policy 
diminished, yet it remains an important logic for the “war on terrorism.”  
 I thus choose to examine Malthus, Spies, Fries and West, and Szilard, because they took 
up, reiterated, and circulated rhetorical tactics and strategies that help to demonstrate the 
longitudinal trajectory of weapons rhetoric. In addition to presenting novel arguments about 
novel weapons, they absorbed prior weapons rhetoric, and the logics that developed from them, 
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and verbalized them for others to absorb and re-circulate. Malthusian overpopulation anxiety 
thus helps to make sense of the speculative effects of anarchist bomb throwing and the framing 
of chemical weapons as a type of massive industrial annihilation. The advocacy of chemical 
warfare during and after WWI established ways to debate weapons that later deliberations about 
atomic bombs reflected, albeit with a distorted image. These influential rhetors thus contributed 
to global anxiety about weapons and global faith in their power to save humanity from 
destruction.  
 These figures also all had historical, political, and technological aspirations that crashed 
their activities into the Paradox. Each figure not only desired to make important arguments about 
weapons for specific political ends, they wanted to entrench their arguments into how society 
organizes itself. While Malthus wanted to influence the development of British economics and 
governmental class organization to perpetuate industrial capitalism, Spies desired to martyr 
himself to spur the extinction of capitalism. And while Fries and West fought to justify chemical 
warfare as a legitimate way to fight wars and to justify the Chemical Warfare Service as a 
permanent division of the U.S. Army, Szilard sought to use weapons to construct a world of 
peace. Thus, all of these figures imagined themselves either implicitly or explicitly as historically 
important, and their importance hinged upon their success in advocating technology and 
weapons. In turn, their relative successes and failures indicate how technology constrained and 
freed their individual capacity to affect political change by limiting the scope of their activities or 
suggesting new ways to use weapons to motivate people.   
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Overview of Chapters 
 In chapter two, I further describe and define the Malthusian Paradox. I argue that 
Malthus’s population theory exemplifies the process of rhetorical invention that centralized the 
melding of faith in technology as humanity’s preservation with anxiety about potential 
technology-induced annihilation. Multiple historical events, technological innovations, and 
political movements at the turn of the 18th century make Malthus’s population theories an 
apropos pre-text by which to gauge and explain the Paradox. By “pre-text” I mean both a 
conceptual frame with which to examine weapons rhetoric, and a kind of living rhetorical frame 
that helped to animate the production of weapons of mass destruction. Malthus lived as the 
agricultural and industrial “revolutions” increased humanity’s productive capacity to unheard of 
levels, which led him to wonder about the fate of large populations in relationship to the 
technological capacity to sustain the increases in productivity that he witnessed. He saw factories 
proliferate, London’s population explode, and Napoleon’s armies rage across Europe, events 
which appeared to make large portions of the global population “redundant.” Malthus used 
several important rhetorical tactics to elucidate his theory that population growth is limited by 
agricultural ingenuity. First, his use of questionable agricultural and demographic statistics 
helped to establish his “principle of population” as a natural law by presenting sublime numerical 
ratios that depicted absurd environmental scenarios well beyond the potential of sustainability. 
Second, by speculating about the catastrophic results of overpopulation his generalizations 
abstracted and amplified the magnitude of these results to threaten the entire earth. Third, his use 
of metaphorical antistasis empowered Malthus to drift between the preservative and destructive 
tendencies of “machines” without contradicting himself. Not only did these rhetorical tactics 
undergird the plausibility of his “principle of population,” they also indicated how weapons 
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rhetoric took up concerns about humanity’s technological fate. Thus, as a pre-text his writings 
provide an entry point for understanding how rhetoric impinges upon technology and how 
technology impinges upon rhetoric.  
 To begin elaborating the Paradox’s influence on the rhetorical manifestation of specific 
weapons, chapter three examines the “bomb talking” of August Spies. In 1886, dynamite seemed 
to suffuse the entire city of Chicago. The mass production of dynamite and other bomb-making 
materials made them available to almost anyone, whether government officials or 
revolutionaries, threatening random, brutal, and widespread violence. Its ubiquity and the 
supposed threat to humanity posed by one explosive device characterized public anxiety about 
terrorism. Spies, the accused arch-conspirator of the infamous Haymarket bombing invoked the 
Paradox to defend himself at trial and to attack the American political system. In his final 
address to the court, Spies espoused anarchism, advocated political violence, and made important 
technological arguments about how revolutionaries could use dynamite to save humanity from 
capitalism. I argue that Spies capitalized on the instability of “bomb talking” to negotiate the 
Paradox with three rhetorical tactics. First, he made an elaborate turnaround argument that 
depicted capitalist destruction as worker preservation and workers’ destruction as capitalist 
preservation. Spies claimed that anarchists wanted to save civilization with dynamite, while the 
state attempted to annihilate the working masses. The state claimed that Spies wanted to 
annihilate the American population with dynamite, while the state attempted to save the people. 
Second, Spies used the polysemous character of the term “dynamite” to serve multiple functions 
in his revolutionary agitation. When he called workers to arms by invoking dynamite, it was 
unclear whether or not he intended them to begin spilling blood. Third, Spies cultivated an image 
of himself as a martyr, and thereby he made a synecdochic generalization about his violent 
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demise and the unending terror of bomb throwers. As one part of the so-called “anarchist 
conspiracy” to terrorize civilization with bombs, Spies depicted himself as representative of an 
entire working population of potential bomb throwers who threatened permanent, random terror. 
Spies thus used the rhetorical instability of dynamite discourse to provoke political instability.  
 In chapter four I turn from anarchist dynamite bombs to the proliferation of chemical 
weapons during WWI and after. I focus on one of the chief officers of the U.S. Army’s Chemical 
Warfare Service, Major General Amos A. Fries, who wrote a military textbook, Chemical 
Warfare, with Clarence J. West of the National Research Council and the Reserve Corps. The 
innovation of chemical weapons, especially mustard gas, introduced a new type of weapon that 
once again provoked widespread anxiety about global destruction, and chemical warfare 
discourse was characterized by a type of rhetorical instability comparable to that of Haymarket-
era bomb talking. In response to widespread vitriolic condemnation of chemical warfare, Fries 
and West mounted a public relations campaign that advocated chemical warfare as a humane and 
efficient way to attain victory. In contrast to August Spies’s capitalization on the rhetorical 
instability of bomb talking, I argue that Fries and West negotiated the Malthusian Paradox by 
rhetorically attempting to stabilize the language of chemical warfare. They capitalized on an 
atmosphere of post-war political stability to legitimate chemical warfare and the Chemical 
Warfare Service. In my analysis of Chemical Warfare, I show how Fries and West utilized two 
prevalent stabilizing rhetorical tactics. First, in order to make mustard gas sound more appealing 
and to ease rampant fear of the new weapons, they used statistical proofs and comparisons to 
conventional weapons to downplay chemical warfare’s physiological effects. Second, they 
amplified the destructive power of “gas” with totalizing generalizations that elucidated the 
enormity of the new weapons’ threat on a global scale.  
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 In chapter five, I examine the personal correspondence of atomic bomb physicist Leo 
Szilard. With doomsday images in his head, he began theorizing how to produce nuclear chain 
reactions in the early 1930s and later became an important figure in the Manhattan Project. In the 
final years of WWII, once he realized that the engineers and scientists working at Los Alamos 
would soon construct the Bomb, he reversed his pro-Bomb attitude and began lobbying for its 
abolishment and arms reduction. Recognizing the dire political consequences of nuclear fission, 
Szilard attempted to situate nuclear physicists, but especially himself, between the “truthful” 
realm of science and the manipulative realm of politics in order to gain political leverage. Once 
he had attained a somewhat influential policy voice, Szilard paradoxically used the capacity of 
atomic bombs to bring both peace and annihilation to advocate his nuclear policy ideas. I thus 
argue that Szilard negotiated the Malthusian paradox by being paradoxical. He used three 
primary rhetorical tactics to intervene in nuclear politics. First, he argued for physicists to display 
a “disinterested” scientific ethos to appear ambivalent about a scientific development that none 
of them should have appeared ambivalent about. Second, Szilard attempted to bargain with the 
government to classify and fund his research by pressuring FDR’s administration with a feigned 
desire to publish, in the midst of WWII, the “secrets” that could empower other states to develop 
the Bomb. Third, he attempted to build the professional consensus of atomic scientists. The 
formation and authority of scientific organizations, he argued, gave political credence to 
scientific thought. By uniting a body of many minds that would not allow the manipulation of 
scientific truth with political language, Szilard asserted that, because they had devised how to 
materialize the means to massive extermination, nuclear physicists were most capable of 
devising how to use the Bomb to bring peace.  
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 To conclude, I show how the examination of these influential texts and rhetors indicates 
that some overriding rhetorical strategies emerged from their individual tactics. When taken 
together, these rhetorical moves helped to characterize weapons discourse. Although specific 
rhetorical tactics and strategies may fade from use with the innovation of certain weapons in 
certain contexts, all of the arguments, figures, and tropes used by Malthus, Spies, Fries and West, 
and Szilard are still at work. The rhetoric of nuclear terrorism provides a final glimpse into a 
contemporary moment in the continuing history of the Malthusian Paradox.  
 
Conclusion 
 With the world’s attention attuned to conflicting and uncertain probabilities that 
humanity, and all other life, could survive a war fought with so-called “ultimate weapons,” 
navigating the Malthusian Paradox characterizes both current and past weapons rhetoric. As one 
element in an intricate history of war, the rhetorical history of weapons, of course, aligns itself 
with other narratives and rhetorical scholarship. The pre-history of weapons rhetoric leading up 
to the Trinity Test demonstrates that many of the commonplaces of late 20th century and 21st 
century weapons rhetoric have much older origins than the summer of 1945. So, in addition to 
elucidating a period of weapons and war rhetorics that have received, thus far, little attention, I 
aim to extend post-WWII studies of weapons rhetoric and add to the historical literature on the 
period since almost all studies of weapons rhetoric post-date the events that I examine. The 
following analyses of population control, dynamite, mustard gas, and early atomic bomb rhetoric 
are foundational because, in addition to expanding the scope of rhetorical scholarship, they 
buttress and support analyses of latter-day weapons and dangerous technologies. 
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 Ultimately, my study is no different than the objects of its critique; it is itself a 
manifestation of exterminism and it offers a potential blueprint for the further deployment of the 
Paradox to justify brutality in the name of peace.37 Although the following chapters lay out the 
successful rhetorical tactics and strategies that accompanied the development of WMDs, I 
modestly aim to help reinvent technology by promoting reflection on how weapons rhetoric 
helped invent our world. Like Walter Benjamin’s conception of the “historical materialist” who 
“regards it as his task to brush history against the grain,” I would dissociate myself from 
barbarism and “the transmission of barbaric documents from one owner to another.”38 However, 
“to brush history against the grain,” critics must not only confront the barbaric rhetorical 
strategies of successful domination, but also the failed attempts at reform and revolt, as well as 
prescriptions to remedy humanity’s greatest problems. Hence, I conceive my critical role as not 
only aiming to confront the rhetorical construction of weapons, but also aiming to confront 
speculative prescriptions for change and failed historical attempts to change the technological 
order. I offer an interrogation of weapons rhetoric to aim yet another level of criticism at the 
construction and maintenance of weapons of mass destruction, despite their apparent resistance 
to all manners of attacks and reformations. The historical trajectory of weapons rhetoric provides 
an opportunity to judge the successful and failed tactics, strategies, ethics, and ideas that have 
helped to shape how individuals and states interact. 
 Weapons rhetoric matters and is of utmost importance because weapons can threaten 
everybody. From individual weapons that threaten our communities, like the dynamite bombs of 
1886 and fertilizer truck bombs, to the most destructive weapons yet invented like thermobaric, 
nuclear, and hydrogen bombs, the successes of weapons advocates who design, manufacture, and 
promote weapons result in death and destruction. Weapons are fearsome, so how we make them, 
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what we make, how we sell, how we deploy, and how we use rhetoric to negotiate, not just the 
Paradox, but the people who make weapons “happen” – from the inventor who invents the fuse 
to the thug or soldier who lights it – should be judged and held accountable.  
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Chapter 2  
 
 
The Malthusian Paradox in An Essay on the Principle of Population 
  
 
 
“It must be acknowledged that bad theories are very bad things, and the authors of them useless 
and sometimes pernicious members of society.”39   ––Thomas R. Malthus 
 
 The Reverend Thomas R. Malthus directed this polemic in 1798 at the many critics of An 
Essay on the Principle of Population, as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society with 
Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other Writers (1798). Malthus’s 
counterattack mirrored his critics’ accusations that his population theory presented British 
society with dangerous ideas from a dangerous advocate. According to Malthus, human fertility 
outpaces technological capacities to sustain population growth. With this general law as a 
premise, Malthus aimed to abolish the “Poor Laws” that had provided relief to paupers since 
1597. Rather than assisting the “redundant” poor, already destined for lives filled with, in 
Malthus’s words, “vice and misery,” they must be “checked” lest their procreative power drain 
state funds, deplete natural resources, or otherwise cause calamity. The “principle of population” 
thus pitted economic and class interests against each other amidst the constraints of populations 
competing for basic biological survival. 
 Malthus and his Essay were controversial but influential. He was not the first political 
economist to explore the vexed relationship between human populations and their means of 
subsistence, but he was the first to bring the debate out from texts on political economy into 
common conversation, the popular press, and the British Parliament. His infamy increased as his 
essay circulated, and “Malthusian” came to refer to harsh governmental management of the poor, 
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ignoring the poor, and blaming the poor for their poverty.40 James Bonar, an early Malthus 
scholar and biographer, sarcastically proclaimed of his subject, “He was the ‘best-abused man of 
the age.’ Bonaparte himself was not a greater enemy of the species. Here was a man who 
defended small-pox, slavery, and child-murder; who denounced soup-kitchens, early marriage, 
and parish allowances.”41  
 Yet, regardless of the invective directed at Malthus and his book, the “principle of 
population” won many adherents among rival political economists and politicians, as it vividly 
elucidated how the unequal powers of population growth and agricultural technology affect 
poverty, emigration, war, and domestic and international commerce. With vast numbers of poor 
people clogging London’s streets, “Malthusianism” influenced British political deliberations 
about how to handle Britain’s exploding population.42 Loath to admit the moral implications of 
eliminating large portions of the population through forced parish resettlement, forced 
emigration, incarceration in work houses, and general abandonment, consideration of the 
“principle of population” provoked Members of Parliament to consider solutions that drew from 
the darker side of Malthus’s assertions rather than from Malthus’s exhortations for people to 
show procreative restraint. For the paupers imprisoned in workhouses, it was Malthus’s 
inflammatory writings that were pernicious and “very bad things;” not those of Malthus’s critics. 
 In his own time, Malthus’s primary policy influence derived from his objections to Poor 
Law reformation. Around this issue Malthus became something of a pundit, and as early as 1800 
the Essay circulated in government circles. Consequently, as rhetorical scholar Marouf Hasian 
wrote, Malthus’s population theory “became a part of the taken-for-granted scientific, moral, and 
legal wisdom of early nineteenth century England.”43 He gained the ear of M.P. Samuel 
Whitbread in 1807, and influenced the reforms advocated by the 1817 Select Committee on the 
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Poor Laws, as well as the 1826 Select Committee on emigration.44 He testified about emigration 
to the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1827, and their final report showed a clear 
Malthusian influence.45 In 1834, the year of his death, the British government validated the 
“principle of population” and “Malthusianism,” by passing new Poor Law legislation that 
presented paupers with an unappealing dilemma.46 The law required them to choose to either 
banish themselves to decrepit work houses or banish themselves from all future welfare.47 
 In addition to his influence on Poor Law reform, Malthus gained fame as a political 
economist and demographer. In 1805, the East India Company’s college at Haileybury appointed 
him to the first professorship in political economy in Britain, from which he published influential 
economic treatises, on wages, rent, and grain importation, including Principles of Political 
Economy (1820). In political economy, “Malthusian” came to refer to theories of diminished 
economic returns derived from population growth, and basing wage theory on the “principle of 
population.” From his economic research, Malthus recognized that history tended to focus on the 
wealthy, so his quest to prove his population theory by compiling as much statistical information 
about understudied poor people made him a founding figure of demography.48 
 An assumption about the potential of technology to both improve a society’s means of 
subsistence and to destroy its living members was implied within Malthus’s work.49 This 
assumption became more explicit when Malthus the man began transforming into Malthusianism 
the ideology.50 Malthus was a technological thinker, positing that if prudence failed to check 
“overpopulation” (i.e., the poor restraining their reproductive habits), then social and political 
authorities must devise technical methods to manage both procreation and agriculture. As the 
meaning of Malthusianism spun out of Malthus’s direct control, subsequent iterations of his 
population theory became even more closely associated with technology.51 The Malthusian 
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League’s rationalization of birth control technologies as a way to manage overpopulation is an 
overt example.52 Elsewhere, eugenics, forced sterilization, concentration camps, and genocide 
drew upon Malthusianism for justification.53 Malthusianism’s technological claims reverberate 
even now. For example, historian Paul Kennedy wrote in 1993, “the greatest test for human 
society as it confronts the twenty-first century is how to use the ‘power of technology’ to meet 
the demands thrown up by the ‘power of population.’”54 In these ways Malthusianism has borne 
a technological legacy as Malthusians, Neo-Malthusians, and even their critics took the latent 
technological aspects of the “principle of population,” and made them primary foci of 
overpopulation analyses. Hence the ism that bears his name – Malthusianism – still “colonizes 
our future.”55 
 I suggest that one way in which it does so can be seen in weapons rhetoric. The rhetorics 
of the 19th and 20th centuries that justified the construction and use of weapons of mass 
destruction drew on central Malthusian themes of overpopulation, state-preservation, and anxiety 
about global destruction. In this way, only part of the Essay’s rhetorical importance derives from 
Malthusianism’s lingering influence on governmental assumptions about how to assert 
technological control over population management. An equally important aspect of Malthus’s 
legacy is found in the history of weapons rhetoric as weapons rhetors drew on Malthusian 
themes, and repeatedly negotiated a paradox endemic to Malthus’s own work, and that of his 
successors: namely, weapons were both promoted as the means to preserve humanity from 
annihilation and denigrated as the means to annihilate humanity.  
 Therefore, this chapter aims to show how Malthusianism functioned as a “pre-text” of 
weapons rhetoric, first by examining the centrality of this technological paradox in Malthus’s 
population theory. Then, I will analyze Malthus’s writings about population to demonstrate how 
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Malthus depended on particular rhetorical tactics to negotiate the Paradox. Malthus’s sublime 
statistical ratios, universal generalizations, and “machine” antistasis undergirded the 
technological plausibility of his “principle of population.” Because I argue that Malthus’s 
iteration of the Paradox has profound ramifications for understanding the development of latter-
day weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, I conclude by indicating the ways 
Malthusian rhetoric appeared to corroborate 19th century concepts of war that rationalized 
annihilation in the name of preservation. 
 
Malthus and the Paradoxes of Technology 
 Malthus, in his polemic against the utopian “sect of speculative philosophers” William 
Godwin, the Marquis de Condorcet, and other idealistic supporters of the French Revolution, 
disparaged the use of rhetorical paradox. Condemning the utopians as “artful and designing 
knaves” and “mad-headed enthusiasts” who advanced “silly speculations and absurd 
paradoxes,”56 he argued that the very concept of utopia bred paradoxical thinking about the 
plausibility, benefits, and happiness of living a trouble-free and immortal life of leisure in a 
world limited by natural resources.   
 Many, I doubt not, will think that the attempting gravely to controvert so absurd a 
 paradox as the immortality of man on earth, or indeed, even the perfectability of man and 
 society, is a waste of time and words, and that such unfounded conjectures are best 
 answered by neglect. I profess, however, to be of a different opinion. When paradoxes of 
 this kind are advanced by ingenious and able men, neglect has no tendency to convince 
 them of their mistakes.”57  
 
Malthus’s vehement criticisms of utopianism, however, neither carried over to criticism of the 
concept of paradox itself, nor caused him to jettison paradoxical arguments from his own 
treatises. Rather than avoiding paradoxes, Malthus depended on his own erudite use of them to 
explicate his population theory. As Bonar noted in his 19th century interpretation of 
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Malthusianism, “The main position of the [Essay] was so incontrovertible, that when the critics 
despaired to convict Malthus of a paradox, they charged him with a truism.”58 
 Indeed, at first glance, Malthus’s “principle of population” might seem more 
straightforward than paradoxical. According to Malthus’s basic argument as stated in the first 
Essay: 
 The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce 
 subsistence for man. Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio.  
 Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers 
 will shew the immensity of the first power in comparison to the second. By that law of 
 our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two 
 unequal powers must be kept equal.59  
 
Few could assail the basic premises that humans procreate more easily than they increase their 
means of subsistence. As publisher Hutches Trower wrote to Malthus’s friend and rival political 
economist David Ricardo in 1821, “Whether population will double itself in 25 or in 50 years is 
of no moment as far as the principle is concerned.”60 But, extrapolating the effects of Malthus’s 
ratios showed that preserving one population entailed threatening other populations, and in the 
controversy surrounding what to do about poor people, industrialization, and popular ethics, 
policy debates often took paradoxical turns as people weighed the benefits and disadvantages of 
technological population management. “Keeping the two unequal powers equal” would require 
massive technological projects and governmental oversight in order to abrogate the universal and 
perpetual natural laws that Malthus proclaimed in his Essay. By arguing that the benefits of 
managing sustenance and procreation would entail making choices that would harm a large 
segment of England’s population – the poor – Malthus announced the prototypical importance of 
the Paradox for deliberations about how to use technology. 
 I suggest that, of the paradoxes that inhabit Malthus’s corpus, his population theory 
exemplifies a central paradox, a paradox ingrained in technological solutions to social and 
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political problems, what I call the Malthusian Paradox. The Malthusian Paradox posits the 
contrary capacities of technology to annihilate humanity and to preserve humanity from 
annihilation.  The material elements of Malthus’s Essay – industrialized mass production, 
agriculture, war, poverty, and population – indicate that one should understand the “principle of 
population” as a technological principle.  
 Two fundamental aspects of his “principle of population”––his concept of “positive 
checks” and his assessment of agriculture––best exemplify how Malthus articulated this Paradox 
in the Essay. Malthus’s concept of the “positive checks” to population growth demonstrated how 
technology threatened certain populations while preserving others. According to Malthus, 
“positive checks” bring population and sustenance into balance with each other by killing the 
excess population. Positive checks do not work alone to regulate population levels; they work in 
tandem with “preventative checks,” which are the prudence and “moral restraint” that people use 
when deciding whether or not to marry and procreate.61 Preventative checks are an essential 
component of Malthus’s population theory, but they are non-technological in character. In 
contrast, positive checks are rooted in whether or not a population has the technological capacity 
to assert control over procreation and death. Malthus listed numerous positive checks: 
“unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad 
nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the  whole train of common diseases and 
epidemics, wars, pestilence, plague, and famine.”62 That Malthus lumped phenomena that are 
clearly technological—factories, cities, and the means to wage war—together with more organic 
phenomena, e.g., nursing, diseases, and harsh weather, as external agents of population decline, 
implied that population management required technical control over all biological and behavioral 
aspects of human life.63 The more humanity can use technology to control these external agents 
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of population decline, the more it can preserve life. But, as Malthus always reminded his readers, 
the preservation of life would come at the severe cost of disaster once a population reached the 
Malthusian limit. If not left to run their “natural” course, “positive checks” required oversight to 
avoid both massive die-offs and catastrophic population explosions. 
 Malthus further implied that humanity could use these “positive checks” to reduce or 
eliminate undesirable populations, or so his critics extrapolated from his thought. One of his 
most prolific critics, William Cobbett, asserted in 1805 that Malthus did make this argument: 
“Mr. Malthus…has not scrupled to recommend checks to population, as conducive to the good of 
mankind.”64 In fact, Malthus tended to emphasize moral education as the solution to Britain’s 
overpopulation problem, and he was careful to clarify that he did not encourage war as a means 
to check populations.65 Nevertheless, Malthus made the willful destructive abuses of technology 
and their effects crucial variables for thinking about the problems of population management. 
 Thus when considering the first national census (1801), which showed that Britain’s 
population was exploding during a time burdened with not only the expansion of dangerous 
factory work, but also war and famine, Malthus wrote that, in “one of the most extraordinary 
facts in history,” at Britain’s exit from the Napoleonic wars, “not only were the wealth and 
population of the country considerably greater than they were at the commencement of the war, 
but they had increased in the interval at a more rapid rate than was ever experienced before.”66 
Furthermore, similar data showed that France’s population increased during the Revolutionary 
War such that Malthus conceded “considerable surprise” that the conflict resulted in an 
“undiminished state of the [French] population in spite of the losses sustained during so long and 
destructive a contest.”67 In these ways, as he surveyed populations expanding despite destructive 
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technological enterprises like industry and war, Malthus introduced technology as a factor for 
analysis and suggested its effects were not straightforward, but paradoxical. 
 Malthus’s assessment of agriculture best-exemplified the paradoxical way that he took up 
the question of technology. Malthus undermined the commonplace view that producing more 
food is always a good idea, and thereby rewrote the concept of agriculture as a primary cause of 
annihilation. According to Malthus, agriculture could prove too successful. Malthus argued that 
agricultural technology threatened populations first by empowering too much population growth, 
and then by failing to keep pace with the population growth it spurred. The resulting shortage 
would cause more and more death as the crisis would develop. Malthus wrote in the second 
Essay that “the want of food…is the most efficient cause of the three great checks to population 
which have been observed to prevail in all societies is evident from the rapidity with which even 
old states recover the desolations of war, pestilence, famine, and the convulsion of nature.”68 
Thus, of the positive checks, the technological failure of agriculture causes the swiftest die-offs, 
and the larger the population disparity, the larger the die-off. Agriculture preserves and sustains 
but, at the Malthusian limit, it exacerbates annihilation. The lack of food was the “ultimate 
check,” because it killed of its own accord, and because it led to further positive checks that 
hastened population decline.69 
 Malthus therefore asserted a skeptical view of agricultural technology. In the second 
Essay, he claimed that, “the fact is, that as no country has ever reached, or probably ever will 
reach, its highest possible acme of produce, it appears always as if the want of industry, or the ill 
direction of that industry, was the actual limit to a further increase of produce and population, 
and not the absolute refusal of nature to yield any more.”70 19th century advances in agricultural 
technology, such as the conversion of between two and three million acres of “waste land” into 
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cultivatable land, innovations in crop rotation, fertilization, drainage, rearing and breeding 
livestock, more intensive cultivation, chemistry, elimination of fallow, concentrated holdings, 
reaping and threshing machines, iron ploughs, and the publicizing of new these methods left 
Malthus nonplussed.71 All of these agricultural techniques proved that people could empower 
population growth, but none of them proved that they could provide any more than a small 
incremental increase of productivity during a famine or other food crisis. Malthus conceded that 
humanity could produce more food, and he welcomed any such increase to alleviate poverty in 
the short term, but such small improvements ultimately indicated humanity’s incapacity to 
prevent overpopulation rather than its capacity to meet population needs.  
 The combination of food shortages with political discontent in turn of the century Britain 
provided Malthus with a more specific example of agricultural technology’s paradoxical 
implications. In the second Essay, Malthus wrote, “had it not been for the [British standing 
army], the distresses of the people during the late scarcities, encouraged by the extreme 
ignorance and folly of many among the higher classes, might have driven them to commit the 
most dreadful outrages, and ultimately to involve the country in all the horrors of famine.”72 Far 
from delivering Britain from want, recent increases in agricultural production had empowered 
too many births. The “redundant population” subsisted, but when the dearth struck, famine 
erupted. These people might not have existed save for recent agricultural innovations, but they 
faced perishing from the failure of agriculture to increase productivity fast enough. Within this 
milieu, revolutionary spirit increased with increased misery and desperation. Hence for Malthus 
the technological paradox had severe political consequences: “If political discontents were 
blended with the cries of hunger, and a revolution were to take place by the instrumentality of a 
mob clamouring for want of food, the consequences would be unceasing change and unceasing 
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carnage, the bloody career of which nothing but the establishment of some complete despotism 
could arrest.”73  
 Paradox thus enhanced a simple understanding of Malthus’s complex population theory 
by demonstrating the competing preservative and destructive tendencies inherent in agricultural 
technology. According to Dale Cyphert, “the performance of paradox…yields authentic 
understanding.”74 In Malthus’s case, his population theory lent “authentic understanding” to the 
basic conundrum that what kills will save and what saves will kill. In Malthus’s formulation, 
even a technology as beneficial as agriculture gets implicated as a probable cause of catastrophe. 
The paradox of agriculture made the technological tragedy of Malthusianism plausible.  
 This Malthusian Paradox persists both as the specific iteration of Malthus’s population 
theory in a world where agricultural technology grinds along to keep pace with population 
growth, and as the general technological paradox that pits every machine’s advantages and 
disadvantages against each other. Malthus’s exposition of the positive checks showed how any 
assessment of technology made negotiating the Paradox almost unavoidable. After Malthus, 
apparent technological necessities for human survival, like improvements in sanitation, 
medicine, and agriculture, not to mention weapons, could appear “bad” because they kept too 
many people alive. This Malthusian extension of his “principle of population” shows how 
fundamental the Paradox is to technology in general: controlling disease, epidemics, pestilence, 
and plague with improvements in medicine and sanitation helped to sustain poor people, but such 
inventions kept them alive to face death in other gruesome ways. Therefore beneficial 
technologies needed to be further controlled, mastered, and manipulated in order to control, 
master, and manipulate ever larger populations. Malthus, by shattering the common conception 
that agricultural technology and increased productivity are good for humanity, re-conceptualized 
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agriculture as fraught with mortal danger. He made it apparent that no longer could any 
technology be conceived of in strict Manichean terms, and any rigorous technological argument 
must address both the “good and evil” of any technology.  
 For weapons proponents as well, this Paradox could not be avoided, but had to be 
rhetorically negotiated. At the most basic level, weapons advocates—acutely, of the most 
destructive weapons—have had to argue that the technological power to annihilate represents the 
technological power to preserve. In order to save and protect, one must have the power to kill 
and destroy. In this way, the Paradox confronts weapons rhetors with an argumentative dilemma 
that they cannot solve, but that they must attempt to rhetorically negotiate. In this regard, 
Malthus’s own rhetorical means of navigating the Paradox can be seen as paradigmatic. I 
therefore turn to an examination of how Malthus negotiated the paradox of his population theory.  
  
The Mathematical Sublime, Universal Generalizations, and Machine Antistasis: Malthus’s 
Rhetorical Navigation of the Malthusian Paradox 
 Malthus’s writings demonstrate that he recognized “technology” as both concrete artifact 
and abstract principle. The “principle of population” was a technological principle, Malthus a 
technological thinker, and his writings imbued with the paradoxes of technology. And Malthus 
was no stranger to argumentation and rhetoric either. His publications and personal 
correspondence contain innumerable accusations of his rivals’ fallacious arguments, bombastic 
rhetorical inventions to sustain his polemical jousting with friends and enemies alike, and 
fastidious debates over the definitions of political economy’s common terminology. Thus, as he 
navigated the paradoxes of his population theory by amplifying the abstract and concrete 
dimensions of technology, Malthus’s rhetoric was deliberate. He amplified the abstract 
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dimension with sublime geometrical and arithmetical ratios that presented absurd environmental 
scenarios well beyond possible sustainability, and with global generalizations of localized 
technological effects that made the Paradox appear universal. He amplified the concrete aspects 
of technology with a type of antistasis, in which the word “machine” revealed how a single 
device could become rhetorically imbued with so much simultaneous preservative and 
destructive power. These rhetorical tactics helped in the conversion of his “principle of 
population” into technological Malthusianism. Malthus’s genius was, in part, rhetorical—a 
capacity to find the means to popularize his population theory when caught up in such 
unsolvable paradox. In the longitudinal trajectory of weapons rhetoric, Malthus provided a rough 
outline of commonplace tactics to negotiate the Paradox, an outline from which weapons rhetors 
could draw in their own confrontations with the Paradox.  
 
The Geometrical and Arithmetical Ratios 
 Malthus proffered the geometrical and arithmetical ratios as statistical proof that 
humanity’s capacity to increase population far outpaces its capacity to increase agriculture and 
subsistence.75 The resultant numerical disparity indicates how the Paradox became an almost 
inescapable conundrum for technological population control. According to Malthus, the 
geometrical increase of people shows how populations double over short periods according to 
the progression 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, etc. The arithmetical increase of food production shows how 
subsistence grows according to the slower progression 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, etc.76 Should these ratios 
hold true, then human populations would soon reach unsustainable and calamitous levels. The 
first Essay used the ratios to describe the implausibility of American and British abilities to 
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increase agricultural outputs to meet a speculative spike in population, and the resulting 
calculations amplified the probable disparity to the point of sublimity.  
 In America Malthus found corroboration that population doubles every 25 years when 
abundance permits. So, according to the ratios, population would outpace food production such 
that the difference would be 4,096 to 13 in three centuries, “and in two thousand years the 
difference would be almost incalculable, though the produce in that time would have increased to 
an immense extent.”77 The ratio of population surpassing means of subsistence by 4,096 to 13 
may sound absurd, but it offered a clear illumination of the potential devastating effects of the 
“principle of population.” Catastrophe would ensue long before the ratios could increase to 
4,096:13. “In these ages want would be indeed triumphant, and rapine and murder must reign at 
large,” he wrote, leaving visualization of “rapine and murder” to readers’ imaginations.78 
Malthus conceded that this extreme disparity of 4,096:13 “could never have existed,” but as part 
of the stunning character of the ratios, he left the fate of the American population open to gloomy 
speculation.79  
 The impossible statistical disparities Malthus calculated from his ratios garnered both 
calumny and brief rhetorical glosses that indicate that Malthus was using a type of “mathematical 
sublime” to prove the “principle of population.”80 Because the ratios represented two ideal 
tendencies, few proofs of their exact numerical manifestation existed, and they therefore 
provided an easy target for his critics. Of the ratios, Karl Marx wrote in Grundrisse that, 
“Malthus’s fantasizing profundity expressed itself in a pure childlike kind of calculation,” one 
that “he has fished purely out of thin air, and which rests neither on natural nor on historical 
laws.”81 Malthus scholars have treated the ratios with more kindness, and the ratios have 
received multiple cursory rhetorical explanations. Bonar called them a “mathematical simile,” 
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Samuel Hollander called them a “polemical device,” and Anthony Flew stated that they “added 
an air of drama and precision.”82 That Kenneth Smith called them “bewildering” begins to 
indicate their rhetorical connection to the Paradox. Smith wrote that, “What Malthus does…is to 
make men’s minds reel in an attempt to reach infinity by counting,” and as the numbers become 
more and more implausible, they “serve to bewilder the reader; they serve to impress him with 
the overwhelming superiority of the power of population.”83 That a population could outpace 
agriculture 4,096:13 in 300 years is a bewildering and overwhelming ratio. Even in its 
speculative impossibility, the ratio amplified the stakes for how populations control their 
technology, because such an overwhelming disparity between population and food demanded 
attention. 
 Malthus’s ratios provided readers of the Essay with a stunning, overwhelming, and 
fearful sign of the Malthusian limit by amplifying the problem of overpopulation to the point of 
sublimity. In this way, the rhetorical function of the ratios derived from Malthus’s use of what 
Kant called “the mathematical sublime.” According to Kant, when the magnitude of numbers 
grows more and more enormous, “Our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, while our 
reason demands absolute totality as a real idea, and so [the imagination], our power of estimating 
the magnitude of things in the world of sense, is inadequate to that idea.”84 In the case of 
Malthus’s population theory, as the disparity between procreation and agriculture grows in 
magnitude and culminates in a ratio like 4,096:13, it becomes more difficult to grasp the total 
severity of the problem. The numbers are so large they both draw attention and defy simple 
assessment. Thereby judging the “principle of population” and its ratios, in the words of Kant, 
“strains the imagination (of expansion) to its limit.”85 The mathematical sublime thus inhibits 
understanding the enormity of the total claim.  
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 The speculative disparity of 4,096:13 may have strained the imagination, but it 
represented growth in ideal conditions. Before the ratios reach a sublime magnitude, one can 
understand the disparity between procreation and agriculture in a more practical sense. Thus, 
Malthus’s amplification of the ratios to the point of sublimity perhaps forced his audience to 
consider the overwhelming direness of the population problem, while a lesser disparity indicated 
that technology could be implemented to maintain a balance between the two competing powers 
of productivity before disaster strikes. In short, Malthus’s sublime ratios may have stunned and 
overwhelmed his audience, but they clarified the stakes of technological population 
management. 
 Malthus’s ambivalence regarding whether the ratios should be considered exact 
calculations or not further indicates that they helped to prove his population theory more by 
producing a sublime impression than by producing a rigorous statistical proof. Malthus 
emphasized the ratios in the early editions of the Essay, but he qualified his position on the value 
of “facts and calculations” in the second Essay, writing “Should any of them nevertheless turn 
out to be false, the reader will see that they will not materially affect the general tenour of the 
reasoning.”86 Malthus used the ratios as static, ideal representations that rigidified the chaos of 
life into a natural law. They represented “true” premises, but the exact numbers were “false” in 
most cases. While the theory was “universal,” the evidence was inconsistent. In spite of their 
statistical faultiness, they proved the general validity, or the “general tenor,” of the “principle of 
population.” The ratios tended to generate extreme conclusions, but a statement that Malthus 
disparaged reaching such conclusions in political economy further casts doubt onto whether the 
ratios should be considered exact or not. The “tendency to extremes is exactly what I consider as 
the great source of error in political economy where so much depends on proportions,” he wrote 
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in The Principle of Political Economy.87 Numbers and facts could vary without impugning the 
universality of the “principle of population,” because these inconsistencies did not disprove the 
“principle” per se. In contrast to demonstrating that a specific population must not pass an exact 
level of growth without providing an exact amount of food, which a strict reading of his statistics 
would indicate, the ratios’ “tendency to extremes” simply impressed that population was the 
paramount problem. 
 Britain provided Malthus with another opportunity to amplify the effects of the 
population problem to the point of sublimity, this time by using the geometrical ratio to 
demonstrate agricultural limits. By imagining agricultural innovation proceeding in a 
geometrical rate, Malthus, for a moment, adopted a position contrary to his own ratio.88 Malthus 
began by conceding that Britain might geometrically double its agricultural output in the 
upcoming quarter century as the maximum possible increase.89 With several recent food 
shortages this twenty-five year doubling could have seemed implausible, but still possible. But, 
Malthus averred that such a rapid initial geometrical increase in agricultural productivity would 
be brief and unrepeatable. He argued that a further geometrical doubling of the land’s agriculture 
in the next quarter century (a quadrupling of the original productivity), would be “impossible.”90 
Each time Malthus multiplied agricultural increases by the geometrical rate, the prospective 
ingenuity required to reach such feats approached the sublime. He therefore moved closer and 
closer back to his original position that agriculture increases in an arithmetical rate at each 
calculation. Britain did not possess the technological ingenuity to pull off the feat of quadrupling 
agriculture in fifty years, much less to pull off the necessary octupling of productivity in seventy-
five years, and so forth. In an era just after a string of famines, geometrical doublings of 
agricultural productivity sustained over many decades would not have seemed feasible in its 
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almost unimaginable depiction of abundance. Malthus indicated this sublimity with sarcasm: “In 
a few centuries it would make every acre of land in the Island like a garden.”91 He directed this 
cutting remark, and his British example as a whole, at Godwin’s conception of leisure-filled 
utopia. But at the same time, Malthus’s sarcasm amplified the limits of agriculture’s preservative 
power. With the conversion of Britain into an uninterrupted lush garden an unattainable endeavor 
that would require a mathematical increase in subsistence as sublime as his statistical predictions 
about American disparities between population and agriculture, Malthus intimated that practical 
attention to Britain’s overpopulation problem should not rely on agriculture alone. Rather, 
Malthus argued, the solution would derive from moral education and elimination of the Poor 
Laws, while Malthusians argued the solution would derive from the accumulation of better 
technologies for population control. 
 Once Malthus had portrayed the preposterousness of converting the entire surface area of 
Britain into a massive garden, Malthus again used his ratios to depict a more “melancholy 
picture” of Britain. If agriculture would not preserve everyone, it would destroy many. He 
forecasted that in a few cycles of statistical progression “we shall see twenty-eight millions of 
human beings without the means of support; and before the conclusion of the first century, the 
population would be one hundred and twelve millions, and the food only sufficient for thirty-five 
millions, leaving seventy-seven millions unprovided for.”92 The seventy seven million citizens 
struggling for basic survival were what Malthus called “the redundant population.” The 
Malthusian limit marked a boundary between those welcome at society’s “feast” and those 
shunned.93 This boundary, enumerated by the ratios, cast out a certain percentage of the 
population incapable of providing its own sustenance by portraying them as unnecessary at best 
and a threat at worst. Malthus’s prediction of so many people immersed in death and destruction 
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once again approached the mathematical sublime. The doomed population, seventy-seven 
million strong, would not be as statistically insignificant to British morality as they would be to 
British capitalism. The ratios thus defined those members of a population most in need of 
technological preservation in the face of probable annihilation.  
 Amplifying the ratios to the point of sublimity also amplified the urgency to manage and 
control this statistical remainder. Techniques to control the redundant population did not always 
focus on preservation, but often on abandonment or “checking” their growth. When the statistical 
disparity between the powers of procreation and agriculture were so extreme, the ratios thus 
seemed to rationalize the redundant population’s marginalization. Because most cases of 
overpopulation threatened the already poorer and powerless classes with starvation, conscription, 
and “unwholesome” jobs, the British government, industries, and military could continue or 
increase their poor treatment of them with impunity. Neither agriculture nor manufacturing could 
provide the redundant population with subsistence, so they were destined not to lives in an 
abundant garden, but to lives, in the words of Hobbes, “poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”94 The 
“redundant” will die one way or another. Perhaps of factory conditions, perhaps of war, perhaps 
of famine, but always a large mass of people sits on the brink of destruction unless ethical and 
effective resource management gets implemented. Malthusians, if not Malthus, thus regarded the 
poor’s superfluity and societal burden as a justification for harsh or brutal treatment. Their 
sublime speculative numbers warranted their getting checked before disaster might strike. 
Hence the logic behind Parliament’s codification of Malthusianism in the 1834 Poor Law that 
dictated an incremental increase in its harsh treatment of paupers. The technology of the work 
house was not meant to preserve Britain’s statistical remainder, but to eliminate them through 
profitable attrition and procreative deterrence.   
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 In later editions of the Essay Malthus revised some of his statistics to reflect new 
evidence without changing any of his claims, and he finally dropped the ratios from the 1826 
edition. But, Malthus did not drop the competing productive premises that Malthus intended the 
ratios to prove. Even without amplifying his ratios to the point of sublimity in the final edition of 
the Essay, his population principle still drew attention to the Paradox. The statistics made the 
population problem appear sublime, but after their removal the principles behind the ratios still 
implicated technology as the solution and the cause of humanity’s precarious relationship to its 
resources. In the decades after Malthus’s death, agricultural innovations did keep pace with 
population growth much better than Malthus anticipated. Global population growth exploded 
with many fewer shortages and famines. Malthus’s population theory, however, showed that 
large populations should not find solace in its agricultural ingenuity, but a warning that the larger 
the global population grows, the greater the eventual catastrophe. 
 
Universal Generalizations 
 Part of the mathematical sublimity inherent in imagining the outcome of Malthus’s ratios 
involves discerning the speculative terrible effects that massive disparities between population 
and agriculture will cause. According to Malthus, any large disparity between population and 
subsistence would cause catastrophic warfare long before it reached 4,096:13 or left seventy-
seven million to starve. Violence would become necessary in order to assure basic survival, and 
the greater the disparity, the greater the magnitude of violence.95 Malthus also tended to 
generalize the effects of his ratios to the entirety of the earth in order to prove the universality of 
his “principle of population.” His ratios worked in concert with his generalizations: once the 
ratios established war as the probable result of the “principle of population,” his generalizations 
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amplified the scope and severity of war to a global scale. Therefore when Malthus incorporated 
war into his universal principle, war became a universal threat. Malthus thus amplified his 
generalization to the point of universal abstraction, far beyond what he could prove from 
localized examples. By moving from localized examples to generalized abstraction, Malthus 
showed how both agricultural and military technologies trended toward situations that cause 
mass death, if not extermination or extinction, in an increasing scale.96 Specific technologies 
appeared poised to annihilate all of humanity in the same ways they annihilated local populations 
in the past. Because every society must abide by the “principle of population,” Malthus could 
promote any one local effect of his population theory as the speculative fate of the whole earth as 
long as it fit the general tenor of his “principle.” And Malthus chose to amplify the probability of 
horrific warfare. Agriculture will feed humanity to the brink of catastrophe, and weaponry will 
facilitate the ensuing collapse. Malthus seldom let mentions of war pass without magnifying and 
generalizing local effects to global scales. He amplified his generalizations about war in several 
steps that each increased the level of magnitude: he implied global annihilation by using 
hyperbolic language to depict a singular ancient conflict, he made a specific inductive argument 
that moved from an American example to a universal conclusion, and he amplified his 
generalization about global bloodshed to the point of abstraction. 
 As much as generalization was central to Malthus’s argumentation, he complicated his 
conception of the tactic by sometimes disapproving of its use because it supported the faulty 
arguments of his utopian rivals.97 At the beginning of The Principles of Political Economy he 
questioned the precision of generalization by asserting that the “tendency to simplify and 
generalize” causes rampant post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacies.98 In turn, Malthus objected to the 
utopian generalization that the unceasing accumulation of technological knowledge will solve all 
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problems, and he accused Godwin and Condorcet of being elated, giddy, and drunk from 
scientific induction.99 But by no means did his negative critiques of generalization lead Malthus 
to question the usefulness, if not necessity, of generalization for proving his population theory. 
Malthus used a basic deductive formula in the first Essay, positing his “principle of population” 
as a general premise and using specific examples to prove it, while in the second Essay he used a 
basic inductive formula, moving from his population theory and its supporting examples to make 
broader claims about humanity’s future prospects. In his preface to the second Essay Malthus 
wrote, “The main principle advanced is so incontrovertible that, if I had confined myself merely 
to general views, I could have entrenched myself in an impregnable fortress; and the work, in 
this form, would probably have had a much more masterly air.”100 But, as a point of 
methodology, Malthus endeavored to support his generalizations at every step with explicit 
examples. 
 Before examining how Malthus amplified his generalizations about war, it is necessary to 
examine how he advanced the “principle of population” as a universal theory. When Malthus 
moved from analyzing specific examples of his ratios, like events in America and Britain, to 
speculating about the fate of all people, his population theory underwent globalized 
generalization. Whether working with deductive arguments in the first Essay or inductive 
arguments in the second Essay, he almost always concluded his arguments with generalizations 
that amplified his findings about local examples by speculating about how they would apply to 
the “whole earth.”101 For instance, after examining some effects of British emigration on 
population change, he made such a generalization in the first Essay. He wrote, “But to make the 
argument more general and less interrupted by the partial views of emigration, let us take the 
whole earth, instead of one spot, and suppose that the restraints to population were universally 
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removed.”102 In addition to Britain, Malthus proved the basic validity of the premise that 
population levels are tied to sustenance by spanning the globe to find examples. Especially in the 
second Essay, Malthus justified his generalizations with the sheer evidential weight of many 
geographic examples. As his demographic studies traversed the globe in time and space, from 
ancient times to modern, from England to Europe, and from Europe to America, Africa, east 
Asia, southeast Asia, Siberia, the South Sea islands, and beyond, from region to region, he ended 
up transcending it. The “whole earth” proved his premises correct, and in the words of Robert M. 
Young, established his population theory as “a universal law, valid for all populations at all 
times.”103 Even as every society attempts different techniques to manage population and 
agriculture with varying degrees of success and failure, no society can escape the 
“incontrovertible truths” that abundance empowers procreation, famines check procreation, and 
unchanging productivity keeps population growth somewhat stable.104 Convincing his audience 
of the universality of this balance was Malthus’s greatest rhetorical achievement according to 
Arthur E. Walzer.105 After Malthus, the “whole earth” did take notice of the population problem.  
 In the first Essay, before making an explicit “whole earth” generalization about the 
effects of war, Malthus depicted a small war by amplifying the level of violence to imply a more 
general global catastrophe. Looking backward to an ancient conflict, the “barbarian” conquest of 
Scythian shepherds, he wrote, “Gathering fresh darkness and terror as they rolled on, the 
congregated bodies at length obscured the sun of Italy and sunk the whole world in universal 
night. These tremendous effects, so long and so deeply felt throughout the fairest portions of the 
earth, may be traced to the simple cause of superior power of population to the means of 
subsistence.”106 Malthus then reflected that, “In these savage contests many tribes must have 
been utterly exterminated.”107 This “utter extermination,” whether hyperbolic or not, provided a 
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concrete example of one population that destroyed another population in a war caused by the 
dictates of biological survival. It was an example Malthus could use to imagine a larger 
catastrophe. Knowing that Scythians were exterminated to make room for ancient colonists, the 
fate of an overpopulated entire earth appears even bleaker. It stood to reason that modern 
indigenous populations would meet the same fate as European colonies proliferated, according to 
the generalization of Malthus’s universal law of population. And by implication, overpopulation 
threatened the “whole world.” But, the magnitude of the “tremendous effects” suffered long ago 
by the Scythians would be much greater at the turn of the 18th century, with the mass of 
“congregated bodies” much larger, the “darkness and terror” greater, and not just Italy, but more 
of the “whole earth” affected. Thus, he amplified the ancient Scythian crisis to portray a problem 
of universal modern importance.  
 In the second Essay Malthus made a more specific inductive argument that generalized 
from specific examples of conflicts in America to amplify a universal conclusion that the global 
population could suffer a brutal war of extermination. He prophesied that, “If America continue 
increasing, which she certainly will do, though not with the same rapidity as formerly, the 
Indians will be driven further and further back into the country, till the whole race is ultimately 
exterminated.”108 Agricultural improvements did not provide liberty to the entire American 
population, and failed to provide moral protection. Domestic expansion of crops and 
manufactured goods came at the price of Native American lives. When European colonists 
proliferated, they wiped out entire native populations, counterbalancing sustenance and 
population with “positive checks.” Malthus took his empirical observations of violence against 
Native Americans and the universality of his population theory as impetus to generalize 
extermination and amplify a possible global crisis. Malthus wrote, “These observations [of 
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American Indian wars] are, in a degree, applicable to all the parts of the earth, where the soil is 
imperfectly cultivated.”109 But according to the skeptical view of agriculture that Malthus 
promulgated, he was asking his readers to imagine a scenario in which every population in every 
country across the globe would die in an unmerciful, horrific spate of killing. He was asking his 
readers to imagine a slaughter in which women and children get wiped out by invaders driven to 
commit atrocities by the simple dictate of biological survival. Given the results of Native 
American wars and American colonial wars, the result of such a war of extermination in “all 
parts of the earth” would jeopardize the survival of large populations on every continent, if not 
the near extinction of humanity. The universality of the “principle of population” implied to 
readers that they, too, might end up committing atrocities in a time of crisis, if not falling victim 
to someone else’s hatchet or bayonet.  
  Having generalized utter extermination from the local level to the global level, he further 
amplified his generalization of universal warfare to the point of abstraction. In the first Essay, he 
described how overpopulation and war combined to push the level of violence upward in an 
increasing scale of annihilation:  
Premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind 
are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of 
destruction; and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this 
war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, advance in 
terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success be still 
incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow levels 
the population with the food of the world.110  
 
Malthus thus imagined the result of such a population explosion as a depraved bloodbath. 
Unleashed within the framework of early capitalist empire building, “evil” reigns victorious over 
humanity’s ability to manage population levels.111 Malthus implied that, at the climax of this 
progression from “depopulation” to “war of extermination” and then to “gigantic inevitable 
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famine,” overpopulation will threaten humanity with extinction. The number of dead would 
accumulate as vices, war, weather, and various types of diseases each kill tens of thousands. 
Malthus portrayed the most destructive positive check, famine, as capable of “completing” any 
mass death by providing the maximum number of bodies needed to recalibrate procreation with 
agriculture, a number well beyond tens of thousands. He extrapolated catastrophic population 
crises not with one primary cause of death, but with them all operating in concert at a magnitude 
theretofore unknown. This catastrophic climax was an abstraction in part as he did note that 
population would “level” after all of the death and destruction, but this image of war made the 
catastrophe sound much direr than normal, more specific population readjustments. Furthermore, 
because of the universality of the catastrophe’s cause, this accumulated disaster was both 
repeatable and plausible across the planet, capable of unleashing unheard of and improvable 
levels of speculative violence. A global overpopulation crisis could level the population at zero. 
He thus abstracted his “principle” by speculating global destruction on a scale he could not 
exemplify. Basing his generalizations on empirical fact would have meant the “end” had already 
come. “Gigantic famine” would already have leveled global population possibly to the brink of 
human survivability.  
 Toward the end of the second Essay, Malthus repeated a warning “that the general 
principles on these subjects ought not to be pushed too far.” Concerned citizens, that is, should 
not harm the poor for the sake of “remote consequence.”112 But Malthus always pointed out the 
remote consequence, which tended to sound much more terrible than any misery arising from 
short-term population management. Malthusians therefore extrapolated a justification for brutal 
treatment of the poor from arguments that Malthus had made explicit in his treatises. Generalized 
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violence and war, as primary negative consequences of his “universal law,” appeared to be 
inevitable wherever people depended on sustenance, which was everywhere.  
 Therefore the way Malthus amplified local conflicts into a speculative global conflict 
implied that, as a correlate to war, weapons came to represent an amplified and universal threat 
as well. Paradoxically, weapons, by providing the means to check enemy populations, also came 
to represent a fortunate and beneficial way to recalibrate population with sustenance. The 
importance of amplified generalizations to weapons rhetoric and subsequent rhetorical 
confrontations with the Paradox derives from the way Malthus depicted the entire human race as 
imperiled. Malthus “proved” that the preservation of humanity would rely on the survival of 
catastrophic wars, and this generalization became a rhetorical commonplace that weapons rhetors 
could draw upon to argue that specific weapons could cause total world destruction or save it 
from annihilation. This imperiled collective fate became an undergirding rationalization for 
advocating and resisting weapons of mass destruction. Thus, Malthus’s amplification of warfare 
to the point of universal abstraction presented another way that he conceived the interplay of 
technology and population such that humanity cannot overcome the Paradox much less war.   
   
“Machine” Antistasis 
 Malthus’s statistical and argumentative imprecision carried over to terminological 
imprecision. In a letter to James Mill, Ricardo attacked Malthus’s denial of political economy’s 
mathematical nature by citing Malthus’s imprecise terminology. According to Ricardo, Malthus 
“thinks he may use words in a vague way, sometimes attaching one meaning to them, sometimes 
another and quite different. No proposition can surely be more absurd.”113 Malthus was not 
unaware, however, of the importance of terminological precision, as demonstrated by his debates 
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and quibbles about the definitions of “glut” and “value” that ran throughout his correspondence 
with Ricardo. He even wrote an argumentative dictionary, Definitions in Political Economy 
(1827), to define economic terms then in common usage.114 With such abundant terminological 
contestation arising from the emerging field of political economy, Malthus’s use of the word 
“machine” constitutes another important element of Malthus’s rhetorical negotiation of the 
Paradox.  
 “Machine” in both its literal and metaphorical meanings functioned in his population 
theory as a type of antistasis, or “repetition of a word in a different sense” wherein each usage 
alludes to different connotations of the term.115 Malthus used a literal meaning of “machine” 
when he described the negative effects of “unwholesome” factory work on the poor, and he used 
a metaphorical meaning of “machine” to refer to the capitalistic functioning of government. 
Although he disparaged “unwholesome manufactures” in his most specific engagement with 
technological artifacts, his attitude toward industrial technology remained ambivalent as his 
overall assessment of machines became more positive. Malthus’s switching between literal and 
metaphorical “machines” revealed an undergirding logic of industrialization: despite the 
problems of unwholesome manufactures, redundant people, and weapons production, capitalism 
and its machines improved society, so they should be tweaked rather than overthrown. Machines, 
in the metaphorical sense of government and capitalism, made technology appear a boon, but 
when “machines” materialized Malthus’s abstract population theory in a non-metaphorical sense, 
“the machine” reified the paradoxes of technology.  
 Malthus used the machine metaphor in response to his rival, Godwin, so first 
understanding Godwin’s usage is essential to understanding Malthus’s iteration. By no means 
did Malthus or Godwin invent the mechanistic metaphor for government. It was a banal 
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commonplace. Perhaps the most famous prior example is Hobbes’s. His depiction in Leviathan 
of an “artificial man” moved by engines, springs, and wheels condensed humanity, technology, 
and governance into one complex metaphor that drove his vision of monarchy.116 Hobbes, and 
other writers employing the same metaphor, can use the “machine” to examine a state either as a 
whole entity, or to examine a state by dissembling it into parts, thereby describing the efficient 
inner workings of government and any other non-mechanical process meant to appear effortless 
and beneficial. In Godwin’s case, he elevated the advantageous status of the machine in his 
philosophical paradigm because the “machine” operated as both the “vehicle” and the “tenor” of 
his metaphor.117 As the vehicle, technology would support humanity’s leisure by performing all 
of its toil and labor. As the tenor the “machine” connoted the smooth operation of a peaceful 
society based on universal liberation. Godwin rejected anti-technological attitudes as “uniformed 
and timid” as he described how to disassemble and reinvent the governmental mechanism. He 
wrote, “The progress of science and intellectual cultivation, in some degree, resembles the taking 
to pieces a disordered machine, with a purpose, by reconstructing it, of enhancing its value.”118 
Godwin’s machine metaphor for government was less vexed by dichotomous meanings than 
Malthus’s. The completed anarchist machine fashioned from “the confused heap of pins and 
wheels that are laid aside at random” from the dismantled government would run with precision 
like a machine and with machines.119 Machines both worked in Godwin’s utopia and symbolized 
how utopias will work as a society, and hence the metaphor complemented his politics.  
 Despite his political and technological disagreements with Godwin, Malthus used the 
machine metaphor for government without compunction. To question Godwin’s “main spring” 
of government (benevolence), Malthus proposed disassembling the British government into parts 
to contemplate reforms that might strike a balance between population and sustenance. 
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According to Malthus, “a society constituted according to the most beautiful form that 
imagination can conceive, with benevolence for its moving principle” will always revert back to 
an economic class system “with self-love the main-spring of the great machine.”120 The anarchist 
“main spring” would malfunction; benevolence would breakdown within Godwin’s political 
machine, wrecking it. Malthus therefore argued that rather than making order out of disorder, 
benevolence would make disorder out of order. A “main-spring of self love” may cause 
problems, but it would not break the entire government like, in Malthus’s estimation, 
benevolence would.  
 If the design fails, society must retool the mechanism. For Godwin, this entailed a 
complete disassembly and reassembly to the point of eliminating the state altogether to keep only 
its “main-spring” in operation. For Malthus, the “main-spring,” or “self-love,” of the capitalistic 
“great machine” must be retained.121 In the second Essay, the basic design of the machine 
remained intact. Malthus wrote, “The structure of society, in its great features, will probably 
always remain unchanged. We have every reason to believe that it will always consist of a class 
of proprietors and a class of labourers; but the condition of each, and the proportion which they 
bear to each other, may be so altered as greatly to improve the harmony and beauty of the 
whole.”122 In addition to demonstrating his political moderate-conservatism, this passage 
provides an alternative prospect for redundant populations. With proper management on 
governmental and scientific levels, as well as proper self-management on the moral level, 
redundant populations could be eliminated not through destruction, but by personal inhibition 
and prevention. This combination of techniques could save the masses from living in misery, and 
thereby save the state as well. Individualism is thus inherent to maintaining the “great machine” 
of industrial capitalism. 
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 The metaphorical use of “machine” depicted industrial capitalism as a preservative force, 
both for individuals and society. Industrial capitalism provided, according to Malthus, two 
important benefits to the entire British population – greater civil liberty for the individual and 
greater wealth and productivity for the state. Upon the introduction of new factory machines, 
“liberty came in their train.”123 However, liberty was not power for the poor, but for the state. 
Malthus made the benefits of machinery to the state economy most clear in Principles of 
Political Economy where he wrote “Like the fertility of land, the production of good machinery 
confers a prodigious power of production.”124 Producing more liberty and wealth for the middle 
and upper classes, meant the working classes engaged in “unwholesome manufactures.”  The 
working classes “improved” only in the sense that they, more and more, worked the dangerous 
occupations that garnered wealth for the owning class and stabilized the government by 
consolidating economic power. Liberty, for workers, entailed their capacity to exchange their 
labor for wages, rather than expecting entitlements, which may or may not come, from landed 
gentry and the government. As a devotee of Adam Smith, Malthus equated the freedom of the 
poor with the greater freedom of markets. And the poor were each free to turn the “main spring” 
with their “self-love,” but they remained powerless to do much else within the “great machine’s” 
economy. The machine metaphor simplified the complex predicament of the poor in relationship 
to the state, because it construed everybody, from the most destitute pauper to the wealthiest 
capitalist, as economically free individuals who could alter their situation by turning the “self-
love mainspring” of capitalism. 
 A few pages after his metaphorical use of “machine,” Malthus used the term in its literal 
sense. Wondering what ancient Greeks would think of watches and telescopes, Malthus 
conceded that humans possess a high level of technological ingenuity. But, he did not observe 
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any machinery that indicated technology would soon, or ever, free humanity from toil, misery, 
and population checks. In fact, the effects of machines were unknown. He wrote:  
 Persons almost entirely unacquainted with powers of a machine cannot be expected to 
 guess at its effects. I am far from saying, that we are at present by any means fully 
 acquainted with the powers of the human mind; but we certainly know more of this 
 instrument than was known four thousand years ago; and therefore, though not to be 
 called competent judges, we are certainly much better able than savages to say what is, or 
 is not, within its grasp.125 
  
 Observation of industrial capitalism’s machinery granted Malthus and his contemporaries a 
certain level of insight into the “powers of a machine” and its “effects.” But his judgment of 
“machines” was conflicted. The “great machine” represented the ideal form of governing power. 
But, destructive effects of literal machines were blatant and far from ideal. In comparison to the 
“great machine,” the actual mechanical devices in factories were, for workers, not-so-great 
machines. Malthus did not need to “guess at its effects” on the working poor, because they were 
obvious. 
 Malthus bemoaned the destructive elements of British industrialization in the first Essay, 
and noted that capitalism’s “great towns and manufactories” were home to “unwholesome 
occupations,” “severe labour,” and inadequate housing, all of which demonstrated the deleterious 
“powers of machines” as well as the failure of the “great machine” to alleviate them.126 In the 
second Essay, Malthus quoted “Dr. Aikin’s Description of the Country Round Manchester” to 
depict the degradation caused by new manufacturing techniques. In order to describe the 
providential “inconvenience” of the expanding cotton industry, Aikin reported that the cotton 
mills rounded up child laborers “of a very tender age” from far-flung urban workhouses to work 
long hours spinning: “The air they breathe from the oil, &c., employed in the machinery…is 
injurious; little attention is paid to their cleanliness; and frequent changes from a warm and dense 
to a cold and thin atmosphere are predisposing causes to sickness and debility, and particularly to 
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the epidemic fever which is so generally to be met with in these factories.”127 Factories and new 
machinery cast already poor people into worse destitution, ruined their health, and otherwise 
brought on their early demise by cultivating vice and misery in manufacturing centers. The 
cotton industry’s new spinning and ginning machinery thus exemplified how new technology 
born of industrialization introduced simultaneous state wealth production and human destruction. 
They increased the possibility of consumption and empowered employers to replace adult 
workers with children to run the machines.128 Despite bearing witness to these “powers of the 
machine,” Malthus remained committed to the belief that manufacturing, capitalism, the 
government, and technology could be reformed to alleviate the misery of the working and 
unemployed poor.129 
 Thus, what makes Malthus’s iteration of “machine” remarkable for weapons rhetoric is 
the way antistasis linked the preservative and destructive aspects of technology in one banal 
word. Rhetorical scholars I. A. Richards and Ron Greene have criticized similar machine 
metaphors, arguing that they cause misunderstanding and oversimplification. But in Malthus’s 
population theory, the way the machine metaphor exposed technology’s paradox shows that 
mechanistic metaphors function in a more complex way.130 In Malthus’s case, his “machine” 
antistasis expressed the complex material and ideological functions of technology in one word, 
which thereby expressed the fundamental paradox of technology. While new technologies 
contributed to the preservative powers of industrial capitalism, individual machines ruined lives, 
families, and cities, as well as they fomented class violence. Alienation of the workers was 
“within the grasp” of the “powers of the machines” as Britain expanded factory production. 
 Malthus’s choice to maintain the machine metaphor to describe the design of states, 
coupled with his refusal to grant that technology is powerful enough to undergird such a society 
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without causing widespread misery shows his ambivalent opinion of machinery. His choice of 
the metaphor may have been casual, but the instability of meaning that “machine” created in the 
Essay reified both the creative and destructive characteristics of machinery. While factories and 
state work houses threatened paupers with destruction, the strengthening of capitalism with 
technology caused the bourgeois to burgeon and manufactured an unprecedented growth in 
national wealth. Although antithetical to his conceptualization of machinery’s actual (as opposed 
to utopian) relationship to governance, the “machine” does reflect the complicated and difficult 
deliberations that Malthus considered when he made the ethical decision to oppose reformation 
of the Poor Laws.  
 Malthus’s use of the word “machine” also reveals another way that his work functions as 
an important pre-text for understanding the development of weapons rhetoric. The metaphorical 
and literal switching between different meanings of “machine” did not promote 
misunderstanding per se. Rather they granted insight into the conundrum of whether the biggest 
“machines” were advantageous or disadvantageous. They were both at the same time; machines 
both helped to constitute the working poor’s existence and threatened that existence with 
destruction.  
 In turn, Malthus’s machine antistasis has more specific importance for understanding the 
development of weapons rhetoric. Although for Malthus the “big” machine was the entire 
governing apparatus, the instability of his usage of “machine” framed individual mechanical 
artifacts as possessing an ominous power over people. And with the further popularization and 
circulation of the machine metaphor it became commonplace that one machine could both 
preserve and annihilate rival populations, if not all humanity. Rhetors could refer to the existence 
of one “machine” as proof of the ultimate preservative and destructive powers of technology. 
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19th Century Logics of Preservation and Destruction 
 The rhetorical tactics Malthus used to negotiate the Paradox—the mathematical sublime, 
amplified generalizations, and machine antistasis—integrated the increasing magnitude of 
technological activity with a complimentary rhetorical magnitude. Thereby his population theory 
helped to update the language of weapons, war, and politics to accommodate increasing 
populations, technological change, and bloodshed. Hence his rhetoric meshed well with 
contemporaneous rationalizations of war and weapons; it disseminated the concept that 
technology might be poised to affect the entire global population with catastrophic results at a 
time when industrialization seemed capable of delivering such a device. For this reason, 
Malthus’s expression of his population theory helps to make sense of some conceptually 
compatible military, industrial, and scientific logics that emerged from the first half of the 19th 
century that also sought to rationalize the preservation and annihilation of larger and larger 
populations.  
 In that era, military strategy adapted to use all elements of larger populations for war, a 
process well-exemplified by the Levée en Masse that aimed for total mobilization of France’s 
citizenry. As enemy populations strove to “exterminate” each other in both internal and foreign 
wars, and as more and more massive armies armed with new weaponry caused increasing 
destruction, a nascent concept of total war that called for complete annihilation began fomenting. 
Even evolutionary theory and its promulgation of the “survival of the fittest” attitude depended 
on Malthusian arguments. Malthus’s negotiation of the Paradox thus further makes an apropos 
pre-text with which to begin assessing the modern history of weapons rhetoric, because his 
population theory corroborated these concepts of industrialized warfare that further made a link 
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between technology and speculative global human extinction. Along with Malthus’s “principle 
of population,” these concepts extended the human, technological, geographical, and conceptual 
scope of war. 
 Malthus recognized the usefulness of hungry, jobless people to military conscription, but 
he somewhat underestimated their newfound importance. In the second Essay, Malthus depicted 
how the powerless statistical fringes of overpopulated societies could get harvested to die in war. 
He wrote, “The ambition of princes would want instruments of destruction, if the distresses of 
the lower classes did not drive them under their standards. A recruiting serjeant always prays for 
a bad harvest and a want of employment, or, in other words, a redundant population.”131 
According to this view, weapons innovation and procurement mattered less to military 
commanders than securing enough bodies to fight. Population growth empowered ruling bodies 
to wage war and “made wars more possible” for the simple reason that there were more bodies to 
die.132 In short, historian John Aberth noted that, “more infantry meant more violence for a 
number of reasons,” mainly their cheaper-than-cavalry maintenance and their expendability as 
superfluous commoners.133 Malthus argued that too great a population increase, though, would 
hamper the state’s ability to wage war because too many redundant people would divert 
economic and military resources to welfare and controlling internal tumult.134 Malthus also 
thought that wartime destruction was “abating.”135 But, Malthus did not foresee that weapons 
and strategy would adapt to killing the larger and larger numbers of people who became 
redundant to state economies early in the 19th century and then throughout the 20th century. 
Nevertheless, with weaponry and standing armies increasing at a pace closer to Malthus’s 
geometrical rate than his arithmetical rate, the context of the French Revolution and Napoleonic 
Wars lent another level of contextual credence to Malthus’s generalization that terrible violence 
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would erupt from global population growth. On a smaller scale, Malthus wrote in the second 
Essay that the “object” of Native American wars was “not conquest but destruction,” because the 
“life of the victor depends on the death of his enemy.”136 On the globalized level, this logic 
would justify unheard of destruction. Thus, Malthus’s importance to 19th century military 
strategy derived from the generalization – to the “whole earth” – of the Malthusian 
rationalization that demanded that enemy populations be driven to the point of “utter extinction” 
in order to preserve the biological survival of the victors. 
 Enlarging the scope of warfare to incorporate so many soldiers meant greater 
interdependence of industrial production, armaments, and citizens. Armies needed to procure 
more weapons, both in number and in power. As a correlation, the population explosion and the 
necessity to kill larger enemy armies empowered the increased mass production of weapons by 
providing more factory workers to manufacture them, and the expansion of standing armies by 
providing cannon fodder. In a circular fashion, the necessity of arming such large armies helped 
to fuel the expansion of weapons industries, which fueled more employment and procreation. 
Historian William H. McNeill used a machine metaphor to describe the transformation of 
soldiery as armies began using mass-produced weapons, “Soldiers…tended to become 
replaceable parts of a great military machine just as much as their weaponry.”137 War thus 
threatened redundant populations by increasing the likelihood of both their employment in 
dangerous industries and their death on the battlefield.138 Furthermore, a war can kill off a 
redundant population, or create one, if it ends before enough people die. For instance, when 
Britain’s army demobilized after the Napoleonic Wars, it caused an unemployment crisis 
because the army employed about four percent of the state’s entire workforce.139 Returning 
soldiers put a strain on the economy as they searched for work, and thereby created statistical 
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redundancy, since the home population, supported by the boons of capitalism, had increased.140 
Even massive wars, however, did not relieve the pressures of overpopulation as they fostered 
industrial expansion and did not preclude agricultural innovation and procreation.141 Weaponry 
and armies thus kept increasing in magnitude apace with the expanding scale of industrialization 
and general populations. 
 France’s Levée en Masse, its innovations in weapons mass-production, the attempted 
extermination of everyone living in the Vendée region, and the scale of French aggression from 
the revolution through the Napoleonic Wars exemplified the adaption of military strategy to 
population growth and industrial expansion. A literal Malthusian “total war” would implicate 
every person in a conflict over basic sustenance. In fact, Malthus stated as much in A Summary 
View of the Principle of Population when he reflected that “from 1795 to 1820, the greatest part 
of which time Europe was involved in a most extensive scene of warfare requiring all its 
population.”142 The Levée en Masse of 1793 marked a signature moment, because it, in theory, 
attempted to accomplish this feat on a national level by mobilizing the entire French population 
(30 million citizens). Before the Levée, for the most part, typical citizens were not targets of 
violence.143 But according to Edmund Dubois-Crancé’s 1789 dictum that “In France every 
citizen must be a soldier, and every soldier must be a citizen, or we will never have a 
constitution,” the Levée legislated universal militarization. It decreed that “all Frenchmen,” 
including women, children, and old men, “are permanently requisitioned for service into the 
armies,” to either fight or provide logistic support.144  
 The Levée remained more an ideal theory than an actual plan, but no other country 
rivaled France in its weapons production and its army’s size.145  Armed by a gunpowder factory 
that produced 30,000 pounds a day, and a rifle industry that produced 750 a day, the French army 
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– an unprecedented 750,000 strong – could swarm anywhere in Europe like none prior.146 
Without the Levée and a growing population (through procreation and annexation) to send into 
battle, perhaps the Revolution and the subsequent wars of aggression could not have been fought 
with such ferocity. The Levée meant that not only would all French citizens become citizen-
soldiers, but by extension so would all foreign citizens and any other population deemed an 
enemy of France.147 With France as their enemies, Britain, Austria, and Germany appeared 
compelled to build rival armies of comparable strength, which resulted in legislation similar to 
the Levée, such as the 1808 Austrian Landwehr that mobilized all men from 18 to 45 years old, 
the comparable East Prussian Landwehr of 1813 and its complementary Landsturm, which 
mobilized “every citizen” to resist invading armies, as well as a massive expansion of the British 
standing army.148 As if to justify such universal military expansion, population growth meant 
that more and more people were alive to die in war, and die they did. After the Levée, all of 
Europe became a probable site of military destruction, and all Europeans became enemies of 
foreign states. 19th century colonial expansion took the threat around the world.  
 With the distinction between soldier and citizen erased, strategy adapted to encompass 
killing enemy civilians. Pierre-Victor Malouet said in 1790 that, “There has been in this 
Revolution a character that belongs to no other: to generalize its principles, to make them 
applicable to all peoples, all countries, all governments.”149 Beyond the principle of political 
liberty, however, the revolution seemed to generalize the principle of extermination, as 
exemplified by the destruction of the Vendée in retaliation for its counterrevolutionary 
resistance. The atrocities committed by French revolutionary forces in the Vendée materialized 
the Revolution’s exterministic rhetoric and served as a microcosmic example of the level of 
violence that could occur on a global scale, at least according to the universal warfare Malthus 
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predicted.150 Liberty came at the price of blood. While the guillotine fell with regularity in Paris, 
in the Vendée, troops were ordered to kill everyone and everything to quell resistance. Georges 
Danton spoke of the “exterminating angel of liberty,” and “in the Vendée, the rhetoric of total 
war was fully translated into blood-streaked, exterminatory fact.”151 “War is declared upon all 
the oppressors of the world,” said Charles-Philippe Ronsin in 1791. Also in 1791, Jacques-
François Menou said “All the nations of Europe must learn that if ever we are forced to make 
war…it will be a war to the death…We will fight to destroy or annihilate those who have 
attacked us, or to be destroyed ourselves.”152 Anacharsis Cloots stated, “The French, like lions, 
will defend themselves in such a way as to leave not a single man alive, not a single tree 
standing…The land of France may be enslaved, but we will perish as free men, with our wives, 
our children and our cattle. So! Princes of Germany, monarchs of the north and south, there you 
will be bathing in the blood of an exterminated nation.”153 The revolutionary French Assembly 
saw the stakes as total, and it “took an oath to die.”154 “Through its amplitude, through its 
incessant repetition of its images of death, martyrdom, and extermination,” according to historian 
David A. Bell’s analysis, such “propaganda drove home a set of simple but potentially 
transformative ideas.”155 Bell concluded that these threats were not hyperbolic, but meant as 
earnest statements about the level of violence these politicians expected their armies and 
civilians to achieve.156 The level of violence perpetrated at the Vendée provided proof of their 
intentions: 25% of its residents died (between 220,000 to 250,000 people). Enemy states could 
expect to fall victim to the same level of violence, or worse, than that of the Vendée. French 
troops proceeded to massacre enemies in Cairo, Jaffa, Haiti, and throughout Spain.157 This 
complementary exterministic military strategy and rhetoric, like Malthus’s population theory, 
helped to generalize exterminism as a global principle.158 
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 Thanks to the French Revolution, the threat of similar upheaval in Britain, and outbreaks 
of machine breaking, a spirit of class-based violence surrounded the publication of the Essay and 
its later editions.159 Revolutionary conflict and degraded subservience to industrial capitalism’s 
factory machinery, which fomented revolutionary tendencies in the first place, confronted the 
“redundant population” with an unappealing choice between aggression and acquiescence. In a 
letter to Ricardo in 1819, Malthus asserted that a British revolution would be much more violent 
than France’s, and the “massacre would in my opinion go on till it was stopt by a military 
despotism.”160 Some workers, such as the Luddites, rebelled by destroying the machines that 
replaced them in factories, and others, such as the journalists of the “Pauper Press,” the radical 
working class journalism that flourished in the 1820s and 1830s, sought to compel the 
revolutionary massacre that Malthus imagined. The Luddite rebellion began in March 1811. 
Workers smashed the cotton machinery that had stolen their jobs, transformed their communities, 
and served as symbolic harbingers of widespread capitalist oppression.161 The British 
government responded, in turn, with the Frame Breaking Act of 1812 that made machine 
breaking punishable by death. Toward the end of Malthus’s life, The Pauper Press denounced 
Poor Law reformation, and promised “all-out war” in 1832. The loose collection of workers’ 
papers provided advice on the utilization of military technologies and tactics such as “street 
fighting, the use of small arms and ammunition, the effectiveness of moveable barricades, and 
the manufacture of explosives, combustibles and burning acids.”162 A year after the 1834 Poor 
Law reforms, James O’Brien, the “nonviolent” editor of The Poor Man’s Guardian wrote, “We 
had rather see our countrymen up to their ears in blood, than see them die by inches, the despised 
outcast victims of your cannibal legislation.”163 The exterministic rhetoric that flourished in 
revolutionary France had crossed the Channel. 
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 The growing scale of warfare in the early nineteenth century thus put new kinds of 
pressure on conceptions of “redundant populations.” The killing – both speculative and real – in 
the era that witnessed Malthus’s generalizations about global warfare, population growth, the 
militarization of citizens, widespread class conflict, exterministic rhetoric, and the strategic 
extermination of peoples in America, Europe, and elsewhere, could not culminate until conflicts 
approached becoming “total war.” The term “total war” did not originate until late in WWI, but it 
developed from the ways that strategy adapted to bring all of these generalized concepts together 
as an abstract military goal in the 19th century.164 In total war, defeating an enemy state requires 
destroying its military capability, its economy, its citizens, and any other contributing factor to 
state power. As precursor to total war theory, Carl von Clausewitz extrapolated the concept of 
“absolute war” from his observations of the Napoleonic Wars. Clausewitz saw Bonaparte 
unleash the “unlimited degree of energy” of “the pure element of enmity unleashed,” “total ruin,” 
and “devastating power” waged on “a scale that up to then had been inconceivable,” all of which 
made Clausewitz recognize the “absurdity” of restraint in combat.165 Rather than providing a 
limiting principle, in “absolute war” “all limits disappeared in the vigor and enthusiasm shown 
by governments and their subjects.”166 Bonaparte projected this attitude: “A man like me does 
not give a shit about the lives of a million men,” he said of the unprecedented death and 
destruction he oversaw.167 Despite such vitriolic rhetoric and the atrocities of the Napoleonic 
wars, the level of destruction committed by French forces seldom reached the ideal of 
extermination.168 Nevertheless, Malthus’s generalizations about the disastrous results of 
overpopulation provided a rationalization for aiming to exterminate enemies as a point of order 
to avert the Malthusian threat. Because Malthusian logic deemed extermination justifiable when 
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a population lacked any other technological means to subsist, governments transformed this 
justification into a strategy to promote state preservation rather than life preservation. 
 The problems of biological survival that confronted humanity with total war also inspired 
the evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace, who both used 
Malthusian inductive generalizations to argue that the history of specific species’ populations 
proved survival behaviors and tendencies for the entire biological world.169 For instance in 
Darwin’s notebooks, the biologist quoted Malthus that “‘the causes of population & 
depopulation have been about as constant as any of the laws of nature with which we are 
acquainted.’ – This applies to one species – I would apply it not only to population & 
depopulation, but extermination and production of new forms.”170 In this scientific iteration of 
Malthusianism, the combination of Malthus’s generalizations about humanity’s ultimate doom 
and the apparent universality of his population theory revealed the natural law that extermination 
to the point of extinction is inherent to survival of not only people but all species. Evolutionary 
theory thus appears to be a generalization of a generalization, and Darwin’s and Wallace’s use of 
Malthus’s universal population principle as the basis of biological evolution re-conceptualized 
the “principle of population” as the determinant factor that guides human behavior.171 Darwin’s 
analyses of animal species exterminating other animal species elucidated how extinction and 
survival depended on a species’ battle with each other over limited resources. Darwin’s 
generalization of Malthusian principles validated Malthus’s generalization about wars caused by 
overpopulation. And because Malthusianism derived from observations about Homo sapiens, the 
most obvious endangered species was humankind. 
 The later development of social Darwinism and the “survival of the fittest” rationale 
indicates how Malthusian generalizations about the fate of humanity radiated outward to 
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influence political rationalizations for innovating, adopting, and deploying more and more 
powerful weapons. Not only did Malthus bring attention to a universal population principle, but 
he also implied that humanity may face its ultimate destruction in scenarios where specific 
weapons help to determine the outcomes of wars in a suddenly overpopulated world. 
Technology, by preserving too many people from death, ushered in annihilation. Proof of his 
universal principle required the assumption that people’s aptitude for killing outweighed their 
aptitude for farming. Malthus theorized global overpopulation and global war at a time when 
industrialization, population growth, technological innovation, and warfare of all kinds seemed 
on the cusp of either materializing exterministic rhetoric or transcending these problems to 
preserve humanity, and therefore his population theory helped to elucidate far-reaching 
ramifications of how populations imagine their survival.  
   
Conclusion 
 Malthus, transformed into Malthusianism, thus did not disappear from debates about how 
to use technology to manage large populations both at home and in enemy states. Meanwhile, the 
technological threat to humanity and the impetus to save humanity from the brink of disaster 
increased after his death. The Malthusian Paradox became even more entrenched as more 
powerful weapons made concern about human preservation in the face of possible annihilation 
endemic. As armies and individuals developed their technological power to kill, they also 
developed their justifications for violence along Malthusian lines. No longer alive to contest his 
Essay’s appropriation, Malthus’s name was invoked to justify brutal aggression against poor 
people and enemies rather than calling for measures to alleviate poverty and conflict. The goal of 
maintaining a sustainable population legitimated the rhetoric of “extermination” as typical goals 
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for both states and revolutionaries. According to Ronald L. Meek’s scathing attack on Malthus, 
“Malthusian doctrines, in their present day forms, are encouraging preparations for war, and 
reducing opposition to the actual waging of war…After all, the advocacy of infanticide or the 
cessation of medical supplies to ‘overpopulated’ countries is not very far from the advocacy of 
more widespread and efficient measures to reduce the population.”172 Meek’s accusation that 
Malthusian arguments rationalized pernicious policies is correct. After Malthus empowered them 
with a forceful ideology, political actors, soldiers, engineers, and scientists could use the anxiety 
derived from overpopulation’s speculative implications to justify extermination for the sake of 
saving one’s own multitude.  
 So, if “It must be acknowledged that bad theories are very bad things, and the authors of 
them useless and sometimes pernicious members of society,” then judging Malthus becomes 
difficult. By naming overpopulation as a primary technological threat to humanity and by forcing 
humanity to confront it, he can be faulted for empowering annihilation while at the same time 
commended for warning us and bringing the predicament to everyone’s attention. He confronted 
humanity with the basic problem that construction is the source of destruction and destruction the 
source of construction. The Malthusian Paradox is thus a moral and psychological dilemma as 
much as it is a technological, political, and rhetorical dilemma. In the moral iteration, “It seems 
highly probable that moral evil is absolutely necessary to the production of moral excellence.”173 
And in the psychological iteration, Malthus conceded that while the Essay cultivated a gloomy 
outlook for humanity, he was “subservient to the important end, of bringing a subject so nearly 
connected with the happiness of society into more general notice.”174 Regardless of whether 
Malthus is judged in retrospect as pernicious or laudable, or his principle judged as good or evil, 
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in order to promote happiness, society has had to reflect on gloomy and unpalatable plans to 
control the balance between procreation and agriculture.  
 Of course, Malthus’s most dire predictions never came to pass, but the Paradox became 
more difficult for weapons rhetors to ignore. While population growth combined with 
environmental degradation has spurred much aggression in the years since his death, the image 
he predicted of a viscous global war for scarce resources in an overpopulated world did not 
materialize. With “universal conscription” at his service, Napoleon did not arm, supply, and 
transport his armies to the extent that technology could have empowered.175 Later, the American 
Civil War demonstrated the amount of destruction that an increased application of technology to 
killing could cause, as would the full integration of military purpose with technology in World 
War I.176 During this period, industrialized technology impacted tactics and strategy, increased 
the speed and ease of communicating over vast distances, equipped large and larger armies with 
weapons with the result that “the civilian was now responsible for providing the industrial means 
of war.”177 The ideal form of total war failed to materialize as well, but the scale of destruction 
increased nonetheless, even though the two ensuing “world wars” and Stalinism came as close to 
fulfilling his prediction as any other conflicts. “Redundant populations” did live under a 
permanent threat as much as they persevered. Amplified generalizations and bloodshed 
continued to circle around each other, even though the magnitude of destruction seldom matched 
the magnitude of the rhetoric used to describe it. 
 Just as Malthusianism has an ongoing history, so do Malthus’s rhetorical tactics. Malthus 
showed that it is quite difficult to address the fate of the global population without confronting 
the Paradox and its basic pitting of technological preservation versus technological annihilation. 
As a pre-text, Malthus’s “principle of population” shows how his rhetorical tactics derived, in 
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part, from contemporary debates about overpopulation and political economy, and then 
proliferated, transformed, and accompanied new rhetorical strategies used to debate new 
weapons. The pre-text was not a rigid frame that determined how weapons rhetors had to speak 
and write about weapons. Rather, it circulated a few rhetorical tactics and technological concepts 
that later rhetors could take up for their own inventions – tactics that meshed well both with the 
Malthusian ideologies and anxieties that framed the commonplace wisdom that the fate of all 
humanity is technologically dependant on the presence of WMDs.  
 Because new mass-produced weapons in the late 19th century began to catch up to and 
bring presence to the idea of global destruction, the following case studies demonstrate how 
weapons rhetors drew from commonplace Malthusian rhetorical tactics for navigating the 
Paradox as well as how they devised their own tactics to negotiate it. Somewhat similar to 
Malthus’s terminological inconsistency regarding the “machine,” August Spies used the 
instability of the term “dynamite” to imbue the weapon with vast power. Similar to Malthus’s 
use of statistics to prove the universality of his population theory, Amos A. Fries and Clarence J. 
West used statistical proofs to demonstrate the “universality” of chemical warfare. And like 
Malthus used increasing levels of amplification to generalize about war, Fries and West used 
increasing levels of amplification to indicate mustard gas’s destructive power. Spies, Fries and 
West, and Szilard all granted the weapon-of-the-moment a “global” power of destruction. That 
sublime statistics, universal generalizations, and antistasis have not disappeared from the 
language used to advocate, resist, and debate dangerous technologies indicates Malthus’s 
importance for understanding how the Paradox and weapons rhetoric interact. Thus, the framing 
of current political, critical, and popular reactions to overpopulation in terms of humanity’s 
technological ingenuity to stave off extinction is a crucial element of Malthus’s rhetorical legacy. 
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39 Malthus, second Essay, 312. To follow the abundant trend in Malthus scholarship, I refer to the 1798 edition as 
the “first Essay,” and I refer to the 1803 and subsequent editions as the “second Essay.” The reason for the 
distinction between the 1798 and latter editions rests on Malthus’s almost complete revision of the first edition in 
1803 when he excised the majority of the original text, revised what he retained, and added hundreds of pages of 
additional evidence. Less substantial revisions appeared in 1806, 1807, 1817, and 1826. His brief final statement on 
the subject, A Summary View of the Principle of Population, was a shortened version of an entry on population he 
wrote for Encyclopedia Britannica, in 1830. Unless otherwise noted, my citations of the first Essay come from: 
Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population and a Summary View of the Principle of Population, 
(New York: Penguin, 1970); and my citations from the second Essay come from Donald Winch’s critical compiled 
edition of the Essay’s latter editions: T. R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population; or A View of its past 
and present Effects on Human Happiness; With an Inquiry into our Prospects respecting the future Removal or 
Mitigation of the Evils which it occasions, ed. D. Winch, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
40 Many scholars of Malthus and Malthusianism have traced the public and private arguments about overpopulation, 
policies, and economics, and depending upon these authors’ foci, they foreground Malthus’s interactions with 
differing varieties of his critics. An extensive, but not complete, bibliography of contemporary responses to Malthus 
by other famous period writers, like William Godwin, William Cobbett, and William Hazlitt, can be found in D. V. 
Glass, Introduction to Malthus, 79-112. For a review of the principle criticisms of Malthus, see Avery, Progress, 
Poverty and Population; H. L. Beales, “The Historical Context of the Essay on Population,” in Glass, Introduction 
to Malthus, 1-24; Bonar, Malthus and His Work, 355-398; Meek, ed., Marx and Engels on the Population Bomb; 
Petersen, “Malthus and the Intellectuals”; and Smith, The Malthusian Controversy, 47-206. 
41 Bonar, Malthus and His Work, 1. 
42 In Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population, Charles Emil Stangeland reported the success of the Essay’s 
arguments prior to Malthus’s iteration of them: “From about the middle of the eighteenth century to the time of 
Malthus, the modern, so-called ‘Malthusian,’ doctrine, that population tendsto increase more rapidly than the food 
supply, found almost universal acceptance;--among French writers, by Montesquieu, Brückner and others, beside the 
Physiocrats and political philosophical writers generally; in England and America in the works of Franklin, Hume, 
Wallace, Steuart, Smith, Paley, Chalmers and others; in Germany in the discussions of Möser, Schloezer and 
Herrenschwand, especially; and among the Italian writers quite generally” (353-354). Ricardo, his friend and rival, 
argued with Malthus about many economic points, but conceded the “principle of population.” But among many 
attacks on Malthus, one of the most common holds that Malthus plagiarized this theory. Malthus admitted his 
intellectual debt to previous writers who examined overpopulation, especially William Paley and Adam Smith. 
43 Hasian, “Legal Argumentation in the Godwin-Malthus Debates,” 194.  Arthur E. Walzer posited a different view 
of the Essay, arguing that its rhetorical importance derived from Malthus’s use of Newton’s Principia as an 
organizing structure. “Logic and Rhetoric in Malthus's “Essay on the principle of population,” 1798.” 
44 Digby, “Malthus and Reform of the Poor Law,” 104. 
45 The Committee’s “Third Report spoke of the empirical testimony of other witnesses having ‘been confirmed in 
the most absolute manner by that of Mr. Malthus,’ and advocated emigration as a means of reducing redundant 
labour and decreasing pauperism.” Digby, “Malthus and Reform of the Poor Law,” 104. The Committee also 
recognized the destructive aspects of technology upon the poor. In part, the Third Report of the Emigration 
Committee reported that the government should facilitate emigration because, “in the United Kingdom there had 
been a ‘redundant population,’ in Ireland agricultural, in Scotland and England manufacturing; that one cause of it 
had been the unavoidable displacement of labour by machinery…” Bonar, Malthus and His Work, 145. 
46 Bonar, Malthus and His Work, 304-305 and 317. Although Malthus did not have a direct hand in enacting the 
1834 legislation, numerous Malthus scholars have observed his influence on the bill. Bishop Otter and Samuel 
Whitbread both noted Malthus’s impact on the Poor Law debates. Smith, The Malthusian Controversy, 296. Bonar 
claimed that “Malthus is the father not only of the new Poor Law, but of all our latter day societies for the 
organization of charity,” and that the controversial discourse that surrounded the Essay altered public opinion to 
make passage of the 1834 Poor Law possible (174). James P. Huzel, provided a review of secondary sources that 
tout Malthus’s “paramount influence in the creation of the New Poor Law of 1834.” The Popularization of Malthus 
in Early Nineteenth Century England, 3.  According to Larry Patriquin, “There can be no doubt that the period 1795 
to the 1830s was marked by a profound ideological shift, and that Malthus was the driving force behind this 
change.” Agrarian Capitalism and Poor Relief in England, 1500-1860, 15. Historian of political economy Anne 
Digby concluded in “Malthus and Reform of the English Poor Law” that, “The abrasive class character of the new 
Poor Law was thus rooted in the moral sentiments of Malthus” (167). Also see Ronald L. Meek’s introduction to 
Marx and Engels on the Population Bomb, 8. 
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 Lorie Charlesworth took the opposite position, arguing Malthus had little effect on Poor Law reformation, 
stating “the case for describing the 1834 reforms as Malthusian is weak, his views were largely abolitionist and the 
Poor Law Commission in 1834 rejected his position taking a positivist route to reform.” She named Jeremy 
Benthem as more influential in Welfare’s Forgotten Past, 14. Anthony Brundage named both Malthus and Bentham 
as the primary intellectual influences on the 1834 Poor Law in The English Poor Laws, 32-36, 40, 45-48, and 54. 
Digby has noted that several notable Malthus scholars (Patriacia Jeams, J. R. Poynter, and William Petersen) argued 
that Malthus had a limited influence on the Law. “Malthus and Reform of the Poor Law,” 105. 
 Digby parsed what was and was not Malthusian about the 1834 Poor Law: it was not Malthusian in its 
provision of emigration subsidies, the increased complexity of Poor Law bureaucracy, and “its failure to take radical 
measures to abolish poor relief. It was Malthusian if the Law is considered a step toward eventual abolition, in 
addition to containing checks to population growth that included the penalization of unwed mothers, the separation 
of sexes in work houses, the ending of “outdoor allowances.” “Malthus and Reform of the Poor Law, 105-106. 
47 Brundage, The English Poor Laws, 12 and 79-81.  
48 Malthus’s second Essay included this critique of history and advocated a method of population study rooted in 
statistical inquiry (26-27).  
49 J. J. Spengler addressed, in brief, the impact of the concept of perpetual technological “progress” on Malthus’s 
formulation of the “principle of population.” “Malthus’s Total Population Theory,” 58-61. 
50 Malthusianism has influenced recent writing scholarship across a variety of disciplines from policy analysis to 
science fiction. A representative recent study of the population question prepared by the Worldwatch Institute, 
Beyond Malthus: Nineteen Dimensions of the Population Challenge (1999), by Lester R. Brown, Gary Gardner, and 
Brian Halweil, described a wide range of catastrophic problems, all of which technology enables, props up, 
exacerbates, and must solve, such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, recycling, and forest and soil 
management.  As a typical example of the Malthusian Paradox, the book claims that technology will save humanity 
from overpopulation crises caused by technology in the first place. Robert M. Young reiterated the Worldwatch 
Institute’s technological solutions in “Malthus on Man,” 85, as did John Avery in Progress, Poverty and Population, 
115. Eric B. Ross examined how Malthusianism helped to justify capitalist hegemony over the poor from English 
colonialism to post-Cold War globalization in The Malthus Factor. Matthew Connelly argued that Malthusian 
population control is, although still quite influential, coming to an end to probably be replaced by genetic control of 
populations in Fatal Misconception. Alan Macfarlane examined how demographic knowledge helped England and 
Japan break out of the “Malthusian trap” of war, famine, and disease to spur economic development in The Savage 
Wars of Peace. Mohan Rao argued that attention paid to Malthusianism and neo-Malthusianism by managers of 
India’s public reproductive and health care created ineffective, if not dangerous, policies in From Population 
Control to Reproductive Health. William D. Sunderlin argued that three strands of Malthusianism affect 
environmental policy making: from the left, class-based anti-Malthusianism calls for poverty alleviation; from the 
middle, moderate neo-Malthusianism calls for prudent population management, and from the right anti-Malthusian 
makes moralistic objections to population management in Ideology, Social Theory, and the Environment. For a brief 
overview of Malthusian science fiction dystopias see Brian Stableford, “Man-Made Catastrophes,” 127-129. 
51 As Kenneth Smith noted in The Malthusian Controversy, if his critics “attack views which Malthus did not 
enunciate, but which were deduced with or without his consent from his work, this is quite a legitimate undertaking . 
. . What men thought Malthus said was as important in the eyes of his critics as the very things he did say” (48). 
According to Jacques Dupâquier, participants at the 1980 International Conference on Historical Demography, 
dedicated to reassessing Malthus, demonstrated that “Malthus has little in common either with ‘neo-Malthusianism’ 
or with what is commonly called ‘Malthusianism’” (viii). 
 Kenneth Burke wrote that “neo-Malthusianism” refers to “not the proliferation of people to their physical 
limits, but the proliferations of habits to their physical limits,” and especially the habits of capitalism and 
technology. Burke asked, “How long, the  admonitions of the neo-Malthusian principle admonish us to ask, can such 
a concept of ‘progress’ continue to engross mankind? Where do we reach the absolute breaking point, the degree of 
alienation beyond-which-not?”As such, an increase in corn production that seems to promise hunger relief can end 
up causing disaster owing to the over-application of pesticides and soil degradation caused by modern methods of 
monoculture: “By astute chemical transformations, corn can become the most paradoxical of things.” Attitudes 
Toward History, 298-300. 
52 “The Malthusian League,” a British contraception advocacy group, operated in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. 
53 See, for instance, Dónal P. O'Mathúna’s  “Human Dignity in the Nazi Era,” which traces a direct line of influence 
from Malthus to Darwin and Spencer, and on to Nazi medical ethics and practices. 
 
 
75 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
54 Quoted in Greene, Malthusian Worlds, 15. Ronald Greene went further to define rhetoric as a technology. He 
described how Malthusian rhetoric became a 20th century technology that seeks to control human procreation and 
potential overpopulation (15).  
55 Greene, Malthusian Worlds, 15. 
56 Malthus, first Essay, 68. 
57 Malthus, first Essay, 130. 
58 Bonar, Malthus and His Work, 85. Even his main argument became somewhat of an enigmatic puzzle, and 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson, in his biographical sketch of Malthus, called the simultaneous destructive and constructive 
“principle of population” that influenced Darwin’s development of evolutionary theory the “Malthusian paradox” 
(“Malthus,” 3). My use of the term “Malthusian Paradox” concurs that the “principle of population’s” emphasis on 
destruction and construction is key, but I differ by emphasizing that Malthus implicated technology as the lever that 
humanity depends upon to preserve itself when confronted by the unpredictable vagaries of nature. The result of 
construction or destruction rests on technology’s capacity to serve people. P. A. Jewell characterized the “principle 
of population” as the “Malthusian dilemma.” Jewell, “Species Diversity and Environmental Carrying Capacity,” 
365. Malthus scholar Donald Winch called his population theory “a universal and perpetual dilemma” (Malthus, 1). 
  Other commentary on Malthus’s use of paradox and his paradoxical career includes John Stuart Mill who 
wrote of “the principle of population” that “Though the assertion may be looked upon as a paradox, it is historically 
true, that only from that time has the economical condition of the labouring classes been regarded by thoughtful men 
as susceptible of permanent improvement.” Quoted in Winch, Malthus, 6 and James, Population Malthus, 109. 
Bonar, also wrote that “Paradoxically, Malthus, who was all his life never more rabid in his politics than a mild 
Whig, became a hero of the Philosophical Radicals [such as Mill].” Bonar, Fay, and Keynes, “The Commemoration 
of Thomas Robert Malthus,” 62. Historian of political economy Samuel Hollander commented that Malthus “left 
himself wide open for misunderstanding because of his love of paradox, argument, and provocation, as well as a 
certain carelessness in the use of terms.” The Economics of Thomas Robert Malthus, 950. Economist, John M. 
Pullen wrote, “There was at least one aspect of Malthus’s thinking about which even his severest critics could not 
accuse him of being muddled. This was, paradoxically, his adoption and application of the doctrine of proportions 
itself – ‘paradoxically’ because it was his use of the doctrine of proportions which more than anything else gave rise 
to his reputation of muddle-headedness amongst those critics who did not realize or agree with the importance he 
attached to the doctrine.” Pullen, “Malthus on the Doctrine of Proportions and the Concept of the Optimum,” 430. In 
his critical biography, Malthus, Donald Winch called Malthus’s defense of Adam Smith’s position on “self-love” 
paradoxical because the attack brought Malthus close to agreeing with Godwin “in doubting wheterh economic 
growth was always advantageous to the mass of society” (32). Winch also wrote that understanding his population 
theory is fundamental for understanding the “peculiarities and paradoxes” that mark the differences between 
Malthus’s social scientific and moralist personae (35). Winch wrote, “Paradoxically…Malthus’s theological 
commitments provide him with a teleology of improvement that acts as the religious equivalent of the secular 
perfectibilism which his Essay set out to undermine” (35). Although he did not mention paradox, Malthus scholar 
W. Petersen noted that Malthus’s Essay has been misunderstood because “part of the difficulty lies in confusions 
and half-contradictions that Malthus introduced as he developed his ideas over a lifetime.” “Malthus and the 
Intellectuals,” 366.  Jacques Dupâquier noted that William Petersen’s book Malthus Reconsidered was translated 
into French with an “apparently paradoxical title Malthus, le Premier Antimalthusien.” Thus, another way to 
characterize Malthus as paradoxical appears in this claim that Malthus was anti-Malthusian. See his “Preface” to 
Malthus Past and Present, viii. 
59 Malthus, first Essay, 71, paragraph arrangement altered. 
60 Ricardo, Works and Correspondence, vol. 8, 361. 
61 Malthus, first Essay, 89-90; and Malthus, second Essay, 23. 
62 Malthus, second Essay, 23. In the second Essay, Malthus excised two items, “vicious customs with respect to 
women” and “luxury,” from the first Essay’s much shorter list of positive checks. First Essay, 103.  
63 In Autonomous Technology, Langdon Winner wrote that the human drive to “master” nature involves “nothing 
less than the capacity of modern science to bring all of material reality under intellectual and practical command” 
(132). 
64 Quoted in James, Population Malthus, 125. 
65 Malthus, second Essay, 18. 
66 Malthus, second Essay, 257. In A Summary View, Malthus noted that the British population increased at a rate that 
would double the population in forty eight years (237). “[A]bout 6.5 million more people [was] being supported by 
the produce of British and Irish agriculture in 1801 than a century earlier” as the British population increased 70% 
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from 9.4 million to 15.9 million while “70-90 percent of the gain came in the second half of the period.” Chambers 
and Mingay, Agricultural Revolution, 3-4; and Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 46. Landes attributed the capacity 
of Britain to absorb this “rapid growth of population” that included, between 1750 and 1830, both a doubling of 
population in rural counties in addition to increasing city and town populations, to the rapid rural population growth 
that led to urban emigration, emigration to English cities from Ireland and Scotland, and the mechanization of the 
textile industry (115-116). According to economic and social historian L. D. Schwarz, “London, which had begun 
the eighteenth century as the great devourer of lives from the country, a town that absorbed an inordinate part of the 
country’s natural population increase and proceeded to kill it, was by the mid-nineteenth century as healthy as the 
rest of the country and no longer a death trap.” London in the Age of Industrialization, 237. 
67 Malthus, second Essay, vol. 1, James ed., 229. More than 300,000 French soldiers died in the battle of 1812. Bell, 
The First Total War, 258. 
68 Malthus, second Essay, 34. 
69 Malthus, second Essay, 21. 
70 Malthus, second Essay, 204. Malthus made his agricultural skepticism clear throughout the Essay’s many 
additions. In the first Essay, Malthus dismissed the “Fallacy of the argument, which infers an unlimited progress 
from a partial improvement, the limit of which cannot be ascertained, illustrated in the breeding of animals, and the 
cultivation of plants.” Malthus, first Essay, 125. In A Summary View of Population, Malthus wrote that the power to 
produce greater quantities of food “is obviously limited by the scarcity of land – by the great natural barrenness of a 
very large part of the surface of the earth – and by the decreasing proportion of produce which must necessarily be 
obtained from the continual additions of capital applied to land already in cultivation” (225). He also repeated his 
pessimistic conception of agriculture, writing that the “actual increase” of crop yields “is extremely slow; and it is 
obvious, that…long before a final stop was put to all further progress, their actual rate of increase must of necessity 
be very greatly retarded, as it would be impossible for the most enlightened human efforts to make all the soil of the 
earth equal in fertility to the average quality of land now in use” (225). 
71 Chambers and Mingay, Agricultural Revolution, 14, 35, 70, and 72; Ashton, Industrial Revolution, 27-28, 60, and 
62; and Landes, Unbound Prometheus, 69-72 and 76. In describing the agricultural revolution, Chambers and 
Mingay echoed the technological idealism reminiscent of Godwin and Condorcet’s utopianism that saw permanent 
sustainability for an ever-increasing population with the agricultural innovations of the mid-19th century (14). 
72 Malthus, second Essay, 244-245. 
73 Malthus, second Essay, 245. 
74 Cyphert, “Strategic Use of the Unsayable,” 90. 
75 Like many of Malthus’s claims about population, he was not the first to note the apparent geometrical and 
arithmetical increases of population and subsistence. Stangeland found the ratios in the “pre-Malthusian” work of 
Graunt, Petty, Saxe, Brückner, Mann, Suesmilch, Ortes, and unnamed others.  Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of 
Population, 354. Furthermore, the ratios can be traced to one of Francis Bacon’s double arguments in Advancement 
of Learning that claimed “Custom goes in arithmetical, but Nature in geometrical progression” (294 [VI.iii]); In 
Malthus and His Work, Bonar also located Plato’s Republic (V.458) as a source of the ratios, a claim that I find 
tenuous at best (66). The ratios have remained popular proofs of the “principle of population.” In 1968, Paul Ehrlich 
used similar ratios in The Population Bomb. Ehrlich (17-18). Ehrlich concurred with Kenneth Smith that “In a book 
about population there is a temptation to stun the reader with an avalanche of statistics…no matter how you slice it, 
population is a numbers game” (17). 
76 Malthus, first Essay, 75. 
77 Malthus, first Essay, 75. 
78 Malthus, first Essay, 139. 
79 Malthus, first Essay, 139. 
80 For a sample of the controversy, see David Booth’s criticism of the ratios and Malthus’s removal of them from the 
last edition (1826) of the Essay in James, Population Malthus, 400-401; and Engels, “Outlines of a Critique of 
Political Economy,” 222. Engels proposed technology as a remedy for overpopulation upon criticizing Malthus’s 
ratios. 
81 Marx, Grundrisse, 573-574 and 606. Historian David Hackett Fischer would label the ratios an example of the 
“fallacy of false extrapolation.” Historians’ Fallacies, 120. 
82 Bonar, Malthus and His Work, 66; Hollander, The Economics of Thomas Robert Malthus, 21; and Flew’s 
“Introduction” to Malthus, first Essay, xi. 
83 Smith, The Malthusian Controversy, 210 and 234. 
84 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 106. 
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85 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 128. 
86 Malthus, second Essay, 9-10. Edward Isaacson reprised this same claim in The Malthusian Limit, viii. 
87 Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 314. Economist J. M. Pullen argued that such ambivalence should be 
understood in relation to Malthus’s belief in the “doctrine of proportions,” which held that economists should avoid 
polarized calculations. He wrote that, “In the literature on Malthus it is not uncommon to find statements accusing 
him of inconsistency and illogicity. The complexity of his system and his failure to produce a clear and simple 
solution to many of the problems he considered are given of evidence of his muddled thinking.” “Malthus on the 
Doctrine of Proportions and the Concept of the Optimum,” 419. Furthermore, “Searching for the best balance 
between opposing tendencies,” as Pullen put it, well-described the entire purpose of the Essay – deciphering how 
best to manage the opposing tendencies of procreation and subsistence (432). 
88 Jacques Ellul later upheld the argument that technology proceeds in such a geometrical rate. In “The 
Technological Society,” Ellul’s second law of self-augmentation stated that “Technical progress tends to act, not 
according to an arithmetic, but according to a geometric principle.” (89). 
89 Malthus, first Essay, 74. 
90 Malthus, first Essay, 74. 
91 Malthus, first Essay, 74. 
92 Malthus, first Essay, 138-139. 
93 Malthus, second Essay, 236-237. The second Essay’s feast metaphor became one of its most infamous passages. 
In full he wrote:  
 A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom                     
he has a just demand, and if the society do not want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion 
of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature’s mighty feast there is no vacant cover for 
him. She tells him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders, if he do not work upon the 
compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up and make room for him, other intruders 
immediately appear demanding the same favour. The report of a provision for all that comes fills the hall 
with numerous claimants. The order and harmony of the feast is disturbed, the plenty that before reigned is 
changed into scarcity; and the happiness of the guests is destroyed by the spectacle of misery and 
dependence in every part of the hall, and by the clamorous importunity of those who are justly enraged at 
not finding the provision which they had been taught to expect. The guests learn too late their error, in 
counteracting those strict orders to all intruders, issued by the great mistress of the feast, who, wishing that 
all her guests should have plenty, and knowing that she could not provide for unlimited numbers, humanely 
refused to admit fresh comers when her table was already full.”93  
This passage garnered so much harsh criticism that Malthus excised this passage from the 1806 and later editions of 
the Essay. Its excision did not prevent future calumniation by rival political parties. For instance, the feast metaphor 
became a notorious proto-example of social Darwinism. In his critique of capitalism, anarchist political philosopher 
Rudolf Rocker wrote in Nationalism and Culture, that “Hobbes’ ‘war of all against all’ became once more the 
unalterable course of nature, which could be changed by no ethical considerations, and the advocates of ‘social 
Darwinism’ never tired of mouthing the gloomy declaration of Malthus that the table of life is not spread for 
everyone” (470). Also, the socialist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon used this passage as the basis for his critique of French 
capitalism, The Malthusians, in which he stated that “The theory of Malthus is the theory of political murder,” and 
economists “cannot conceive how, without some sort of an organization of  homicide, a balance between population 
and production can exist” (6-7). 
94 Hobbes, Leviathan, 70. 
95 Yet again, Malthus did not originate this link. It is ancient, a manifestation of the biblical apocalypse. One of 
Malthus’s intellectual predecessors for instance, William Petty wrote in 1682 that once there is “one Head for every 
Two Acres of Land in the Habitable part of the earth,” then “according to the Prediction of the Scriptures, there 
must be Wars and great Slaughter &c.” “Another Essay in Political Arithmetick,” 464. Also see Petersen, Malthus, 
173. 
96 In the words of Ron Greene’s Malthusian Worlds, “the principle of population serves to divide the national body 
into competing social bodies requiring the extermination of biologically dangerous bodies in order to protect and 
promote the life of the national body” (12). Claude Lévi-Strauss formulated a similar scenario: “Once men begin to 
feel cramped in their geographical, social and mental habitat, they are in danger of being tempted by the simple 
solution of denying one section of the species the right to be considered human.” Tristes Tropiques, 149. 
97 See for instance his chapter entitled “Of the Necessity of General Principles on this Subject” in the second Essay. 
98 Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 5-6. 
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99 Malthus, first Essay, 123 and 131. See Condorcet, Outlines, 343-344; and Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political 
Justice, 77-78. 
100 Malthus, second Essay, 9. 
101 Bonar, Malthus and His Work, 266. For an account of Malthus’s recalcitrance toward pure induction and 
mathematical analysis of political economy, see N. B. de Marchi’s and R. P. Sturges’s “Malthus and Ricardo’s 
Inductivist Critics: Four Letters to William Whewell.” 
102 Malthus, first Essay, 75. 
103 Young, “Malthus on Man,” 73. 
104 Malthus, first Essay, 80. 
105 Regarding Malthus’s rhetorical accomplishments, Walzer wrote: “Malthus discovered the importance (“weight”) 
of an idea (the principle of population) whose significance (“force”) to a philosophical and political question 
important to his contemporaries had not been elucidated.  By claiming that the principle was a universal, eternal law 
. . . he gave to it new meaning as a centripetal law of history.  This seems to me a just statement of Malthus’s 
achievement, and it is a distinctively rhetorical one.” “Logic and Rhetoric,” 15. 
106 Malthus, first Essay, 83.   
107 Malthus, first Essay, 84. 
108 Malthus, second Essay, 18. 
109 Malthus, second Essay, 18. 
110 Malthus, first Essay, 118-119.  
111 Malthus, first Essay, 138-139. 
112 Malthus, second Essay, 316-317. 
113 In the same letter, Ricardo further described Malthus’s problematic terminology: “the error, [in Malthus’s 
refutions of J. D. Say and Ricardo] is in his language, he appears to me not to be aware of the import of his words 
which he uses – they convey a totally different meaning to his mind, and to mine!” Ricardo, Works and 
Correspondence, vol. 8, 331. Ironically, Hollander wrote that, “Precisely what Ricardo intended [in this same 
passage] is unclear.” The Economics of Thomas Robert Malthus, 986. Furthermore, Bonar suggested in Malthus and 
His Work that the most problematic of Malthus’s imprecise use of terms derived from his metaphors, asserting that 
“The abundant metaphors of the first Essay had led to many misunderstandings” (418). 
114 Ricardo wrote to Malthus that, “With respect to the world value you have defined it one way, I another. We do 
not appear to mean the same thing and we should first agree what a standard ought to be, and then examine which 
approaches nearest to an invariable standard the one you propose, or that which I propose.” Works and 
Correspondence, vol. 8, 229. In the preface to Definitions in Political Economy, Malthus noted that, “The 
differences of opinion among political economists have of late been a frequent subject of complaint; and it must be 
allowed, that one of the principal causes of them may be traced to the different meanings in which the same terms 
have been used by different writers” (vii). Yet, Malthus conceded that his definitions were neither complete nor 
infallible, and he even questioned the entire plausibility of his undertaking. “I am strongly, indeed, disposed to 
believe, that in the sciences of morals, politics, and political economy, which will not admit of a change in the 
principal terms already in use, the full attainment of this object is impossible; yet a nearer approach to it is always 
something gained,” he wrote (260). 
115 Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, 16, emphasis mine. 
116 Hobbes, Leviathan, 5. 
117 Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 97. 
118 Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 576. 
119 Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 576. 
120 Malthus, first Essay, 144; and second Essay, 66-67. 
121 As if in corroboration of the confusion caused by Malthus’s terminology in general and the machine metaphor, 
commentators have ascribed other “main springs” to Malthus’s conception of government. An anonymous critic 
dubbed the entire “principle of population” as the “master-spring in this social and political machine.” Quoted in 
James, Population Malthus, 111. Jacques Dupâquier contradicted this passage in Malthus to single out marriage as 
the “main spring” of the “machine,” not “self-love.” He wrote that Malthus, “Nearly two centuries ahead of his time 
he was able to show that in Europe the institution of marriage furnished the central pivot of the regulating 
mechanism.” See his “Preface” to Malthus Past and Present, xii. 
122 Malthus, second Essay, 331. Also see Malthus, first Essay, 144. 
123 Malthus, first Essay, 179. 
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124 Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 360. Malthus defended his ambivalence, noting that the “evils” of 
machinery affected classes differently. He wrote, “it appears to me not a little extraordinary that I should sometimes 
have been classed with Mr. [Simonde de] Sismondi as an enemy to machinery” (352). 
125 Malthus, first Essay, 155. 
126 Malthus, first Essay, 103, and Malthus, A Summary View, in Malthus, first Essay, 250. 
127 Malthus, second Essay, 186. Numerous condemnations of factory working conditions, workers’ living 
conditions, and industrialists’ exploitation of children appeared, to depict the roots of Britain’s expanding wealth, 
economy, and upper classes. Friedrich Engels’s The Condition of the Working Class in England (1845) is perhaps 
the most famous. In John Fielden’s The Curse of the Factory System (1834), he wrote of child labor that: “in many 
of the manufacturing districts, the most heart-rending cruelties were practiced on the unoffending friendless 
creatures…they were flogged, gettered and tortured in the most exquisite refinement of cruelty, that they were, in 
many cases, starved to the bone while flogged to their work, and that even in some instances they were driven to 
commit suicide.” Quoted in Avery, Progress, Poverty and Population, 86. 
128 Malthus, second Essay, 134; and Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 352. 
129 His hope in industrialization grew in each edition of the Essay, as documented by G. Gilbert, “Economic Growth 
and the Poor in Malthus’ Essay on Population.” Gilbert argued, “Over a twenty-three year period of the simple 
analysis of a special type of growth inimical to the welfare of the poor is gradually qualified and at the same time 
purged of its anti-manufacturing overtones. Indeed by the fifth edition (1817), Malthus can marshal both fact and 
theory behind a relatively hopeful view of the benefits the working poor might derive from a growing national 
output” (191, emphasis his). 
130 In The Philosophy of Rhetoric Richards noted that “mechanical analogies” can cause misunderstanding by 
oversimplifying the psychological processes of understanding language that they are supposed to illuminate. (13). In 
his Foucault-ian critique more specific to Malthus’s metaphor, Ron Greene noted in Malthusian Worlds that calling 
a “governing apparatus,” a machine can also lead to misunderstanding. He wrote, “It is important not to reduce the 
idea of a governing technology to a machine, although machines might function as technologies that make a 
particular type of work possible or more efficient. A governing technology is both more and less than a machine” 
(8). 
131 Malthus, second Essay, 222. The term “redundant population” was not idiosyncratic to Malthus, but a common 
term used by contemporaneous political economists to describe people who served no function for capitalism or 
worked at its extreme periphery. “Redundancy” also applied to other realms of the economy, such as currency, about 
which David Ricardo and Malthus long argued. Regarding redundant populations, though, the two authors agreed. 
Ricardo wrote in his treatise The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817) that, “the substitution of 
machinery for human labor” is “the same cause which may increase the net revenue of the country may at the same 
time render the population redundant, and deteriorate the condition of the laborer,” such that “the situation of the 
laboring classes will be that of distress and poverty” (251 and 253). Although historians of political economy have 
enumerated the many theoretical differences between Ricardo and Malthus, both noted the contradictory tendencies 
of machinery to create and destroy people by providing employment, thereby a stimulus to procreate, and by taking 
away employment, thereby afflicting the unemployed. Ricardo’s treatment of the redundancy of people thus echoed 
Malthus. Hollander reviewed this debate in The Economics of Thomas Robert Malthus, 692-701. 
132 Cunningham and Grell, Four Horsemen, 98. 
133 Aberth, From the Brink, 63. Also, McNeill called population growth the “fundamental disturber” of French 
society that spurred the French Revolution, and the impetus of the industrial revolution. The Pursuit of Power, 185. 
134 Malthus, second Essay, 338. 
135 Malthus, second Essay, 43; and Malthus, A Summary View, reprinted in Malthus, first Essay, 254. 
136 Malthus, second Essay, vol. 1, James ed., 37. 
137 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, 141. 
138 Adam Smith, Malthus’s intellectual predecessor, noted in Wealth of Nations that “in a country of which a great 
part of the inhabitants are artificers and manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war must be drawn from 
those classes, and must therefore be maintained by the publick as long as they are employed in its service,” and they 
must be maintained by the public because of “the progress of manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war” 
(397). 
139 McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, 207-208. 
140 Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 255-256. 
141 Bonar wrote that, “Switzerland had exemplified the fact that Emigration does not permanently check population, 
but, on the whole, encourages it. France, at the time chosen [the Revolution], exemplified the fact that even the most 
 
 
80 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
destructive wars have a similar effect on the growth of numbers.” France’s population increased from 26 million to 
28 million during the Revolutionary period. To explain this increase Bonar pointed toward the industrialization of 
France which, like in England, led to more births than could be offset by war fatalities. He noted that “for war 
purposes…every new annual surplus of 80,000 youths above eighteen might be taken for military service without 
any diminution  in the number of marriages.” Malthus and His Work, 155, 157, and 161. Regarding concomitant 
wars, industrial expansion, wealth production, and improved agriculture from 1793 to 1810, Ricardo wrote “There 
has been an increased rate of profits, but it has been accopmpanied with such decided improvements of agriculture 
both here and abroad, for the French Revolution was exceedingly favourable to the increased production of food, 
that it is perfectly reconcilable to my theory [that the creation of profits attends the creation of wealth during wars].” 
Letters of David Ricardo to Thomas Robert Malthus, 8. 
142 A Summary View, In Malthus, first Essay, 231. Malthus also intimated the violent context of his Essay in the 
preface to the fifth edition (1817) by situating the original 1798 edition in a period of violence: “This essay was first 
published at a period of extensive warfare, combined, from peculiar circumstances, with a most prosperous foreign 
commerce” (Malthus, second Essay, 11). 
143 Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 30. 
144 Quoted in McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, 192 
145 Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 107. “The French Revolution saw the first real attempt to 
mobilize the scientific talent of a nation.” Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 106. 
146 Bell, The First Total War, 149; and Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 106-107. Napoleon 
disparaged rifles in comparison to muskets for their lengthy loading time, calling them “the worst weapon” and 
banning them in 1805. Headrick, The Tools of Empire, 87-88. 
147 Bell, The First Total War, 124 and 174. 
148 Bell, The First Total War, 252-253 and 296-297. 
149 Quoted in Bell, The First Total War, 115. 
150 Bell noted that, “during the Terror of 1793-1794…the idea of a total, physical extermination of France’s enemies 
did not remain comfortably theoretical…the torch of total war was first applied to a region of France itself: the 
Vendée.” The First Total War, 153. 
151 Quoted in Bell, The First Total War, 117; Bell, The First Total War, 161. 
152 Quoted in Bell, The First Total War, 116. 
153 Quoted in Bell, The First Total War, 116. 
154 Bell, The First Total War, 116. 
155 Bell, The First Total War, 146. 
156 Bell, The First Total War, 160-161. 
157 Bell, The First Total War, 212-217. 
158 According to Bell, “The rhetoric does matter...for it shows just how completely the French state had…rejected 
the older regime of limited war” (The First Total War, 143). 
159 Brundage,  The English Poor Laws, 25-26. 
160 Ricardo, Works and Correspondence, vol. 8, 107-108.  
161 In an anonymous threat to the British government, received by Home Office Secretary Richard Ryder, the 
“Luddites” wrote: “Every frame Breaking act you Make an amendment…only shortens your Days…there are fire 
Ships Making to saile by land as well as by Warter that will not faile to Destroy all the Obnoctious in…both Houses 
as you have been at a great Deal of pains to Destroy Chiefe part of the Country…The Remedy for you is Shor 
Destruction Without Detection - - prepare for thy Departure and Recomend the same to thy friends.” Quoted in 
Binfield, Writings of the Luddites, 1. 
162 Quoted in Huzel, The Popularization of Malthus, 197. Other Pauper Press editors and writers, such as The Black 
Dwarf’s Thomas Wooler, The Gauntlet and The Cosmopolite’s Richard Carlile, and The Radical’s James Lorymer, 
held similar violent revolutionary convictions, as did the popular and well-published anti-Malthusian William 
Cobbett (214 and 236). 
163 Quoted in Huzel, The Popularization of Malthus, 197. 
164 For an etymology of “total war,” see Bell, The First Total War, 9). 
165 Clausewitz, On War, 254, 706, 732, and 736. 
166 Clausewitz, On War, 717. 
167 Bonaparte supposedly said this in 1813 to Austrian statesperson Clemens Lothar Wengel von Metternich. Quoted 
in Bell, The First Total War, 206 and 251. 
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168 The most destructive warfare possible did not exterminate any nation, far from it. Later “total wars” did not live 
up to the ideal either. Roger Chickering, a historian of total war theory, argued in “Total War” that the term gets 
used so often, that its usages tend to stray from the strict concept to signify almost any conflict that gets described 
with hyperbole “in terms so extravagant that no war yet has fulfilled them,” or the term still gets used, but it gets 
qualified to fit less-than-total wars (18). Of the hyperbolic usage of “total war,” he further wrote: “‘Total’ is a 
powerful word. Its connotations are foreign to compromise, qualification, or nuance. When soldiers, politicians, and 
bureaucrats invoked the idea of total war for partisan purposes in times of duress, they indulged the rhetorical excess 
that was inherent in the concept from the beginning” (17). Furthermore, replacement adjectives for “total” get 
substituted, including absolute, hyperbolic, general, hegemonic, and systemic, while “The rhetorical disarray reflects 
a grave flaw in a narrative organized around the concept of total war. The narrative repeatedly misrepresents the 
history of warfare during the past two centuries, for its heuristic constraints elide varieties of military experience that 
violate the developmental patterns it prescribes” (18-19). 
169 Many Malthus scholars have written overviews of Malthus’s influence on Darwin and Wallace, among them 
Petersen, Malthus, 218-230; Young, “Malthus on Man”; and Keynes, “Malthus and Biological Equilibria.” 
170 Malthus, first Essay, 114. Also compare Malthus, first Essay, 268. Darwin quoted in Young, “Malthus on Man,” 
82. 
171 According to economic historian Robert Young’s “Malthus on Man,” Darwin considered “his theory as a 
generalization of Malthusianism” (82). Marx somewhat concurred that Malthus’s importance derives, in part, from 
his generalization of ‘brutality’ to “all forms of society” despite Malthus’s lack of solid proof. Grundrisse, 605. 
172 Meek, Marx and Engels on the Population Bomb, 48-49. 
173 Malthus, first Essay, 210. 
174 Malthus, second Essay, 9. 
175 Napoleon was, according to military historian Liddell Hart, “curiously indifferent to the opportunity of 
introducing new weapons, and his era of warfare was notably unproductive, though it coincided with the spring tide 
of Industrial Revolution.” Quoted in Brodie and Brodie, From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 108-109. 
176According to military historians Brodie and Brodie, “The American Civil War was a colossal proving ground for 
improved weapons of all kinds. For the first time the achievements of the industrial and scientific revolution were 
used on a large scale in war.” From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 133-134. 
177 The Brodies wrote of 19th century weapons that “There was abundant opportunity for experimentation with and 
testing of new weapons, and for a realization of the dizzying impact of science and the industrial revolution upon 
tactics and strategy. Communications were completely transformed by the steamship, the railroad and the telegraph. 
Armies were much bigger than before and more mobile; firepower was vastly more effective, thanks to the adoption 
of rifles and breechloading weapons of all kinds; and war became more destructive than ever in the past. The 
American Civil War cost 600,000 dead out of a population of 31,000,000 and the Franco-Prussian War was equally 
deadly while it lasted.” From Crossbow to H-Bomb, 124-125. 
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Chapter 3   
 
 
Bomb Talking: August Spies and Dynamite at the Haymarket Trial 
 
 
“We have preached dynamite!”178   ––August Spies 
 
 “REVENGE! Workingmen, to Arms!” read August Spies’s infamous circular of May 3, 
1886.179 Spies drafted, printed, and circulated the document in Chicago on a day of widespread 
strikes and a clash at the McCormick Reaper Works where strikers had attacked their 
replacement “scab” workers with sticks, stones, and bricks. The commotion at McCormick’s 
interrupted Spies’s own nearby speech to the Lumber Shovers’ Union. When he arrived at the 
factory, he saw strike-breaking police, led by notorious Captain John Bonfield, clubbing people 
and shooting at random into a large crowd of workers. Two strikers died. Cyrus H. McCormick, 
Jr. and the Chicago Tribune blamed Spies and his “incendiary” language for the riot.180  
 This May, 1886 installment of the then 19-year-old violent labor conflict at 
McCormick’s, a farm machinery factory, was precipitated by another strike the previous year 
that had forced McCormick to reinstate the wages he had previously cut. But in response to the 
workers’ temerity in that strike, McCormick installed pneumatic iron-molding machinery to 
replace those most responsible for organizing the strike.181 Later he replaced all union workers 
with scabs. These union workers and other unemployed Chicagoans did not remain idle as new 
machinery rendered jobs obsolete, and as replacement workers arrived from around the world to 
compete for remaining jobs. They took to the streets. 
 The clash at McCormick’s occurred on the third day of a national strike for the eight-hour 
workday. On May 1, 40,000 Chicagoans and 350,000 laborers nationwide had walked out. In the 
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years leading up to the eight-hour strike, the number of such labor protests had increased, as had 
the levels of violence and bloodshed used to suppress them. Much like Malthus’s London, the 
City of Chicago was experiencing an industrial population explosion that exacerbated the 
miserable poverty in which a large portion of the city’s population lived. In 1867, the state of 
Illinois legislated an eight hour workday to help alleviate labor problems, but employers refused 
to abide by the law. According to Spies, the implementation of “labor-saving machinery” was the 
“principle reason” workers demanded a reduction in working hours. Workers thought shorter 
workdays would prevent even greater unemployment.182 Chicago anarchists, of whom Spies was 
a principal agitator, viewed the eight hour issue as moot, since it would in no way alleviate the 
system of “wage slavery.” Still, in May 1886, they sided with the eight-hour movement in order 
to maintain and boost anarchist support among workers.183  
 May 1st and 2nd passed with little aggression, but residents of Chicago were tense when 
Spies’s May 3rd “revenge circular” called for workers to unite in resistance to the police violence 
at McCormick’s.184 In what had become a commonplace response to state interventions into 
workers’ affairs, Spies’s “revenge” circular concluded: “If you are men, if you are the sons of 
your grand sires, who have shed their blood to free you, then you will rise in your might, 
Hercules, and destroy the hideous monster that seeks to destroy you. To arms we call you, to 
arms!”185 Although the message was ambiguous, at Haymarket, someone threw a bomb. The 
dynamite rhetoric of the anarchists materialized, as much to their surprise as anyone else’s.  
 When Spies arrived at the May 4th Haymarket rally, he found a restless crowd and no 
organizers. After rounding up some speakers, Spies began the evening’s events by giving a rather 
tame twenty-minute speech. Albert Parsons, Spies’s friend and colleague, followed, echoing the 
familiar call to arms. “Americans, as you love liberty and independence, arm, arm 
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yourselves!”186 A few minutes later he demurred, “I am not here for the purpose of inciting 
anybody.”187 Samuel Fielden spoke last, and uttered the words that Bonfield used to justify the 
police raid, and for which he would have to defend himself in court: “Keep your eye on the law. 
Throttle it. Kill it. Stop it. Do everything you can to wound it—to impede its progress.”188 
Fielden did not speak long. With a storm blowing in, the crowd of about 3,000 dwindled to about 
500. Despite the peacefulness of the meeting, to which even attendee Chicago Mayor Carter H. 
Harrison attested, a force of 176 police officers under the direction of Captains Bonfield and 
William Ward closed in on the speakers’ wagon in double time from their nearby station. Ward 
ordered Fielden and the audience to disperse. At that moment a bomb sailed into the police ranks 
and exploded, killing at least one policeman.189 The police began firing their revolvers into the 
crowd “in wild confusion,” and they clubbed audience members without mercy and without 
discrimination as people fled the scene.190 According to some reports, Lieutenant James Bowler 
yelled “Fire and kill all you can!” and Bonfield prized a gun from the hand of a dead officer and 
shot with two weapons.191 Seven policemen died, most from friendly fire, and 60 were injured. 
An unknown number of civilians died and were injured. An apparent assassin planted in the 
crowd attempted to shoot Spies in the back during the chaos. Spies’s brother, Henry, intervened 
to save Spies and got shot in the groin. In Haymarket’s aftermath, Spies would be tried as a 
bomb conspirator—for “preaching dynamite”—convicted, and executed. 
But not before giving his most famous speech. Upon his death sentence he addressed 
Judge Joseph E. Gary’s court. In it “dynamite” factored not as mere metaphor, but as the central 
trope through which Spies worked through the reverberations of the Malthusian Paradox in 19th 
century middle-America. In order to argue for the plausibility of anarchist social revolution he 
had to imbue “dynamite” with the powers to wreak massive destruction on industrial capitalism 
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and to preserve workers at the same time. In one sense, Spies’s calls to explode capitalists and 
capitalist property with dynamite were then a commonplace of the anarchist movement, and the 
act of dynamiting perhaps best exemplified acts of revolutionary violence, or “propaganda by the 
deed.”192 But in another sense, anarchists like Spies touted a weapon, the technological means 
and manifestation of violence, as the world-historical agent of revolutionary change. Spies’s talk 
of dynamite was therefore a paradoxical rhetoric of technology much like Malthus’s, summoning 
technology in order to combat a world more and more beholden to it. But Spies was not a would-
be social engineer who sought to maintain an aging republican society amidst the industrial 
revolution. He was an activist, seeking to deploy “revolutionary” technologies to overthrow 
capitalism. Spies and his co-anarchists thus used a technological rhetoric of terrorism to advocate 
a classless technological utopia.  
As a nascent rhetoric of terrorism, the way that Spies spoke and wrote of dynamite would 
later echo in the ways that people framed fertilizer truck bombs in Oklahoma and improvised 
explosive devices in Iraq. “Infernal machines,” as dynamite bombs had come to be known, were 
assembled by revolutionaries at home with mass-produced materials, and promised immense 
political power for their small-time manufacturers.193 Dynamite bombs, however, never quite 
fulfilled this promise. As states and populations prepared for the “Great War,” a war of capitalist 
expansion facilitated by industrial technology, the Haymarket bombing provided a glimpse at the 
seeming futility of resisting military expansion with weapons rhetoric. 
To explore “dynamite’s” role in the longitudinal history of paradoxical weapons rhetoric, 
I divide this chapter into four sections. In the first section, I explore bomb talking in anarchist 
political discourse. Then I examine Spies’s “Address to the Court,” arguing that Spies used the 
instability of bomb talking to destabilize American politics. This instability of language is 
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observable in three of Spies’s crucial rhetorical tactics. First, he made elaborate turnaround 
arguments about the concepts of destruction and preservation that depicted destroying capitalism 
as worker preservation and destroying workers as capitalist preservation. Like Malthus’s 
generalizations about global warfare, Spies’s turnaround arguments amplified the political 
function of dynamite. Unlike Malthus’s anti-Revolutionary position, Spies used amplification to 
demonstrate that bomb throwing was a viable corrective to political and industrial violence. 
Second, similar to the way Malthus reified the “machine” metaphor with antistasis, Spies’s ironic 
“dynamite” metaphor reified his figural, more impractical exhortation to destroy the government 
as the literal, pragmatic, and immediate need for workers to prepare for self-defense. Third, Spies 
cultivated an image of himself as a martyr, and thereby he made a synecdochic generalization 
about his violent demise and the eventual demise of capitalism. I then examine how Haymarket-
era bomb talking proved self-defeating for the anarchist movement. I conclude by indicating the 
rhetorical legacy of anarchist bomb talking. 
 
Bomb Talking 
 Haymarket was the first terrorist dynamite bombing in the United States that gained 
widespread publicity, and it thereby gave presence to the rhetorical threat of random 
bombings.194 Before this clarifying event, talk of bombs had infused the public discourse of 19th 
century class conflicts, and especially that of Haymarket’s primary participants. At the 
Haymarket trial, Spies and his co-defendants spoke of dynamite. A lot. Their many appeals to 
destroy capitalism, its edifices, and its advocates with dynamite, and their high praise of 
dynamite constituted what Floyd Dell, a Chicago literary critic, poet, and radical journalist, 
called “bomb-talking.”195 But these threats of destruction and encomiums to dynamite were not 
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particular to Spies’s rhetoric, or to the rhetoric of other likeminded political agitators, but 
extended to the rhetoric of journalists and political authorities, both in the U.S. and abroad. To 
settle labor disputes, every party seemed delirious to blow up their adversaries. Spies thus 
participated in a common international discourse that upheld dynamite as the singular technology 
that would somehow sweep capitalists from power and destroy governments, or at least could 
symbolize as much. When Spies preached dynamite, he operated within a militant discourse 
underpinned by anarchist political theory and the possession of dynamite bombs by 
revolutionary-minded workers. Dynamite not only infused Chicago’s political discourse circa 
1886, but it pervaded the Haymarket trial, both in language and in material presence.  
 Alfred Nobel invented and patented dynamite after a sustained effort to produce an 
explosive that would ensure his family’s financial success.196 Nobel’s father, Immanuel, ran a 
large weapons business in Russia, manufacturing rifles, mines, cannonballs, mortars, and other 
machine components that supplied Russian munitions during the Crimean War. Explosives 
became the fulltime occupation of Alfred, and he began manufacturing nitroglycerine for 
commercial use in 1862.197 He developed Nobel’s Blasting Oil, a powerful, volatile explosive, 
but liquid nitroglycerine proved too prone to accidental explosions to remain a marketable 
product. Nobel’s subsequent invention of dynamite in 1867 made nitroglycerine “safe” to handle 
by using an absorbent material, kieselguhr, to soak up the liquid, which formed a putty. A 
cardboard wrapper prevented leakage, and a mercury fulminating (blasting) cap completed the 
packaged explosive. The same year, Nobel began manufacturing dynamite in twelve countries, 
creating an expansive international dynamite empire. By the early 1880s Nobel operated 93 
factories worldwide, and by the late 1880s he had patented Nobel’s Blasting Powder, or 
ballistite, a military-grade dynamite.198 In this period, “dynamite” became a generic term for 
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Nobel’s mixture, a mixture that people could imitate with ease by substituting other absorbent 
materials (most often sawdust) for kieselguhr.199 The global distribution of Nobel’s dynamite and 
the knowledge of its basic design made bombs easy to procure or make for anyone who wanted 
to throw them, whether state-sponsored soldier or revolutionary. 
 For anarchists worldwide, dynamite became a means to use an industrial technology to 
destroy the system of industrial technology. Revolution thus required both a rejection of and an 
embrace of technology. In God and the State and Statism and Anarchy, Russian anarchist 
Michael Bakunin revised the concept of “science” to undermine “the triumph of a brutal 
materialism” that resulted from the deification of science and technology.200 Bakunin’s 
humanized conception of artifice rejected the unthinking worship of technology, even as it 
welcomed any technology that would benefit workers.201 “Science” therefore stood between the 
workers’ quest to end the “perpetual and bloody immolation of millions of poor human beings in 
honor of some pitiless abstraction” and the bloody immolation of workers.202 Bakunin’s 
humanization of science resembled what has become known as the “democratization of 
technology,” or the political empowerment of all citizens with scientific and technological 
knowledge. For Bakunin, science “must spread among the masses. Science, being called upon to 
henceforth represent society’s collective conscious, must really become the property of 
everyone.”203  
 But such democratization had curious implications. Well-disseminated chemical 
knowledge of dynamite production in the hands of everyone, for instance, would facilitate 
liberation. This science in the hands of a few technocrats would facilitate enslavement. Bakunin 
did not propose any specific changes to technology; rather he proposed a change in the 
relationship of everyone to technology such that the masses would control it rather than the few. 
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Bakunin did not describe how transferring ownership would solve the problems of dangerous 
factory conditions, the production of dangerous products, and the despoiling of the environment. 
Yet, destroying the state with explosive science in a revolution that “spares nothing and stops at 
nothing” provided a more immediate, concrete solution for technological oppression.204 In the 
hands of all workers, dynamite could even the imbalance of weaponry with the state.  
 Another Russian anarchist political philosopher, Peter A. Kropotkin, shared Bakunin’s 
vexed approach toward technology. In “Modern Science and Anarchism,” Kropotkin defined 
anarchism in technological terms, describing it as a “world-concept based upon a mechanical 
explanation of all phenomena, embracing the whole of nature” as well as embracing scientific 
method. 205 He saw “perfection” in turn of the century industrial and agricultural techniques, 
claiming that with these techniques “a very high degree of well-being can easily be obtained in a 
few years by communist work.”206 Kropotkin further called for a fluid method of calibrating 
society, an anarchism powered by industry and machines.207 But Kropotkin dissociated “modern 
science” from the other industrial powers – states, religions, laws, militaries, and landlords. 
Anarchists must not destroy industrial technology as they would these other modes of power. 
Technology formed both a primary root of the problem and a primary root of the solution.  
 Most of the Haymarket defendants echoed these ambivalent sentiments toward 
technology.208 And despite their vehement political disagreements, anarchists and capitalists 
agreed that they could use the same tools, machines, and dynamite to achieve their goals. 
Dynamite in particular provided anarchist political theory with the apparent technological means 
to destroy the governmental machine. The dynamite assassination of Russia’s Czar Alexander II 
in 1881 showed that the “science” of modern explosives could work on a much larger scale if 
studying, making, distributing, and using dynamite became a point of emphasis for anarchists.209 
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Other weapons introduced during the American Civil War, such as rifled and breech-loaded 
artillery, repeating breech-loaded rifles, land and marine mines, armored trains, flame throwers, 
submarines, torpedoes, and steam-powered ironclads did not suit anarchist goals in the same 
way. They were too difficult or expensive for non-governmental entities like impoverished 
factory workers to appropriate, manufacture, and deploy. Other weapons also gained infamy in 
both revolutionary and mainstream presses during this period, such as the Gatling gun, the 
Winchester rifle, and the Colt revolver, yet these weapons cost more, and individuals could not 
reproduce them at home. Not so with dynamite. Dynamite’s design offered common availability, 
cheapness, and an easy way to make bombs.210 With dynamite costing about 40 cents per pound 
and individual bombs costing between six and fifteen cents, almost any daring individual could 
make them.211 For all these reasons German militant anarchist Johann Most recommended using 
dynamite bombs to carry out “propaganda by the deed” in Revolutionäre Kriegswissenschaft 
[Revolutionary War Science].212 And for these reasons, the Congress of Socialists of the United 
States, in part organized by Spies, called for revolutionary violence with such “scientific” 
methods.213  
 In fact, much of Spies’s career prior to Haymarket involved his prolific participation in 
this common international dynamite discourse. Spies’s May 3rd editorial on the eight-hour strike, 
which he published in his newspaper, Die Chicagoer Arbeiter-Zeitung, his May 3rd speech to the 
Lumber Shovers’ Union, and his revenge circular of May 3rd were workaday affairs, little 
different from his full-time agitation for workers’ rights. As such, Spies’s call for armed 
retribution differed little from his typical bomb talking as well as it differed little from other 
anarchist discourse. Spies’s revenge circular, for instance, echoed Most’s Revolutionäre 
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Kriegswissenschaft, which demanded “Proletarians of all countries, arm yourselves! Arm 
yourselves by whatever means you can. The hour of battle is near.”214  
 Spies made such rhetoric a driving force in Chicago labor politics. By the general strike 
of May 1st he was one of the foremost labor leaders not only in Chicago but in the United States. 
A German immigrant who arrived in New York City in 1872, Spies opened an upholstery shop 
in Chicago in 1876 as a twenty-year-old. The national Railroad strike of 1877 drew his attention 
to the plight of workers and the brutality of their suppression. The same year, Spies joined the 
Socialistic Labor Party [SLP] and its armed educational defense group, the Lehr-und-Wehr 
Verein.215 Along with many other disgruntled party members he dropped out of the SLP in 1880 
after the SLP ordered its groups to cut ties with the Lehr-und-Wehr Verein.216 Spies believed that 
the SLP’s democratic political engagement was an ineffective means to enact inadequate reforms 
in a corrupt system. In 1880 as well Spies became the manager of the Arbeiter-Zeitung, which 
became the most-distributed German-language paper in Chicago. He took over its editorship in 
1884.217 Among the multitude of socialist and anarchist newspapers in Chicago, the Arbeiter-
Zeitung played a key role in urging workers to action. Imprisoned after Haymarket, Spies 
continued contributing material to the paper by smuggling it out with friends and family.218 He 
also published in English in The Alarm, edited by Parsons. As a well-reputed and skilled orator, 
he advocated anarchism on lecture tours of the east coast and Midwest, from New York to 
Omaha. Spies’s integration into Chicago’s German working class culture also included 
membership in the Aurora Turnverein, a politically infused gymnastics club, and appearing in a 
labor-movement play, Wilhelm Rosenberg’s Die Nihilisten, which Spies co-wrote, in 1882.219 
 Through this prolific agitation, Spies garnered widespread international recognition.220 In 
1883 he became the secretary for the International Working People’s Association’s [IWPA] 
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Information Bureau and a member of its General Committee. The IWPA was the nascent 
anarchist revolutionary party that coalesced around two events – the refusal of a faction of the 
SLP to form a coalition with the Greenback Party, and Johann Most’s speaking tour of the U.S. 
Owing to Most’s influence, arming workers became a primary purpose of the IWPA. Spies 
helped to draft the IWPA’s 1883 “Pittsburgh Manifesto,” which called for the destruction of 
class-based society in its first resolution. It sold 200,000 copies in four languages.221 In contrast 
to Most’s sole focus on force and violence to achieve revolution, under Spies’s and Parsons’s 
organization the Chicago IWPA teamed with unions and labor groups to promote workers’ 
rights. One of many splintered forms of anarchist thought, Spies’s and Parsons’s brand of 
anarchism, the “Chicago idea,” advocated the combination of anarchism and “revolutionary 
unionism.”222 Spies did not, however, disavow force and violence, and his allegiance to the 
largest workers’ organization in Chicago, the Central Labor Union, led to the group passing a 
resolution that proclaimed all workers should arm themselves.223 Establishment Chicago 
newspapers, like the Tribune and Times, calumniated his name. They instructed journalists to 
report Spies’s most “inflammatory” and violent remarks to build public opposition to 
anarchism.224 Throughout all of these activities, Spies touted dynamite. 
 But Chicago’s anarchists did more than talk bombs, they possessed them. In order to 
make their revolutionary political agency plausible enough to substantiate their rhetorical threats, 
they had to have the capacity to wreak widespread destruction. Chicago’s anarchists believed 
that the workers should arm themselves for defense against state aggression and for the ultimate 
day of revolution. Dynamite thus became almost as prevalent in small arsenals as in speech. Co-
defendant Louis Lingg spent most of his short time in America before the Haymarket bombing 
manufacturing dynamite bombs. Spies’s newspaper and an anarchist saloon offered free weapons 
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training.225 Spies even kept bomb parts and dynamite in his desk at the Arbeiter-Zeitung. When a 
Daily News reporter visited Spies’s office, Spies gave the reporter a bomb casing and told him: 
“Take it to your boss, and tell him we have nine thousand more like it—only loaded.”226 The 
increasing prevalence of dynamite in Chicago and the increasing violence that occurred at 
various strike-related conflicts throughout Chicago seemed to foreshadow the bombing. “Have 
you any dynamite about you?” the Times’s Edgar Owen asked Albert Parsons as a group of 
mainstream press reporters joked with the Parsons family just before gathering at Haymarket.227  
 The explosion of the dynamite bomb at the May 4th Haymarket rally differentiated 
Spies’s most recent bomb talking from any of his previous utterances. The explosion marked the 
exact moment when, after years of calling workers to arms, he could be accused of inciting 
violence. He called for bloodshed; he called for dynamite. At long last, at Haymarket, from his 
vantage on the speakers’ wagon, Spies witnessed both. Someone in their audience, perhaps, took 
his words in a literal sense.228 During the subsequent trial, the defendants and their attorneys 
often admitted that they advocated social revolution, that the revolution would probably 
necessitate violence, and that the best weapon with which to fight the state was dynamite.  
Rather, the essential issue debated in Judge Gary’s court was thus whether the defendants could 
be held accountable as murderous conspirators when so many people in Chicago, across the U.S., 
and around the world talked bombs as much or more than they did.  
 With bomb talking was so commonplace in Chicago in 1886, Spies and his co-defendants 
were incredulous that the state used their “incendiary” language to charge them with conspiracy. 
In his courtroom address, Spies noted the hypocrisy of accusing him of publishing articles about 
how to make dynamite bombs when almost every paper in Chicago, whether radical or 
establishment, had published almost identical material.229 “‘But,’ says the State, ‘you have 
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published articles on the manufacture of dynamite and bombs.’ Show me a daily paper in this 
city that has not published similar articles!” he demanded.230 Spies had a point. In February, 
1885, the Tribune detailed how to make what we now call “time bombs,” as well as hat bombs, 
bottle bombs, fuse-less grenades, various types of gunpowder, and dynamite bombs.231 The 
Chicago Times recommended dynamiting strikers with hand grenades.232  
 Yet, without his bomb talking the state had no means to try Spies for conspiracy. Lacking 
reliable witnesses, pertinent physical evidence, and the identity of the bomber, the prosecution 
focused on Spies’s speeches and writings as the only causal connection between him and the 
Haymarket bomb. Numerous editions of the Arbeiter-Zeitung and The Alarm became state’s 
evidence, along with Most’s Revolutionäre Kriegswissenschaft, because they contained explicit 
instructions about how to build dynamite bombs. Spies had even published an editorial in 
Arbeiter-Zeitung on the day of the Haymarket bombing to decry the killings at the McCormick 
clash, which read “with good weapons and one single dynamite bomb, not one of the murderers 
would have escaped his well-deserved fate.”233 Spies published a comparable article by Schwab 
in the same issue that also demanded violent revenge. Witnesses testified to the threats made by 
the defendants in speeches throughout the city.234 Although the amount of threatening literature 
was voluminous, the defense team noted that all such material “was general in its character,” 
and therefore so-called incendiary articles had no direct connection to the Haymarket 
bombing.235 Rather, they claimed the prosecution introduced these writings to appeal to the 
jury’s fears and prejudices.236 
 In addition to anarchist literature, the state produced ample physical evidence to sway the 
jury.237 The defendants’ attorneys accused the state of “parading” a large array of bomb-related 
artifacts and persons in front of the jury to give material presence to the defendants’ bomb 
 
 
95 
 
talking. In his opening argument, prosecuting attorney Ingham admitted as much: “We expect to 
bring into court dynamite bombs by the dozen, and until the dozens run up into barrels. No bomb 
which we shall trace to these defendants can have any possible legitimate purpose. We shall 
show by men of science that dynamite bombs cannot be used for anything else but for cowardly 
and atrocious murder.”238 A wide sampling of various dynamite bombs littered the courtroom’s 
floor during Chicago Police Captain Michael Schaack’s testimony: bomb fragments removed 
from policeman Mathias Degan’s corpse, bloody, shrapnel-pierced police uniforms of dubious 
origin, fragments of objects blown up with dynamite seized during illegal raids of suspected 
anarchists, photographs of random bombs, Engel’s small, unused metal furnace, and the 
dynamite and bomb parts that Spies kept in his desk at the Arbeiter-Zeitung building.239 Injured 
policemen displayed and described their injuries. And the jury convicted the eight men. 
 Dynamite was the weapon of the moment. It was prevalent both in word and in arsenals, 
at the Haymarket, at the trial, and beyond. And the trial did not dampen the “dynamite orators’” 
incendiary words.240 It served as another platform to champion their cause, and in their final 
addresses to the court, the bomb talking continued. They refused to acknowledge that their calls 
to arms with dynamite had caused the Haymarket bombing, and several of them sounded just as 
incendiary upon their sentencing as they sounded before the bombing. Lingg said, “I tell you 
frankly and openly, I am for force. I have already told Captain Schaack, ‘If they use cannons 
against us, we shall use dynamite against them.’”241 Engel said, “No power on earth can rob the 
workingman of his knowledge of how to make dynamite bombs—and that knowledge he 
possesses.”242 Furthermore, “Nor do I deny, that I, too, have spoken at meetings, saying that, if 
every workingman had a bomb in his pocket, capitalistic rule would soon come to an end.”243 
Parsons claimed, as further proof of Lingg’s innocence in manufacturing the Haymarket bomb, 
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that Lingg’s bomb would have proven much more destructive, because as he twice said, 
“dynamite is an explosive which annihilates its victims.”244  
 Spies, too, did not cease talking bombs. Rather, he drew from the common international 
dynamite discourse as a source of rhetorical invention. In his address to the court, Spies asserted 
that, “From their [the state’s] testimony one is forced to conclude that we had, in our speeches 
and publications, preached nothing else but destruction and dynamite.”245 Spies embraced the 
accusation. “We have preached dynamite!” he proclaimed. “We have said to the toilers, that 
science had penetrated the mystery of nature—that from Jove’s head has sprung a Minerva—
dynamite!”246 Dynamite, hailed as the means to annihilate capitalism and as the means to 
preserve the working class, pushed Spies into a direct confrontation with the Malthusian 
Paradox. The fate of anarchism as a viable American political movement was in 1886 tied to the 
success or failure of bomb talking to motivate revolution. Anarchism would live or die by bomb 
talking. Spies had lived by bomb talking. And he would die from bomb talking. 
  
August Spies’s Address to the Court: Turnaround Arguments, The Polysemy of Dynamite,  
and Self-Martyrdom  
 Throughout the trial, bomb talking and the Haymarket dynamite bomb had combined to 
prove the conspiratorial guilt of Spies. The prosecution’s case hinged upon the connection 
between Spies’s rhetoric and the unknown bomber’s weapon. When Judge Gary denied the 
defense’s request for a retrial, held up the court’s death sentences, and granted the convicted men 
a chance to address the court on October 7, 1886, the audience was attuned to how Spies would 
speak about dynamite. Spies delivered the first speech, speaking for about two hours. He argued 
that he had nothing to do with the bomb throwing; that the bomber remained unknown, making a 
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charge of conspiracy impossible to prove; that Chicago’s police force was corrupt and had 
kidnapped his main alibi; that the state had mounted an illegal prosecution by buying the 
witnesses who testified against him, and by handpicking a jury that would convict regardless of 
the case presented; that the prosecution tried them for believing in anarchism rather than for 
murder; and that the state would murder innocent men.247 
 But Spies did more. In a context where anarchists, capitalists, journalists, and industry 
could use dynamite for simultaneous contested military, political, and symbolic purposes, he 
made important technological arguments that demonstrated how both the ubiquity of dynamite 
and that of bomb talking created not only volatile and unstable situations, but also the occasion 
for volatile and unstable speech. The ubiquity of bomb talking brought instability to language as 
words used so profusely took on literal, symbolic, ironical, and historical senses. As an anarchist 
agitator, Spies used this instability rhetorically to create political instability. And Spies found in 
the instability of dynamite a model for how to negotiate the logical instability of the Malthusian 
Paradox. The presence of paradox empowered Spies to delve into logical instability in his 
courtroom address, both pointing out its presence and exploiting it with his bomb talking.  
 In his address to the court, Spies exploited the rhetorical and logical instability of bomb 
talking in several ways. He used this instability to construct turnaround arguments about the 
power of dynamite to either annihilate capitalists and anarchists or to preserve them. He 
articulated that the various rhetorical purposes and meanings of bomb talking produced a 
multitude of meanings, some of which were beyond his control. And Spies cultivated himself as 
a martyr whose executed body was freighted with the paradoxical tensions of whether workers 
would be technologically destroyed or liberated.  
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Turnaround Arguments 
 One of the curious possibilities afforded by paradox in general, and the Malthusian 
Paradox in particular, is that of antistrephon, or turning arguments against each other. Because 
paradox holds two seemingly opposing positions at once, it facilitates rhetorical turning, changes 
in argumentative direction, and the appropriation of argumentation and evidence to prove 
competing claims. By using turnaround arguments, rhetors may do more than negotiate paradox. 
They may exploit it. Spies used the logical instability afforded by paradox to construct 
turnaround arguments about how dynamite facilitated political destruction and preservation in 
order to situate the legal relationship of revolutionaries to the government. What the state viewed 
as preservative – capitalism – Spies viewed as destructive, and what the state viewed as 
destructive – anarchism – Spies viewed as preservative. Spies therefore turned the state’s 
evidence against him into evidence against the state. As Spies spun defense from attack and spun 
attack from defense, the concepts of “destruction” and “preservation” swirled around each other 
with increasing intensity. “Destruction,” according to Spies, meant capitalism’s annihilation of 
workers, while “destruction,” according to the state, meant anarchism’s annihilation of 
democratic society. “Preservation,” according to Spies, meant preserving the masses by 
annihilating the forces of capitalism, while “preservation,” for the state, meant preserving the 
masses by annihilating the labor movement and anarchism.  
 Spies first indicated that he would paradoxically turn the state’s case into his defense, and 
to turn his defense into an attack on the state, by quoting Marino Faliero, a Doge of Venice.248 
“My defense is your accusation; the causes of my alleged crime your history!”249 For Spies, the 
state was, because of its violent maintenance of capitalism, guiltier than Spies of provoking the 
Haymarket bombing. Dynamite served as the material proof of this turnaround. In its most basic 
 
 
99 
 
form Spies expressed the commonplace of bomb talking that the explosive will facilitate the 
ultimate destruction or preservation of society and civilization depending on which political 
system ends up victorious. 
 As his address unfolded, Spies used antistrephon to turn one of the state’s accusations 
about his involvement with dynamite conspiracies into an argument that instead the state was 
conspiring to commit violence. The strike against the Hocking Valley Coal and Iron Company in 
1884 was presented by the state as proof of the barbarity of the labor movement at the same time 
it was presented by Spies as proof of capitalism’s barbarity. The prosecution charged Spies with 
conspiring to transport dynamite to the strikers. Spies paraphrased the prosecution, agreeing that 
he “might have destroyed thousands of innocent lives in the Hocking Valley with that 
dynamite.’”250 Whether the event represented capitalist or anarchist destruction was up for grabs 
amidst the instability of bomb talking, and Spies seized this as his own evidence against the state. 
“I saw hundreds of lives in the process of slow destruction, gradual destruction,” he exclaimed. 
“There was no dynamite, nor were they Anarchists who did that diabolical work. It was the work 
of a party of highly respectable monopolists, law-abiding citizens, if you please.”251 Spies thus 
exploited the Paradox to show that dynamite, far from representing the destruction of society, 
could preserve society. The danger to society posed by an idle mine could not compare to the 
danger to society posed by killing its productive population. The Hocking Valley strike, and even 
the would-have-been use of dynamite by strikers, was thus the true preservative action.  
 As anarchists wanted to overthrow the state and destroy capitalism the state depicted 
them as despicable “monsters” bent on destroying society. Spies once again exploited the 
instability of bomb talking to reverse the charge with a rhetorical turn, transforming the monster 
metaphor into a description of capitalist society. According to Spies, a system of power that used 
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“fiendish bloodsucking” and “child eating” to preserve the state did not deserve preservation, but 
rather destruction.252 “Anarchism does not mean bloodshed; does not mean robbery, arson, etc.” 
he said. Rather such “monstrosities” are “characteristic features of capitalism.”253 Anarchism did 
not appear quite so destructive when compared to the atrocities committed by the industrial 
capitalist “fiend” against innocent children. By conveying total enmity, the monster metaphor 
helped Spies imbue his adversaries with sinister and diabolical attributes. The “monster” had no 
positive attributes; the “monster” had no preservative power; the “monster” intended only 
bloodshed; the “fiend” attacked with no mercy; the “monster” was industrial capitalism. As 
demonstrated by Hocking Valley, any pretense toward societal preservation on the part of the 
state was, according to Spies, a dangerous ruse. The “demons of hell” would thus admire the 
success of their most conspicuous compatriot – the U.S. government.254 
 After using the instability of bomb talking both to turn around the state’s evidence against 
Spies into evidence against the state, and to turn the “monster” metaphor for anarchism into a 
metaphor for capitalism, Spies once again exploited the logical instability of the Paradox to 
redefine American society as, first and foremost, destructive. Breaking conventional wisdom that 
Americans are “free,” Spies elaborated that what the state wanted to preserve as the basis of 
societal organization – industrial capitalism’s “monstrous” effects on workers – proved much 
more destructive than anarchist dynamite bombs. In contrast to the small magnitude of violence 
that occurred at Haymarket, Spies spoke of American government:  
It means the preservation of the systematic destruction of children and women in 
factories. It means the preservation of enforced idleness of large armies of men, and their 
degradation. It means the preservation of intemperance, and sexual as well as intellectual 
prostitution. It  means the preservation of misery, want, and servility on the one hand, and 
the dangerous accumulation of spoils, idleness, voluptuousness and tyranny on the other. 
It means the preservation of vice in every form. And last but not least, it means the 
preservation of the class struggle, of strikes, riots and bloodshed.255 
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The vast array of mechanical power monopolized by corporations and politicians—industrial and 
agricultural machines, railroads, telegraphs, telephones, steam power, Gatling guns, and 
gallows—demonstrated to the court that capitalists and the government were “the conspirators 
and destructionists,” rather than anarchists.256 For these reasons, Spies lauded the bombing. “If I 
had thrown that bomb, or had caused it to be thrown, or had known of it, I would not hesitate a 
moment to say so. It is true that a number of lives were lost—many were wounded. But hundreds 
of lives were thereby saved! But for that bomb, there would have been a hundred widows and 
hundreds of orphans where now there are few,” he proclaimed.257 Spies disavowed any personal 
bloodlust, but he refused to condemn the Haymarket bombing. The bombing, although in the end 
futile, was an act of worker preservation aimed at arresting the violent oppression of workers. By 
exploiting the Malthusian Paradox, Spies’s antistrephon thus turned the state’s evidence, the 
“monster” metaphor, and the accusation of committing wanton destruction against the state. 
 
The Polysemy of Bomb Talking 
 Spies refused to disavow the Haymarket bombing, but he did disavow that his bomb 
talking had any specific effect on the bomber. Spies spoke of dynamite for multiple rhetorical 
purposes, only one of which was meant to encourage immediate revolutionary bloodshed. When 
Spies said, “dynamite!” or “to arms!” the sheer ubiquity of bomb talking and its rhetorical 
instability had imbued these terms with multiple and divergent meanings. Spies exploited this 
polysemous instability to espouse dynamite: he called upon workers to arm themselves with 
dynamite, he called upon dynamite for self-defense, he called upon workers to stockpile 
dynamite for the future revolution, he invoked dynamite as a metaphor to symbolize the abstract 
concept of revolution, and, when the perfect time would at long last arise, he spoke of dynamite 
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as the means to overthrow of capitalism. Only in this last sense were his words meant to be taken 
literally as an exhortation to throw a dynamite bomb (and Spies had said in the days leading up 
to the Haymarket bombing that it was not yet time for revolutionary violence). Yet, the 
polysemous character of Spies’s prolific bomb talking meant that when he “preached dynamite” 
his incendiary words were open to a wide range of interpretations, especially during the 
tumultuousness of an event like the police advance on the Haymarket rally. When the Haymarket 
bomber went astray by acting on anarchist exhortations to dynamite capitalists, it produced a 
surprising literalization of Spies’s bomb talking. The subsequent debate at the trial about whether 
to understand Spies’s bomb talking as literal or not indicated that, regardless of intent, when he 
spoke of “dynamite,” interpretation took place in the hazy interzone of meaning created by 
polysemy. 
 When Judge Gary’s court insisted that Spies’s bomb talking could only be interpreted in a 
strict sense, it insisted, however indirectly, that it would ensure that anarchist bomb talking 
would be stabilized, literalized, and thus criminalized. Understanding Spies’s dynamite oratory 
as literal benefitted the prosecution’s case by establishing a causal link between Spies’s 
incendiary language and the Haymarket bombing. The literal reading equated the action of the 
bomb-thrower with action of the bomb-talker.258 The court’s insistence on a literal reading of 
Spies’s bomb talking, however, rendered the various other polysemous meanings inherent to 
Spies’s dynamite oratory inconsequential to the Haymarket bombing. Therefore in his address to 
the court, Spies attempted to prove his innocence by identifying the polysemous instability of 
bomb talking. But he also exploited this rhetorical instability to draw attention to the underlying 
revolutionary causes of the Haymarket bombing by reestablishing the polysemous meanings of 
“dynamite” as paradoxically the agent of the workers annihilation and their preservation.   
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 In order to prove there was more to his bomb talking than the literal, Spies invoked a 
temporal distinction between the present urgent need for self-defense and the distant 
revolutionary future, both of which dynamite would facilitate. He said, “I may have told that 
individual who appeared here as a witness that the workingmen should procure arms, as force 
would in all probability be the ultima ratio; and that in Chicago there were so and so many 
armed, but I certainly did not say that we proposed to ‘inaugurate the social revolution.’”259 In 
fact, he did call for revolution, but not for immediate revolution. The bomber, Spies suggested, 
misunderstood Spies’s call to arms. Without massive widespread support throughout Chicago (to 
form the heralded Chicago Commune), or the country (a general strike), the state would crush 
the labor movement. Spies therefore used “dynamite” in a polysemous sense. Spies’s bomb 
talking would only transform from meaning self-defense into literal exhortation to commit 
immediate revolutionary violence when workers had attained the support and means to 
overthrow capitalism, and not until then. But inherent to the necessity of self-defense was the 
contributory meaning of Spies’s bomb talking that offensive dynamiting would take place at 
some point. 
 With so much bomb talking, the lack of anarchist violence had somewhat retracted the 
symbol of dynamite into an abstract concept of revolution, a concept that always seemed to get 
pushed further into the future.260 Indeed, dynamite had come to symbolize the concept of 
revolution as a metaphor. Spies drew attention to the instability of his bomb talking by 
contextualizing it with other violent ironic metaphors. He reported that the Fon du Lac 
Commonwealth demanded “To arms, Republicans!” Spies then quoted the paper’s list of deeds 
that Republicans should commit to keep Democrats from winning an upcoming election: “Every 
Republican in Wisconsin should go armed to the polls next election day. The grain stacks, 
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houses and barns of active Democrats should be burned; their children burned and their wives 
outraged…shoot every one of these base cowards and agitators…Burn them.”261 Spies expressed 
chagrin that his bomb talking led to a death sentence when this list of atrocities went unnoticed, 
much less unpunished, by the authorities. If the court considered the Commonwealth’s 
exhortation to murder their political opponents’ children and rape their wives a metaphor for 
voting, then Spies demanded an explanation why his metaphors should receive a literal 
interpretation. “How does the Arbeiter-Zeitung compare with this?”262 Spies’s dynamite oratory 
was no more “incendiary” than typical political discourse and just as banal, but the “Republican” 
example indicated how the polysemous instability of violent rhetoric became mobilized for 
contested political purposes. The government would authorize the validity of interpreting the 
Commonwealth’s exhortations to commit atrocities as ironic metaphors, but not Spies’s. Thus by 
evidencing the Commonwealth’s ironic metaphor, Spies drew attention to the injustice of 
convicting him according to a literal reading of his bomb talking when that was just one of many 
possible interpretations. His symbolic use of dynamite was just another polysemous, albeit 
ironic, indication that dynamite would eventually save the working class from capitalist 
annihilation.   
 Given the futurity of the revolution, Spies further distanced himself from a literal 
interpretation of his bomb talking by minimizing it as an insignificant and figural instant in a 
long inevitable historical progression. In contrast to the authorities who “maintain that they can 
call a halt to progress, and dictate a standstill to the eternal forces of which they themselves are 
but the whimsical creation,” Spies claimed that everyone “cannot retreat even if we would. The 
force of circumstances drives us on to Socialism.”263 In the context of the trial, Spies was arguing 
that he was both accountable and not accountable for the Haymarket. On one hand, he in 
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particular was accountable for the Haymarket bombing by being an agitator who encouraged 
violence as a general tendency in revolutions, even though he discouraged it in Chicago. On the 
other hand, he was not accountable because he was a mere minor agent in a larger uncontrollable 
historical movement. According to this historicism, the state should not hold him accountable for 
heralding what history dictated was going to happen regardless of whether or not Spies was an 
agitator. In the grand historical scheme, his bomb talking was as “whimsical” as his adversaries’ 
rhetoric, and therefore it was no more meant to be understood literally than anyone else’s. Spies 
thus disclaimed any responsibility for “ultimate” revolution, because that responsibility does not 
rest with one person, one call to arms, and one proposal to “inaugurate” it. Spies thus exploited 
the polysemy of bomb talking to depict himself as both innocent and guilty at the same time. He 
did “preach dynamite,” but he did not preach dynamiting Haymarket. 
 
Self-Cultivated Martyrdom 
 Even though Spies exploited the instability of bomb talking to prove himself innocent of 
conspiring to blow up Haymarket, he also argued that he was the most guilty party. Concomitant 
to his attempt to downplay the significance of his pre-trial bomb talking, Spies amplified the 
significance of his execution by cultivating his martyrdom. With his last words before the court 
Spies compared himself to other martyrs whose executions served as embodied synecdoches for 
various causes. Spies said, “Truth crucified in Socrates, in Christ, in Giordano Bruno, in Huss, 
Galileo, still lives—they and others whose number is legion have preceded us on this path. We 
are ready to follow!”264 Such analogies were another commonplace that inflected Haymarket 
discourse. Just as these historical executions served as synecdoches of the ideals of philosophy, 
religion, and science, Spies desired that his own death would function as an embodied 
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synecdoche for anarchism. His death would represent the injustices perpetrated against workers 
worldwide and thereby reveal the truth of anarchist principles.265 All of the Haymarket 
defendants expressed a willingness to die if their executions would benefit the labor movement, 
and in various ways, Parsons, Neebe, Lingg, Engel, Fischer, and Fielden cultivated their 
martyrdom in their addresses and elsewhere.266 However, Spies’s words had a more traceable 
legacy in the transformation of the eight men into “the Chicago Martyrs.” More so than his co-
defendants, he demanded to be a martyr. And on the eve of his hanging, rather than asking for 
commutation, Spies asked Governor Oglesby to execute him as a “sacrifice” to save the other 
condemned men. He knew that his fate represented the fate of everyone if they failed to revolt. 
His execution, by representing the fate of all workers in the unstoppable progression toward 
capitalism’s extinction, seemed like it could resolve the Malthusian Paradox by bringing 
coherence to an otherwise incoherent situation. For if neither bomb talking nor bomb throwing 
caused the overthrow of capitalism, then at least he could memorialize the costs of that change 
via martyrdom. 
 Spies argued that his execution would become an important causal event in the course of 
history by framing it as a lesson for workers that they must fight to obtain justice. Whereas he 
argued his bomb talking was insignificant, his execution would be momentous. Rather than 
stopping political dissent his hanging would impel it. Spies stated that “The contemplated murder 
of eight men, whose only crime is that they have dared to speak the truth, may open the eyes of 
these suffering millions; may wake them up.”267 The singular Haymarket case thereby 
represented the plight of all workers who suffer from capitalist and governmental aggression. 
“One” became a synecdoche for “millions” in a rhetorical process wherein, according to 
rhetorician Richard Lanham, “experience is described in terms of other experience, but at a 
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different level of magnification.”268 The experience of one transferred to the experiences of 
millions, because as Spies suffered bodily death, millions suffered the deaths of justice and 
liberty. In the words of Kenneth Burke, Spies desired to become the “synecdochic 
representative” of the whole anarchist movement.”269 The significance of martyrdom thus 
derived from the capacity of one death to get amplified to such an enormous scale that it became 
representative of almost everyone’s lives. The millions who witnessed his execution magnified 
his death through memory and the repetition of observation rather than repeating an act of 
violence. His martyrdom used a moment of destruction to grant witnesses awareness, 
understanding, and insight about how to work for future preservation. 
 Spies used his execution to warn the state that his death would signal capitalism’s death, 
and for that goal he demanded that the state must kill him. He concluded his address:  
 And if you think that you can crush out these ideas that are gaining ground more and 
 more every day; if you think you can crush them out by sending us to the gallows; if you 
 would once more have people suffer the penalty of death because they have dared to tell 
 the truth—and I defy you to show us where we have told a lie—I say if death is the 
 penalty for proclaiming the truth, then I will proudly and defiantly pay the costly price!  
 Call your hangman!270   
 
By embracing the concept of being a bomb-throwing conspirator while at the same time denying 
his guilt; he applauded the ideals for which he was sentenced while decrying the ideals by which 
he was sentenced. In this way, to quote Stephen Browne, violence provided “a symbolic means 
to transform events and ideas into a new rationale for human relations and collective action.”271 
The destruction of one person would transform society by compelling the preservation of all 
workers through revolution. Spies demanded death, because it would hasten the destruction of 
the system that killed him. He called the hangman to arms just like he called the workers to arms 
for both would serve the same purpose – advancing the demise of capitalism. Spies’s bid for 
martyrdom was thus warranted by unalterable path of history, and thus he left any paradoxical 
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ambiguities about whether or not workers would end of getting annihilated or liberated for 
history to resolve.  
 Spies’s last words upon the gallows resonated even more than his address. Before Spies 
died after several minutes of writhing in the noose, he said: “There will come a time when our 
silence will be more powerful than the voices you strangle today.”272 With his martyrdom no 
longer in his control, Spies’s sudden silence got amplified to a deafening noise when “millions” 
of witnesses repeated his final words again and again. Much more that his preaching dynamite, 
the sudden, violent absence of his bomb talking became symbolic of capitalist oppression. The 
single statement became disembodied upon Spies’s death but re-embodied whenever other 
people utter his last words anew. Moreover, his brief statement persisted and proliferated as his 
successors in the labor movement turned his last words into an international slogan to motivate 
agitation. More so than any one editorial or speech, news of his execution would circulate to a 
much wider audience owing to the audaciousness of the injustice perpetrated against him.273 He 
had, as he planned, become a martyr, a synecdoche for all revolution. 
  Because Judge Gary’s court scrutinized Spies’s rhetoric as a primary element of its 
prosecution, Spies had a platform from which to probe the complexities and instabilities of bomb 
talking. His rhetorical tactics revealed that the power of any given weapon is much greater than 
its material design. The power of any weapon derives from a combination of its discharge in 
battle and in speech. A weapon represents much more than its own material existence, but the 
ways that rhetoric helps to freight the deployment of weapons with psychological, cultural, and 
ideological weight. And through the coupling of Spies and dynamite bomb, rhetor and weapon, 
Spies demonstrated how bomb talking was imbued with both rhetorical and logical instability, 
and how Spies exploited this instability to negotiate the Malthusian Paradox. His rhetorical and 
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argumentative antistrephon, afforded by bomb talking’s instability, argued that anarchist 
destruction would preserve the working classes from capitalist destruction. His deployment of 
dynamite’s polysemy showed how bomb talking could be simultaneously literal, symbolic, and 
historically destined. And his self-cultivation of martyrdom framed personal destruction as class 
preservation.  
 
Dynamite Discourse and the Political Limits of Bomb Talking 
 With “anarchy on trial,” as lead prosecutor Grinnell put it in his closing statement, the 
Haymarket event resembled a microcosm of how weapons and rhetoric together arbitrated 
political power. Spies confronted his audience with a serious choice: it either had to stand with 
Spies and the labor movement by admitting the fallibility and moral failings of a system that 
would hang innocent men, or it had to acquiesce to capitalist oppression. But for all the 
anarchists’ calls to dynamite capitalism and trust in dynamite as the weapon that would facilitate 
social change, the moment a dynamite bomb exploded in Haymarket, it failed to spur revolution. 
Despite incessant heralding, the moment for symbolic violence had not arrived. The bomb, 
awaited with eagerness and cajoled by so many, neither inspired a “Chicago Commune” nor a 
national uprising, and much less did it inspire the overthrow of capitalism. Instead the 
Haymarket bomb gave the government the justification it needed to suppress the anarchist press 
and make examples of its workers, writers, and editors. As literary critic Jeffory A. Clymer 
wrote, bomb talking empowered agitators to “gauge the possibilities for—and limits on—social 
action and individual agency in the emerging mass culture produced by industrial and finance 
capitalism.”274 After the Haymarket trial, the possibilities and limits of bomb talking on political 
agency proved severe and fellow agitators judged their bomb talking a failure. The martyrdom of 
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four men was no substitute for widespread social change, and their executions demonstrated that, 
for revolutionaries, bomb talking was self-defeating rhetoric.  
 In one simple respect, bomb talking was self defeating because it misrepresented 
dynamite’s technical capacity to wreak destruction, and as a correlate, the misrepresentation of 
dynamite’s destructive power misrepresented the ability of any revolutionary who wielded it. 
When a dynamite bomb exploded, the limited amount of damage wrought exposed the 
commonplace amplification of dynamite’s destructive power as mere hyperbole. With five times 
more explosive power than gunpowder, dynamite was described as capable of blowing up 
everything and everyone in a single blast.275 The Alarm, for example, stated that “One man 
armed with a dynamite bomb is equal to one regiment of militia, when it is used at the right time 
and place…One dynamite bomb properly placed will destroy a regiment of soldiers.”276 In his 
oft-referenced description of dynamite, U.S. Army General Philip Sheridan noted that people 
could conceal bombs in their pockets. With these “pocket” bombs, “whole armies and cities 
could be destroyed…banks, United States sub-treasuries, public buildings and large mercantile 
houses can be readily demolished, and the commerce of entire cities destroyed.”277 Dynamite 
may have seemed to even the power disparity between workers and the government, but it did 
not in fact do so. One bomb carried in a pocket did not cause such massive death and destruction 
even when exploded in the midst of a police regiment’s tight formation at Haymarket. Dynamite 
did not possess an unlimited capacity to annihilate, and therefore neither did the revolutionaries 
who touted, manufactured, and used it. The technical capacity of the weapon showed the bomb 
throwing revolutionaries would get crushed by a well-armed state military.  
 The threat of random dynamite bombings stoked public fear nonetheless, but the fear 
proved self-defeating for anarchism. The combined threat of rhetoric and weapon constituted 
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dynamite as an important anxiety-producing symbol for anarchist political thought that was, in 
the estimation of Clymer, more powerful than the Haymarket bomb itself.278 And public fear of 
dynamite in Chicago after the Haymarket bombing was rampant.279 Chicago residents testified to 
the city’s anxiety. Lawyer and judge Samuel P. McConnell, who heard the Haymarket explosion 
on his way home from an evening out with his wife, reminisced that on the morning after the 
bombing, “The general opinion prevailed that there had been planned an uprising of anarchists 
and that no one was safe…It was several weeks…before the fright and hysteria subsided.”280  
 The bomb and appeals to force proved too fearful, however. Rather than causing the 
public to fear the state, the anxiety produced by bomb talking turned possible supporters into 
adversaries. In a letter to Lucy Parsons, Chicago socialist labor agitator George Schilling wrote, 
“The revenge circular of August Spies was met by the revenge of the public mind, terrorized 
with fear until it reeled like a drunken man, and in its frenzy swept away the safeguards of the 
law and turned its officers into pliant tools yielding to its will.”281 Schilling concluded by calling 
the Chicago anarchists’ rhetorical tactics “mistaken methods,” because they “lead to greater 
despotism,” and “terrorize the public mind and threaten the stability of society with violence,” 
while such “agitation inspires fear; it shocks the public mind and conscience.”282 Thus, the use of 
bomb talking to provoke anxiety proved self-defeating. It further limited their political agency by 
indicating that anarchism would be antithetical to people who wanted to inhabit a peaceful 
society. 
 The anarchists’ mobilization of dynamite as the agent of world-historical change proved 
additionally self defeating for their movement, because it misrepresented the usefulness of the 
weapon to cause political change. Bomb talking often granted the weapon the capacity to not 
only wipe out a city block or a regiment of soldiers, but to wipe out all of civilization. The wife 
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of lead defense attorney William P. Black wrote to the Daily News that dynamite “will soon 
depopulate the earth.”283 Revolution seemed urgent for “A girdle of dynamite encircles the 
world,” wrote Johann Most.284 The fate of the labor movement and the fate of capitalism seemed 
to teeter on the brink of destruction along with untold numbers of lives. Dynamite seemed to 
possess an inordinate amount of power to transform human relations. But it did not do so. The 
revolution was crushed before it even began.  
 Instead, anarchism’s embrace of dynamite ended up empowering further state 
suppression of worker politics. Bomb talking accomplished the opposite of what the anarchists 
set out to do – it strengthened capitalism and restricted the autonomy of their political agency. 
William Holmes wrote in 1892 that it was undesirable for anarchists and labor advocates to 
“extol the excellence of dynamite as a factor in the coming crisis,” because “Much of this kind of 
agitation we have had in the past. And what have been its legitimate fruits? The scorn and hatred 
of the very class (the working people) whom we most desire to win; the bitter enmity and 
persecution of the authorities; the contempt of capitalists; and the antagonism of all classes.”285 
After Haymarket, anarchism’s enemies employed one of Spies’s rhetorical tactics, antistrephon, 
to turn the symbol of dynamite against its most vocal advocates. New York labor journalist John 
Swinton noted that the “enemies of the labor movement” could use the Haymarket dynamite 
bomb as a potent symbol to deride any type of worker activism as dangerous and unappealing.286 
The police, the mainstream press, and the prosecution did just that, using the potency of 
dynamite symbolism to build and maintain public opinion against the accused bomb 
conspirators. Police interviewed at Haymarket after the bombing showed no remorse for their 
attack on the rally and its participants who had been “preaching dynamite for years.”287 The 
Chicago Times called for the extermination of the “slavic [sic] wolves” who perpetrated the 
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bombing to avenge the dead policemen. The authorities had succeeded at turning the “dynamite” 
symbol against anarchism. The “power” of one dynamite bomb held the city hostage for fear of 
more bombs, and only after the executions of Spies, Parsons, Fischer, and Engel did the fervor in 
Chicago subside. Thus, rather than hastening the inevitable social revolution, bomb talking 
retarded it. Political stabilization accompanied rhetorical stabilization. 
 The limitation of “dynamite’s” capacity to inaugurate revolution pushed back on Black 
Friday. Rather than liberation, bomb talking brought destruction to the Chicago anarchists. 
Haymarket occurred at the climax of dynamite’s symbolic importance for anarchism, and Black 
Friday marked the virtual end of commonplace anarchist bomb talking. Looking back at the 
effects of the trial on Chicago’s “radical press,” historian of anarchism Bruce C. Nelson wrote: 
“A decade of repression changed the content and trajectory of the radical press [after 
Haymarket]. The inflammatory rhetoric, the ads for the Lehr-und-Wehr Verein, the articles on 
dynamite, even the initials IWPA, disappeared immediately.”288 For anarchism, its embracement 
of dynamite culminated in anarchism’s getting forever labeled a political movement that is, 
above all else, violent.289 Paradoxically, anarchist bomb talking ended up defeating anarchism 
rather than annihilating capitalism. And for that reason, bomb talking failed to resolve the 
paradox. 
 
Conclusion 
 Governor John Peter Altgeld later pardoned Fielden, Schwab, and Neebe, as well as the 
five dead men, in June 1893. The stereotyped xenophobic image of conspiratorial anarchists 
plotting to destroy property and kill capitalists lives on though. The Haymarket bomb 
transformed dynamite, as a metaphor for general revolution and the pinnacle of political thought 
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in the hands of anarchists, into the literal representation of indiscriminate physical destruction 
and the metaphorical nadir of political thought. The appeals to force and appeals to fear inherent 
in bomb talking succeeded in instilling widespread fear of the idea of anarchism and of the word 
“anarchy.” Anarchism has remained an underground, disparaged, and almost powerless political 
movement. Mainstream media persist in labeling any window broken during a protest the work 
of “anarchists.”   
 More durable than anarchist political thought, the common international discourse in 
which Spies participated persisted despite the waning importance of dynamite bombs. New 
weapons inhabited it, though. If the “public” does not still live in fear of anarchist bombs, 
extremist right-wing terrorists’ fertilizer truck bombs and roadside “improvised explosive 
devices” provide a new fearsome threat of random violence. In retrospect, Haymarket bomb 
talking demonstrates that current terrorism discourse reproduces the era’s commonplaces. With a 
substitution of names, places, and weapons, the rhetoric of Spies and his contemporaries could 
serve as a primer on terrorism rhetoric and politics after 9/11.290 Although IEDs have replaced 
dynamite as terrorists’ weapon of choice, and “Islamic fundamentalists” have replaced anarchists 
as the frightening enemy, the ways terrorists, government officials, and the media talk about 
weapons shows that they still negotiate the Paradox by capitalizing on the instability of weapons 
rhetoric. As capitalism and fundamentalist Islam, locked in disagreement about which ideology 
preserves and destroys civilization, continue to generate wars and aggression, news media 
resound with talk of cowardly foreigners bent on destroying civilization with ultimate weapons. 
Occasional bombings and phantom WMD arsenals continue to serve as singular justifications for 
long wars of occupation and divisive foreign policies. 
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 In terms of the longitudinal history of weapons rhetoric, Spies’s tactics were noteworthy 
in several ways. Similar to his exaggeration of dynamite’s importance in world affairs, the 
subsequent case studies demonstrate that amplification of a weapon’s destructive power well 
beyond its physical power to destroy were commonplaces of chemical warfare and atomic bomb 
discourses. Turnaround arguments would continue to circle around the defensive and offensive 
aspects of military activities and the theory of deterrence. The symbolic power of “dynamite” 
became supplanted in importance as, in turn, “gas” and “the Bomb” became ultimate weapons in 
dynamite’s stead. Spies’s invocation of dynamite showed how language could spill over into the 
realm of physical destruction and how physical destruction could spill over into the realm of 
language. Bomb talking was not just symbolic violence, but somehow constitutive of bloodshed 
in the inscrutable space between the literal and figural meanings created by the word “dynamite.” 
In the end, a remarkable product of Spies’s self-defeating bomb talking was the stabilization of 
bomb talking. After the Haymarket trial’s criminalization of bomb talking, talk of revolutionary 
dynamite was shunned. Bomb talking’s polysemy was reduced to a kneejerk indicator of wanton 
anarchist terror, and its instability was brought under control and stabilized. With anarchism all 
but defeated, and dynamite discourse stabilized, the state and capitalism were empowered to use 
weapons rhetoric to enforce the political status quo. In the next chapter, I show how two 
chemical warfare textbook writers did just that; Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries and Clarence J. West 
relied on rhetorical stability, rather than instability, to navigate the paradoxes of mustard gas. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Humane Extermination: The Mustard Gas Advocacy of Major General Amos A. Fries 
 
“Notwithstanding the opposition of certain people who, through ignorance or for other reasons, 
have fought it, chemical warfare has come to stay.”291   ––A. A. Fries and C. J. West 
 
 British troops of the 15th and 55th Divisions did not pay much attention to the shells that 
landed in their frontline trenches with a plopping sound on the night of July 12-13, 1917. An 
unfamiliar faint odor suggested a gas attack, but the lack of a visible cloud, a pungent smell, and 
physical symptoms indicated that the German barrage at Ypres had, aside from harassing the 
men of the 6th Battalion, failed. The soldiers thought they were duds. Still, having accustomed 
themselves to chemical warfare, many of the troops affixed their gas masks and awaited the all 
clear that came the following morning. But they were not duds. The German Army had saturated 
the front between St. Jean and Potijze with about 50,000 mustard gas shells.292 As the day 
progressed, the battalion’s 5,000 soldiers developed large suppurating blisters, and their eyesight 
failed.293 Many lay dead or dying. Over a million more German mustard gas shells followed in 
the next ten days, dousing the front with 2,500 tons of mustard gas and causing a staggering 
increase in British “gas” casualties.294  
 Victor Meyer invented the German method of mustard gas preparation in 1886 when he 
mixed thiodiglycol with phosphorous tricholoride.295 When the German Chemical Warfare 
Service discovered its usefulness as a weapon, the burgeoning German chemical industry already 
had the means to produce it in large quantities. Two chemical companies, Bayer and C. A. F. 
Kahlbaum, manufactured the gas and filled shells at a peak rate of 24,000 per day and 200,000 
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per month.296 Once the German Army understood that adding high explosives [HE] to mustard 
gas shells would disseminate the liquid in a fine mist that increased the likelihood of inhalation 
and skin contact, even more dangerous second generation shells were manufactured.297 These 
shells eliminated the tell-tale “plop” made by the original mustard gas shells and made their 
explosive sound indistinguishable from other HE shells. This increase in destructive capacity, 
along with mustard gas’s relative permanence, especially in cold weather, and its debilitating 
physiological propensity to seep into any wet human cell in lungs, eyes, and skin helped to build 
the reputation of mustard Gas as WWI’s most notorious chemical weapon. Owing to its 
physically and psychologically destructive power, mustard gas became a potent symbol of early 
20th century wartime destruction. 
 More so than any other weapon deployed in WWI, “gas” received the most opprobrium, 
and its use stirred great controversy and debate owing to its novelty and the magnitude of fear it 
generated. According to Paul Virilio, all wars possess certain weapons that help to define 
perception of a conflict.  
 There is no war … without representation, no sophisticated weaponry without 
 psychological mystification. Weapons are tools not just of destruction but also of 
 perception—that is to say, stimulants that make themselves felt through chemical, 
 neurological processes in the sense organs and the central nervous system, affecting 
 human reactions and even the perceptual identification and differentiation of objects.298  
 
Virilio’s claim well applies to mustard gas on the chemical and psychological levels. During 
WWI, the world looked different through a fogged-up gas mask. Since the range of artillery 
covered the entirety of the European front and could extend everywhere, the mustard gas threat 
seemed to loom more and more for the entire global population. Rolling clouds of vaporized 
liquid, human research experiments, and industrial accidents threatened citizens far from WWI’s 
frontlines, helping mustard gas earn its notoriety as the “king of gases.”299 Despite the anxiety 
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produced by mustard gas, its destructive power never quite caught up with the hyperbolic 
rhetoric used to describe it. Like other chemical weapons, the effectiveness of mustard gas 
decreased throughout the war with training and the innovation of defensive equipment. 
 Thus, in order to remain a viable military option in the face of widespread opposition and 
limited battlefield use, mustard gas needed persistent advocates. Amos A. Fries became such an 
advocate – a “super-military agitator” for chemical warfare.300 A Lieutenant Colonel in the Army 
Corps of Engineers, he had worked on projects as diverse as improving Los Angeles Harbor and 
building roads at Yellowstone Park. In mid-August 1917, he arrived in France as the Director of 
Roads for the American Expeditionary Force [A. E. F.]. Five days later, though, in the chaos of 
adjusting to unfamiliar ways of waging a chemical war, he became Chief of the brand new Gas 
Service.301 Fries directed the somewhat stilted American response to Germany’s use of chemical 
weapons, building the Gas Service out of nothing. After President Woodrow Wilson’s “General 
Order no. 62” in late June, 1918 amalgamated various other service branches into a distinct 
bureau in the War Department called the Chemical Warfare Service [CWS], Fries became a U.S. 
Army Brigadier General and Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service, A. E. F.302 Upon WWI’s 
conclusion, Fries began building the CWS into a primary unit of the U. S. Army, and in early 
1920 he became Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service. He maintained this position until his 
military retirement in 1929, whereupon he became a virulent anti-communist and “right wing” 
education pundit.303 Fries, as an outspoken advocate of chemical warfare, bore a central 
responsibility for assuring both the presence of mustard gas in American arsenals and the 
spillover use of chemical agents in everyday industrial consumer products.304 In 1921 he 
published his definitive statement on the topic, Chemical Warfare, co-written with Clarence J. 
West. 
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 Unlike Fries, chemical warfare did not dominate West’s professional career. Before the 
war, he received his doctorate in chemistry from the University of Michigan in 1912 with a 
thesis on salt. When the U.S. began preparing for chemical warfare, the Army, the U.S. Bureau 
of Mines, and the National Research Council (NRC) organized about 15,000 American chemists 
to serve in either civilian or military capacities at home and overseas. West was enlisted, and 
during the war he served as the head of the editorial department of the Research Division of the 
CWS. From 1918 to 1919 he worked on researching and testing gas masks at the American 
University wing of the CWS. The CWS maintained close ties with the NRC after the war, and 
the organizations worked on a number of joint projects, such as investigating how to combat 
marine borers. West became Director of the NRC’s Research Information Service in 1921. By 
and large, the publication of Chemical Warfare marked West’s last direct involvement with the 
subject of chemical warfare, although as the Director of Research Information Service at the 
NRC, which served as an intermediary between university and government chemical warfare 
research, he helped to keep track of American chemists and other scientists should future wars 
need their enlistment.305 
 Fries and West needed to turn conscripts and officers into well-drilled battlefield 
chemists. In addition to advocacy, therefore, another of Chemical Warfare’s purposes was 
pedagogical, and much of it reads like a Chemistry textbook. Chemical Warfare covers the full 
range of lachrymators, sternutators, nerve agents, and vesicants developed during the war, and 
how to utilize, research, and produce them. It includes a detailed guide to the chemical and 
technical manufacturing of mustard gas, complete with diagrams of requisite apparatuses and 
chemical formulas. It also includes a history of chemical warfare, its development in WWI, and 
the formation of the Chemical Warfare Service, in addition to offensive and defensive tactics.306 
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WWI correspondent Carl W. Ackerman called it “the first authoritative book on the subject of 
poison gas published in the United States.”307 
 For Fries and West, a lack of knowledge and training in chemical warfare would be fatal 
to the U.S. Army. They wrote, “From the standpoint of the man at the front the Training Division 
[of the CWS] is one of the most important [army divisions]. To him gas warfare is an ever 
present titanic struggle between poisonous vapors that kill on one side, and the gas mask and a 
knowledge of how and when to wear it on the other.”308 Chemistry was thus vital to military 
training.309 The “titanic struggle” presented people with an unappealing proposition: learn how to 
identify chemical agents and don the proper protective gear at a moment’s notice, or die. Yet, 
even as Chemical Warfare depicted chemical weapons as having such extraordinary and singular 
military significance, it worked to make training in chemical warfare seem banal, in step with the 
routines of everyday military life.  
 In this chapter I argue that Fries and West humanized chemical warfare not to celebrate 
it, but to manage the paradox that a weapon of mass destruction could be useful for 
manufacturing “peace.” Several of Chemical Warfare’s rhetorical purposes – weapons advocacy, 
training soldiers in chemical warfare, analyzing the tactics and strategies of chemical warfare, 
and making futuristic projections – helped them “humanize chemical” warfare, itself a paradox, 
by making it seem like a routine and unremarkable element of warfare, if not everyday life. 
Unlike Spies, who exploited the instabilities of language and logic afforded by paradox, Fries 
and West did not navigate the paradoxes of technology so much as they confronted a rhetorical 
product of the Malthusian Paradox: an either/or dilemma about whether or not chemical warfare 
was humane. In confronting the strong categorical binaries that characterized chemical warfare 
discourse, Fries and West jettisoned ambivalence and logical uncertainty to take a firm stance in 
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favor of chemical weapons as a preservative force. In this way, by attempting to legitimate 
chemical weapons as distinctly humane in their capacity to preserve life, Fries and West 
extended and added to the basic rhetorical tactics used by Malthus and Spies to negotiate the 
Malthusian Paradox.  
 The remainder of this chapter examines the chemical weapons paradox in three parts. The 
following section provides a historical and discursive overview of how the Paradox of chemical 
weapons developed into a strict, but rhetorically unstable, polarization between pro-gas 
proponents and anti-gas opponents. Proponents declared chemical weapons preservative, and 
therefore humane, and opponents declared them too destructive, and therefore inhumane. This 
binary constituted the rhetorical terrain that Fries encountered as he mounted public relations 
campaign to establish the legitimacy of chemical weapons. Next I show how Fries and West 
negotiated this paradoxical binary in Chemical Warfare. By advancing statistical proofs of 
chemical warfare’s humaneness and amplifying their humane preservative efficiency to 
encompass the complete spatio-temporality of humankind, they attempted to rhetorically 
stabilize the somewhat chaotic discourse of chemical weapons. In conclusion, I assess the results 
of Fries’s publicity campaign and trace the post-WWI history of mustard gas and chemical 
weapons. 
  
The Paradoxical Discourse of Chemical Warfare 
 Much like Haymarket era bomb talking, WWI era chemical weapons discourse was 
characterized by rhetorical instability, as chemical weapons in general, and mustard gas in 
particular, became polarizing issues. Yet, unlike Haymarket era bomb talkers – from anarchists 
to capitalists, and from journalists to factory workers – who all agreed that dynamite was a useful 
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and legitimate weapon, the participants in WWI era chemical warfare discourse became starkly 
divided over the legitimacy of chemical weapons. Proponents displayed unwavering devotion to 
chemical weapons and detractors displayed unwavering vitriolic condemnation. Both sides 
remained adamant. In this section, I suggest that this sharp division between chemical warfare’s 
advocates and its detractors defined how rhetors articulated the Malthusian Paradox of 
weaponized gases. In the remainder of this section, I indicate the rhetorical instability of this 
discourse by examining their main points of contention, which was best exemplified by 
disagreement about whether chemical warfare was “humane.” Confronted by widespread 
condemnation of chemical weapons and an instable rhetorical terrain, Fries took a firm stance in 
favor of chemical warfare, a stance that included a profuse public relations campaign.  
 In the decades before WWI, chemical warfare was an ardently contested issue in 
international peace negotiations and armaments conventions. The problem of chemical warfare, 
as it was construed in diplomatic debates, revolved around whether weapons that killed by 
poisonous vapors – rather than by steel or explosives – were legal. The 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Peace Conventions made the issue prominent. Diplomats and state leaders at both conventions 
deliberated the legitimacy of “poison or poisoned weapons,” and in the end, both treaties 
outlawed them. The 1899 treaty decreed that the “contracting Powers agree to abstain from the 
use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious 
gases.”310 Germany signed, but the U.S. did not. “Article 23” of the 1907 treaty, which all of 
WWI’s major belligerents signed, was explicit about the reason to ban chemical weapons: they 
had been “justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world.”311 By taking a 
definitive stance against chemical warfare as illegal and barbarous, the two Hague treaties 
established the illegitimacy of chemical warfare as an explicit, but refutable, point of 
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international law. At that point, though, the debate was speculative; no military yet possessed 
any viable chemical weapons. 
 Perhaps more so than the outright banning of poisonous gases in international law, it was 
how diplomats questioned the humaneness of the new weapons that indicated how the chemical 
warfare debate would become so polarized. Famed naval strategist and American diplomat A. T. 
Mahan provided the era’s definitive statement on the humaneness of chemical weapons. He 
persuaded the 1899 American delegation to abstain from signing the Hague treaty, because, he 
argued, asphyxiating gases were as humane as any other weapon.  
The reproach of cruelty and perfidy addressed against these supposed [poison gas] shells 
was equally uttered previously against fire-arms and torpedoes, although both are now 
employed without scruple. It is illogical and demonstrably humane to be tender about 
asphyxiating men with gas, when all are prepared to admit that it is allowable to blow the 
bottom out of an ironclad at midnight, throwing four or five hundred men into the sea to 
be choked by the water, with scarcely the remotest chance to escape.312 
 
This uncompromising proclamation equated poisonous gas’s destructive capacity with that of 
“conventional” weapons. Its function, like any other means to victory, was to wreak maximum 
destruction. Mahan in 1899 thus neither professed chemical warfare humane nor inhumane. 
Rather, Mahan’s statement implied that the objections to chemical warfare made by the Hague 
treaties and their advocates were inconsistent, even paradoxical, unless they deigned to oppose 
warfare writ large. Nevertheless, he did give prominence to the question of humaneness, and this 
question became the defining stasis point of the ensuing chemical weapons controversy.  
 The rampant use of chemical weapons in WWI, however, moved the debate from 
diplomatic circles into full public view. The massive scale of Germany’s mustard gas 
deployment, exemplified by the dousing of British troops at Ypres III, in addition to the fear it 
produced, its persistency, its toxicity, and its physiological effects made the humaneness of 
mustard gas – and chemical warfare in general – the most contested issue.313 In fact, it seemed to 
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constitute the only stasis point that opponents agreed to contest directly. Drawing from his 
experiences as a doctor and member of the British gas troops during the war, pro-gas advocate J. 
B. S. Haldane laid out the debate’s basic positions. “I claim, then, that the use of mustard gas in 
war on the largest possible scale would render it less expensive of life and property, shorter, and 
more dependent on brains rather than numbers. We are often told the exact opposite, that it will 
make it more barbarous and indecisive, and lead to the wiping out of the population of whole 
cities.”314 In this way, almost every rhetor who addressed the topic of chemical warfare weighed 
in to declare it either humane or inhumane.315  
 Chemical weapons discourse proceeded to develop in paradoxical fashion. Advocates 
held that chemical weapons preserved life by significantly reducing bloodshed, lifelong 
debilitating injuries, and death, as well as by deterring wars from being fought. Opponents held 
that chemical weapons were exceptionally destructive and typified the most horrific form of 
warfare. Thus, chemical weapons discourse reiterated the paradox that what kills us will save us 
and what saves us will kill us. And it was in this way that this iteration of the Paradox differed 
from those of Malthusian population theory and dynamite bombs. While the discourse as a whole 
was paradoxical, very few individual rhetors ever spoke of it as so. Rather, rhetors took sides—
pro or con—and articulated the problem in the starkest of terms. The two opposed positions 
subsequently avoided direct confrontation with each others’ major arguments, and thereby 
stabilized their own terrain of the discourse, even as chemical warfare discourse as a whole 
remained as rhetorically messy and instable as the weapons under consideration.  
 Far from merely proclaiming gas “humane” – if not the “most humane weapon ever 
invented” – advocates speculated that chemical weapons were so powerful that they would 
abolish war. 316 Advocates argued that not only did chemical weapons win wars by reducing 
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bloodshed, injuring without killing, and reducing the length of wars, they also would preserve 
life by constituting a deterrent so powerful that it could never exist. Fries articulated this 
commonplace in his 1920 Annual Report of the CWS: “As warfare becomes more complicated, 
intelligence and science become of greater value, and every development of science that makes 
warfare more universal and more scientific makes for permanent peace through making war 
intolerable.”317 The latter half of this sentence became the slogan of the CWS’s Chemical 
Warfare bulletin.318 Fries and other chemical warfare advocates wanted peace, but only a peace 
maintained by weaponized gas. This logic, however, would necessitate an unceasing chain of 
weapons escalation. Competing powers would work to make the chemical weapons deterrent 
viable with the most destructive weapon possible, which would empower ever more destructive 
offensive power. Reducing the length of wars, or abolishing them, would thus require future 
weapons with much more maiming and killing capacity. To chemical warfare’s detractors, of 
course, such talk was “monstrous and inhumane.”319  
 The prospect of escalating the power of chemical weapons with airplanes provides a stark 
example of this rhetorical split in meaning and helps to indicate the rhetorical instability of the 
era’s chemical weapons discourse. Advocates and detractors described the development in terms 
almost identical terms to each other, but paradoxically, to argue opposite positions. In a 1921 
article for National Service magazine, Fries wrote, “Perhaps the greatest guarantee that war will 
cease is the development of chemical warfare and the spreading of information that chemical 
warfare along with the Air Service will make war more and more universal, finally carrying it to 
the door of every citizen. When that day comes the world will see strenuous efforts made to 
settle disputes without resorting to war.”320 In comparison, journalist Will Irwin’s The Next War, 
which also saw print in 1921, foresaw “a projectile—the bomb carrying aeroplane—of 
 
 
131 
 
unprecedent size and almost unlimited range; here is a killing instrument—gas—of power 
beyond the dream of a madman; here is a scheme of warfare which inevitably draws those who 
were hitherto regarded as non-combatants into the category of fair game.”321 Aside from a 
reference to a “madman” and a more assertive stance on gas’s destructiveness, Irwin’s anti-gas 
appeal mirrored Fries’s pro-gas appeal. Thus, for Fries, the threat of sprinkling mustard gas from 
airplanes would cause an end to war, but to Irwin the same act promised global terror. 
 For gas’s opponents, talk of fewer casualties and fatalities and speculation about 
permanent peace failed to address the realities of chemical warfare. Unlike the war’s other 
common chemical agents, mustard gas “burns the body inside or out, wherever there is moisture. 
Eyes, lungs and soft parts of the body are readily attacked.”322 Once absorbed into cells through 
various pores, mustard gas converts into hydrochloric acid through hydrolysis. The mustard-
gassed body thus becomes a miniature acid factory and storage container for the toxic substance 
to burn for, perhaps, weeks until hydrolysis renders the gas inert.323 Mustard gas therefore caused 
particular injuries that conventional weapons did not – burning from the inside out, as well as 
from the outside in, prolonged asphyxiation from drowning on one’s own fluids, and the 
development of putrid sores over the entire body. British soldier-poet, Wilfred Owen, described 
the experience of being gassed as “an ecstasy of fumbling…floundering like a man in fire or 
lime...guttering, choking, drowning…white eyes writhing…blood gargling from the froth-
corrupted lungs…vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues.”324 
 At first, avoiding injury during a mustard gas would have been near impossible when 
German mustard gas soaked the salient.325 As the German Army proceeded to launch as much 
mustard gas as it could, shelling the British trenches with it every night, the already muddy 
battlefield became a “sucking quagmire…foul with every abomination.”326 In March 1918, 
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witnesses reported that mustard gas flowed through the streets of Armentières like water.327 After 
the air cleared, mustard gas still saturated the muck, threatening soldiers with incapacitating skin 
blisters should they slip into a crater. Not appreciating mustard gas’s persistency, casualties and 
fatalities mounted as soldiers handled tainted equipment, ate tainted food, touched each other, 
brushed the ground while defecating, and fell in the mud.328 Nurses and doctors who treated the 
wounded became casualties.329 Even after the infantry understood the characteristics of mustard 
gas, diving into craters to evade high explosive [HE] and shrapnel shells necessitated diving into 
mustard gas-soaked mud against which their uniforms could not protect. To soldiers, this was 
“dirty warfare.”330   
 Gas’s opponents further argued that it produced particular types of horrifying 
psychological damage. Chemical weapons triggered apprehension, panic, battle fatigue, and “gas 
mask exhaustion” like no other weapons.331 Gas attacks demoralized both green recruits and 
veterans.332 Frightened troops “stampeded” from the front.333 Psychological horror, or “gas 
shock,” accompanied the “frightful pandemonium” when a lookout cried “Gas!”334 Recounting 
an early mustard gas attack in his war diary, Hervey Allen noted that a new member of the 
British gas school “couldn’t apprehend the fact that we [infantry] were suffering from the fear of 
gas, rather than from the gas itself.”335 Soldiers suffering from “gas fright” thought they had been 
gassed when no attack had occurred.336 Additional neologisms like “gas neurosis” and “shell 
shock” were born from the atypical physical destruction of WWI artillery bombardments.337  
 For the most part, American public opinion sided with chemical warfare’s opponents. 
Americans expressed a staggering dislike of gas and expressed an “outspoken and almost 
violent” hostility to chemical warfare.338 An opinion poll about disarmament conducted in late 
1921 tallied 366,795 votes for abolition of gas warfare and 19 votes in favor of its retention.339 
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Fries and the CWS asserted that “disinformation” about poison gas, such as Wilfred Owen’s 
poem, had poisoned the public’s knowledge of chemical warfare with inaccurate depictions.340 
No matter the source of negative public opinion, the public’s stance was clear, and official U.S. 
WWII military historians claimed that “there can be no doubt that gas warfare emerged from 
World War I with the reputation of a horror weapon even when field experience did not 
substantiate this view.”341  
 Military command did not share infantry’s dread of the new weapons, but it did approach 
chemical warfare with trepidation. Fries and West wrote that during the war, “Much the hardest, 
most trying and most skillful work required of the Chemical Warfare Service officers was to 
persuade…Staffs and Commanders that gas was useful and get them to permit a demonstration 
on their front.”342 This reluctance remained after the war. So, in addition to facing civilians and 
soldiers sick of war and horrified by “poison gas,” Fries and the CWS also were mostly 
unprotected in a time of great demobilization, army reorganization, funding cuts, and 
disarmament conventions.343 To survive so much turmoil, according to a “watchword” of the 
CWS, “Chemical Warfare Service officers have got to go out and sell gas to the Army.”344  
 Fries, however, did more than attempt to “sell gas to the Army.” The rhetorical terrain of 
his enterprise, marked by widespread reluctance, opposition, and hostility to chemical warfare, 
helped to define the scale of his response. Fries mounted a profuse public relations campaign to 
tout the necessity of maintaining chemical warfare to military command, soldiers, politicians, 
chemists, and the American public. He wrote articles for military publications, chemistry 
journals, and popular magazines, wrote letters to chemists in an attempt to enlist them to 
influence politicians (he provided direct-mail postcards), gave speeches at military events, 
testified before congress, and even wrote a negative book review of an anti-gas treatise. The 
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direct-mail resolution he asked chemists to send their congressmen read: “Therefore, let it be 
Resolved That it is the opinion of (——) that chemical warfare is such a complete and distinct 
science in itself, as well as such as powerful weapon of war, that a strong Chemical Warfare 
Service should be maintained as a complete and independent department in the United States 
Army, as a prerequisite to any proper national defense of our country.”345 The stakes of Fries’s 
public relations campaign were high: he was defending a novel, but required, military unit, a 
nascent, but vast, chemical industry, and attempting to ensure general military preparedness with 
speculative warfare looming. Chemical Warfare was thus the primary document of a much larger 
publicity campaign in which advocating chemical warfare, keeping soldiers trained, analyzing 
tactics and strategies, and predicting the future of chemicals and chemical warfare were essential 
rhetorical components. 
 Fries and West argued that their persuasive goal was educational – to educate soldiers 
and citizens about chemical warfare in order to disabuse them of their ignorance and cowardice, 
which merged with a secondary goal to ensure the survival of American soldiers.346 Regarding 
the first goal they wrote, “We believe that all opposition to chemical warfare to-day can be 
divided into two classes—those who do not understand it and those who are afraid of it—
ignorance and cowardice.”347 But facts would dispel both, they claimed, and once enough 
information made its way to the public, public opinion would turn in favor of the CWS. With 
respect to their second pedagogical goal to protect soldiers, Fries and West described their basic 
onus in terms that would also help disabuse recruits of fear and ignorance. They wrote, “While 
the importance of impressing upon the soldier the danger of gas was early appreciated it was 
deemed necessary not to make him unduly afraid of the gas.”348 With so much anti-gas opinion 
based on hyperbolic fear and ignorance, they asserted that the public needed a way to “check the 
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accuracy” of the chemical warfare information they encountered.349 Thus, accuracy, they 
claimed, would educate and calm. 
 In Chemical Warfare, Fries’s and West’s pedagogical goals, advocacy goals, and 
strategic goals resulted in a rather complex task as they confronted their central rhetorical 
dilemma – the stark paradoxical binary constituted by the disagreement between chemical 
warfare’s opponents and proponents. However, Fries and West did not negotiate the paradoxes 
of technology directly, or even semi-directly, in the ways Malthus and Spies did. Rather, they 
negotiated one pole of the chemical weapons paradox – the pole that categorically declared 
chemical weapons humane, legitimate, and above all, preservative. They denied outright their 
adversaries stance that the weapons were inhumane, illegitimate, and above all, destructive. Fries 
and West declared, for instance, that “the Army and the general public have now so completely 
indorsed chemical warfare that it is believed the argument of the inhumanity has no weight 
whatever,” and that “inhumanity of [gas] is absolutely disproven by the results of its use in the 
World War.”350 They asserted the undeniable validity of chemical warfare: “Notwithstanding the 
opposition of certain people who, through ignorance or for other reasons, have fought it, 
chemical warfare has come to stay.”351 With their partisan position clarified, they negotiated the 
Malthusian Paradox by attempting to stabilize the unruliness of chemical weapons discourse. 
They did so by depicting chemical weapons as fearful enough to never falter in defense, but not 
so fearful as to refuse its penetration into all spheres of human activity. With statistical proofs, 
Fries and West thus depicted the horrific characteristics of chemical warfare as easily endured; 
and through rhetorical amplification, they transformed its lackluster battlefield record into a 
monumental achievement. 
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Stabilizing Chemical Warfare Discourse: Statistical Diminishment and Totalizing 
Amplification 
 Chemical warfare emerged from WWI in technological and rhetorical disarray. As such, 
chemical warfare was invoked for a broad range of political purposes, from arguing for pacifism 
to preparing for more war. Mustard gas symbolized the horror of war as much as it symbolized 
the promise of future weapons to abolish war. Fries and West, seeking to dispel the image of 
chemical weapons as horrifying, despicable, illegal, destructive, treacherous, and inhumane, 
attempted to stabilize the rhetorical significance of weaponized gases by touting their 
effectiveness and viability as the primary weapons of choice. Hence, they confronted the 
Paradox as a distinctly polarized product of chemical warfare discourse, but adopted a decidedly 
one-sided perspective. Categorically rejecting the claim of “inhumanity,” Fries and West made 
the case for the power of mustard gas to secure victory while preserving life.  
 Fries and West used two primary rhetorical tactics in Chemical Warfare to stabilize the 
discourse of chemical weapons. They advanced statistics and amplified speculations. With 
respect to the former Fries and West published casualty and fatality statistics to prove the 
humane power of chemical weapons to preserve life rather than kill it. These statistics 
downplayed chemical warfare injuries in comparison to those of conventional weapons. With 
respect to the latter, as they looked forward to the future of chemical warfare, the authors used 
amplification to depict how the gas could penetrate the entire spatio-temporality of human 
existence. At the highest level of their amplification, they made totalizing arguments that made 
mustard gas appear capable of permanently extending its humane preservative power across the 
entire globe. With these two tactics, Fries and West thus attempted to stabilize the chemical 
warfare controversy, and decide it, unambiguously, in the CWS’s favor.  
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Statistical Diminishment 
 In scattershot fashion throughout Chemical Warfare, Fries and West invoked statistics to 
demonstrate the humaneness of mustard gas and other chemical weapons. Whether they were 
describing a particular war gas, specific battles, chemical warfare tactics and strategy, or 
advocating for the weapons, they used statistics to downplay chemical warfare’s destructive 
power.352 They argued that ignorance, not genuine controversy, was responsible for the debate 
about chemical warfare, and used statistical comparison to attempt to dispel such “ignorance.”353 
According to Fries and West, “The measure of humanity for any form of warfare is the 
percentage of deaths to the total number of injured by the particular method of warfare under 
consideration.”354 According to the accumulated battlefield data from WWI they presented, 
chemical weapons produced a very low percentage of deaths and only minor injuries. By this 
logic, the cumulative data showed that the effectiveness of chemical weapons derived not from 
their capacity to kill or maim, but counter-intuitively, from their capacity to preserve the lives of 
combatants. The ideal image, invoked by Fries and West, of well trained and defense-minded 
soldiers who escaped injury and death thus seemed to stabilize the rhetorical chaos of chemical 
warfare discourse by depicting not the horror of battle, but the banality of routine.  
 Minimizing the destructive power of mustard gas served Fries’s and West’s rhetorical 
goal to teach wary soldiers that the weapon’s killing power was easily surmounted with basic 
defensive measures. They wrote, “Due to the very slight concentrations ordinarily encountered in 
the field, resulting from a very slow rate of evaporation, the death rate is very low, probably 
under 1 percent among the Americans gassed with mustard during the war.”355 With this one 
percent fatality rate the authors conveyed that, of all the ways to die in battle, soldiers would 
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probably not die from mustard gas, even after exposure. The low fatality rate showed that 
mustard gas was less of a frightful terror weapon, and more of a nuisance to endure within the 
more dangerous hail of steel. Fries and West did not deny that when troops were unprepared for 
an attack and ignorant of defensive measures, mustard gas lethality increased, as witnessed by 
the 6th Battalion on the night of July 12. This lethality, though, was limited. In the greater context 
of their pedagogy, the statistic inculcated the understanding that defensive gas equipment and 
procedures worked quite well. By knowing the simple defensive tactics that Fries and West 
taught - disposing of exposed clothing, rinsing chemicals from exposed skin as fast as possible, 
and avoiding gassed areas – soldiers could preserve their lives in a chemical attack. The dead 
were poorly trained, and therefore statistically insignificant.  
 Not only was mustard gas’s fatality rate low, they argued, but its propensity to cause 
severe injuries was likewise minimal. The severity of most mustard gas casualties appeared 
slight in their estimation, because the typical exposure to it was very low. They wrote that, “one 
part in 14,000,000 is capable of causing conjunctivitis of the eye and that one part in 3,000,000 
and possibly one part in 5,000,000 will cause a skin burn in a sensitive person on prolonged 
exposure.”356 Hence, many gas casualties happened after brief contact with a miniscule amount 
of the substance – just enough to cause reactions. Fries and West further speculated that, 
“Probably the majority of burns from mustard gas arose from concentrations of gas consisting of 
less than one part of gas to five hundred thousand of air.”357 Although horrific for victims, low-
dose casualties, such as those caused by exposure to gassed woods, dugouts, shelters, and 
clothing, as well as skin-to-skin contact, caused blisters, minor lung damage, and temporary 
vision loss.358 These injuries caused by low-level exposure did not appear very hazardous, much 
less menacing. By Fries’s and West’s argument, the sheer statistical preponderance of non-severe 
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casualties refuted definitively the claim that it was an indiscriminate terror weapon. Mustard gas 
casualty and fatality statistics were, by their argument, definitive proof that it was humane. They 
helped secure victory by temporarily incapacitating, not permanently maiming. 
 Advancing the statistical mean of WWI fatality and casualty rates provided a further way 
to downplay the destructiveness of chemical weapons by empowering Fries and West to 
eliminate the significance of instances of mass casualties as statistical anomalies. They conceded 
that American casualties from German gas attacks “fluctuated through rather wide limits. There 
were times in the early days during training when this reached 65 per cent of the total 
casualties.”359 However, the final tally helped to stabilize the concept of chemical warfare by 
jettisoning the most chaotic and unstable moments of WWI, especially the battles where troops 
were unprepared for gas attacks (e.g., the first mustard gas attack). Such battles, they argued, 
provided little insight into the stable character of chemical warfare. Rather, as Fries and West 
sought to build trust in their system to reduce American casualties, the statistical mean proved 
the long-term effectiveness of the defensive gas tactics outlined in their textbook. “On the whole 
the casualties from gas reached 27.3 percent for all fatalities,” they concluded.360 Thus, instead of 
the statistical anomalies caused by the introduction of hitherto unexpected types of gas attacks, 
the important number was the whole number, the constant unwavering statistical mean that 
proved that mustard gas would injure but not kill if the readers of Chemical Warfare heeded its 
exhortations to exercise calm diligence in gas attacks. 
   Contrasting the casualty and fatality rates of chemical weapons with the rates of other 
WWI weapons provided Fries and West with a way to diminish the destructive power of 
chemical weapons by establishing their efficiency to injure but not to kill. More than just 
repeating a commonplace of chemical weapons discourse, they implied that military 
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commanders should embrace chemical warfare as a brand new strategic method. An “official list 
of casualties in battle as compiled by the Surgeon General’s office” cited by Fries and West 
showed that chemical agents caused 27.4 percent of 258,338 total U.S. casualties. Fries and West 
concluded from these numbers that “it is readily deduced that only 2 per cent of those wounded 
by gas resulted in death. That is, a man wounded on the battle field with gas had twelve times as 
many chances of recovery as the man who was wounded with bullets and high explosives.”361 By 
defining chemical weapons as very injurious but not fatal, they situated war gases as 
simultaneously one of the least destructive weapons deployed in WWI and one of the most 
effective, since “no other element of war, unless you call powder a basic element, accounted for 
so many casualties among the American troops.”362 Unlike conventional weapons, they injured 
many but killed few. Chemical weapons thus provided the advantage of wreaking a much lower 
amount of physical devastation than conventional weapons. Fries’s and West’s argument 
envisioned that strategists should want to disperse enemy troops with harassment, light 
casualties, and little to no bloodshed.  
 Indeed, this statistical argument seemed to overturn a basic principle of military strategy 
that dictated armies must seek maximum destruction in war. Clausewitz, for instance, asserted 
that the argument that one country could disarm another “without too much bloodshed” was a 
“fallacy that must be exposed,” that “moderation” in war led to “logical absurdity,” and that “the 
impulse to destroy the enemy…is central to the very idea of war.”363 Fries and West broke the 
connection between strategic success and destruction by implying that battlefield effectiveness 
derived not from killing and maiming, but from causing the greatest number of minor injuries. 
Considering their goal to “sell gas” to a military command schooled in the art of causing massive 
destruction, the claim that chemical weapons were more useful because they killed less and 
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inflicted less severe injuries than conventional weapons would have perhaps seemed a total 
reversal of war theory. They were proposing to win wars by preserving as many enemy soldiers 
as possible. In this way, Fries’s and West’s statistical comparison of like phenomena purveyed 
chemical weapons and the Chemical Warfare Service as the humane way to wage all future 
battles in defiance of the 19th century quest for maximum annihilation. 
 Fries’s and West’s statistical argumentation may have indicated to soldiers and the public 
that the danger posed by mustard gas should not cause undue fright or dereliction of training. But 
after spending so much space diminishing mustard gas’s destructive power, Fries and West 
risked making the weapon no longer seem powerful enough to warrant manufacturing, storing, 
and deploying it to professionals whose livelihoods depended on the capacity to wreak wartime 
destruction and devastate enemy populations. If high explosive bombs and shells, machine guns, 
tanks, and airplanes were more destructive, then they would have seemed more desirable for 
further research and development, especially given the novelty of Fries’s and West’s chemical 
warfare strategy. Because they diminished mustard gas’s effectiveness with statistics, they 
needed to rebuild its reputation as “king of the gasses.” Thus, Fries and West bolstered their 
statistical proofs by touting chemical weapons as possessing an unequalled capacity to be 
deployed across the entire globe.  
  
 
Totalizing Spatio-Temporal Amplification 
 Amplifying the destructive power of chemical weapons provided Fries and West with a 
means to stabilize chemical warfare discourse by clarifying that, even though chemical weapons 
were somewhat nondestructive and preserved enemy soldiers, that tendency did not mean 
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chemical weapons lacked the power to attain victory. Far from it, Fries and West argued. They 
used different levels of amplified magnitude to describe how chemical agents, and especially 
mustard gas, would prove militarily useful everywhere and for all time. They concentrated their 
use of amplification on depictions of what future gas warfare would be like, respective to the 
minimal, yet effective deployment of chemical weapons in WWI. I suggest that Fries and West 
used three levels of amplification, each extending the threat of chemical weapons and mustard 
gas to encompass more and more geographical and psychological space, and which climaxed in a 
totalizing generalization about the future of chemical warfare. The first level amplified mustard 
gas’s efficiency on the battlefield, the second level augmented the first level by extending the 
weapon’s range to the whole earth, and the third level swept every human peacetime activity into 
the purview of preservative toxic chemicals. 
 The first level of amplification built upon the reputation of mustard gas as the “king of 
gases,” and amplified its destructive power to encompass all elements of battle. Fries and West 
wrote that the introduction of “the most valuable war gas known at the present time” was so 
momentous that mustard gas “changed completely the whole aspect of gas warfare and to a 
considerable extent the whole aspect of warfare of every kind.”364 Mustard gas changed “the 
whole” of warfare by requiring a complete battlefield spatio-temporal adjustment to the new 
weapon. Its presence necessitated constant wariness wherever mustard gas shells might explode, 
which was everywhere on the front. It would persist for months, whereas an artillery shell’s 
effectiveness did not persist beyond the first blast. Fries and West added a second temporal 
dimension to their amplification when they guaranteed that “in the future large numbers of these 
shell [HE and mustard gas] will be used.”365 Not only would mustard gas’s toxicity persist, but 
so would its strategic usefulness. Mustard gas, according to this logic, will seep into the complete 
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spatio-temporal phenomenon of war, because all offensive actions would benefit from forcing 
enemies to don gas masks for interminable periods, wear almost unmovable impermeable 
clothing, and treat the entire landscape with neutralizers without end.   
 Fries and West further amplified the power of mustard gas by speculating about how 
chemical warfare would encompass not only all war activities, but the entire earth and all people. 
They wrote, “The high explosive mustard gas shell, not only because of its persistency but 
because of its quick deadliness, can be fired singly and be depended upon to do its work 
wherever there be men or animals.”366 Amplifying mustard gas’s potential to get deployed 
“wherever there be men or animals” extrapolated the dangers faced by soldiers in a battlefield 
gas attack to menace everybody. Civilians would need to learn chemical warfare defense as 
much as soldiers would. Fries and West thus implied that future chemical warfare would be 
unhampered by most problems of mobilization and logistics. They were certain that chemical 
weapons could extend to any living being in the battle zone. And the battle zone could be 
anywhere, but especially where people had less preparation and warning, which was away from 
battlefields.367 By this logic, mustard gas thereby began seeming like a more and more viable, 
useful, and successful weapon, one that the U.S. Army should maintain in its arsenals. If 
chemical warfare preparedness would dictate military behavior, then in the future imagined by 
Fries and West the global population must either wear a gas mask or face sure injury, albeit it 
probably not a terrible one. 
 The third level of spatio-temporal amplification made not just war but every facet of 
human existence appear dependent upon one type of weapon. According to Fries and West, “gas 
is a universal weapon, applicable to every arm and every sort of action. Since we can choose 
gases that are either liquid or solid, that are irritating only or highly poisonous, that are visible or 
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invisible, that persist for days or that pass with the wind, we have a weapon applicable to every 
act of war and for that matter, to every act of peace.”368 By proposing that chemical warfare 
would affect the global population’s “every” activity both in war and in peace, the magnitude of 
their amplification reached its uppermost totalizing limit. When they averred that peace and war 
will remain forever inseparable, Fries and West made chemical weapons seem unavoidable, 
necessary, and desirable. This speculative ideal applied to mustard gas as well, although not in 
practice.369 The “universality” of chemical weapons in peacetime broadened their appeal well 
beyond military affairs. The future of warfare, according to this highest level of amplification – 
the “universal” application of chemical weapons, portrayed the futurity of war as absolute, 
predetermined, everywhere, unending, and inescapable. Fries and West thus established the 
categorical certainty that chemical weapons would remain commonplace, but this certainty need 
not cause undue fear and panic because the universal application of chemical weapons was 
preservative not destructive. 
 This third “universal” level of augmented amplification therefore tied into an important 
element of their public relations campaign that sought to justify the use of chemical agents at 
home, on farms, and in industry as even more beneficial during peacetime than during 
wartime.370 Fries and West wrote that WWI’s chemical weapons “are aiding to-day and will 
continue to aid in the future the peaceful life of every nation.” Amplifying the power of chemical 
weapons entailed a complementary amplification of chemicals in general. The “unlimited value” 
of this “unlimited field” meant that every nation would embrace the dual uses of dangerous 
chemicals in every action.371 According to the rationale that chemicals “aid” humanity in all of 
its endeavors, the global population should welcome chemicals to assist with disinfection, water 
purification, exterminating pests, dye making, quelling riots, incapacitating criminals, “humane” 
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hunting, doping airplane wings, developing photographs, perfuming, producing artificial fabrics, 
distilling gasoline, fertilizing, and curing the ill, for instance. The authors reconceived the 
humane extermination of wartime belligerents as using peacetime humane extermination for the 
preservation of humanity.372 Fries and West thus granted chemicals a vast preservative power 
beyond their weaponization by framing them as essential to nurture and protect humanity from 
pests, disease, and famine. However, mass-producing chemical agents for all of these purposes 
meant that “every nation” would also be preparing for a massive chemical war. But this military 
preparation also could preserve life through deterrence, if every chemical power possessed 
equivalent arsenals. This is the paradox of “dual use” toxic chemicals: proof of the weapons’ 
usefulness derived from the combination of the peacetime and wartime functions. Fries and West 
thus used the material functionality of war gases as proof of the speculative adaptability of 
dangerous toxins to all human activities, and the speculative adaptability of chemicals to all 
activities proved the viability of maintaining the means to produce chemical weapons into 
perpetuity. Thanks in part to the advocacy of Fries and the chemical industry, unsafe chemicals 
would become commonplace in homes. 
 Thus Fries and West downplayed the effectiveness of mustard gas as a weapon by 
examining its statistical performance in WWI, and then amplified its preservative power to a 
permanent global scale. Despite taking a categorical stance in favor of chemical warfare’s 
preservative power, the instability of chemical warfare discourse slipped into the argument at 
times. The “gas is very deadly,” they wrote of mustard gas in what seems like a direct 
contradiction of their statistical proofs that argued that mustard gas was not so deadly at all.373 
But, wartime and peacetime equaled all time, and thus Fries and West advocated a permanent 
state of being in which chemicals presented everyone with the contrary prospect of inviting a 
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weapon of mass destruction into the home to sanitize, exterminate, and grow food. Extermination 
and preservation became “universal” synonymous activities according to the logic of Chemical 
Warfare. The individual soldier’s problem, the “titanic struggle” between death and protection, 
became the world’s problem, and by implication so did the possibility of humanity’s humane 
self-extermination. 
   
Conclusion  
  Fries’s and West’s publicity campaign had mixed success. They did not overcome the 
“psychology of gas training…which they never succeeded in fully solving” for the soldiers 
whom the CWS inculcated into the chemical warfare discipline, much less military command, 
politicians, and the public.374 Indeed, chemical warfare remains today a subject of humanitarian 
concern and vigorous opposition. But the CWS remained intact, albeit often underfunded and 
undermanned compared to its WWI heyday. The massive chemical weapons factory and proving 
grounds at Edgewood Arsenal often sat idle. However, their foundational pedagogy helped to 
train soldiers as the CWS continued both to research new weapons, tactics, and strategies, and to 
develop elaborate drills and instructions for troops.375 The publicity campaign, in conjunction 
with the emergent chemical industry, helped to legitimate the influx of mass-produced chemicals 
into almost every facet of American life as a preservative technology for agriculture, sanitation, 
and medicine.376 This process of saturating the globe with chemicals has, of course, also resulted 
in widespread anxiety, denunciation, and resistance. Thus, Fries and West did not surmount the 
Malthusian Paradox, and it continues to confront rhetors who participate in the discourse of 
chemicals. 
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 The history of mustard gas between the world wars was also fraught with mixed results, 
as the weapon fell out of and into military favor.377 For the most part, narrow deterrence worked, 
and chemical powers desisted from gassing each other. Instead they saved their weapons for 
unprepared “uncivilized” enemies. In the 1930s, the Japanese Army deployed mustard gas during 
its “Rape of Nanjing,” and the Italian Army bombarded ill-clothed Ethiopians with it from 
airplanes. At intermittent times between world wars, the U.S. manufactured mustard gas at its 
large factories at Edgewood, Pine Bluff, Huntsville, and Rocky Mountain arsenals. Other states, 
powerful and weak, did likewise, stockpiling chemical agents prior to and during WWII.378 In 
battle, WWII belligerents ended up not gassing each other. But another Fritz Haber invention, 
Zyklon-B, continued to demonstrate the power of chemical weapons to annihilate within Nazi 
extermination camps. Meanwhile, a large-scale U.S.-Australian program of human mustard gas 
experimentation caused many thousands of casualties.379 The U. S. desisted from large-scale 
mustard gas manufacturing in 1968, but the ease of producing it from chemicals readily available 
for commercial uses means that the threat persists. Thiodiglycol (TDG), a common precursor 
chemical used in mustard gas production requires a simple one-step reaction – the addition of a 
chlorinating agent – to make mustard gas. Now, TDG is mass produced for commercial uses, 
such as rubbers, lubricants, stabilizers, antioxidants, inks, dyes, photographic and copying 
processes, antistatic agents, epoxides, coatings, metal plating, textiles, solvents, cosmetics, and 
arthritis medication. TDG “is more accessible today than it used to be in the early days of 
mustard gas production.”380 In addition to mustard gas’s common availability, “Its large-scale 
processing for that purpose seems relatively undemanding in terms of technology.”381 Owing to 
this availability of TDG and the ease of converting it into mustard gas, an international TDG 
black market has emerged.382  
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 Fries anticipated this diffusion of mustard gas knowhow, if not who would possess it. 
Fries argued that mustard gas and other chemical weapons posed an internal threat to the U.S. 
government if possessed by advocates of “the bloody terrorism of a Godless communism.”383 
Mustard gas production did not require a massive military-industrial system, and Fries 
understood that the CWS might not retain monopolistic control of the new weapons. He wrote 
that “the use of gas by unauthorized persons may prove a very serious problem. Practically all of 
these gases are so powerful that an ample quantity can be carried in a pocket to make it very 
dangerous in an ordinary room or even entire buildings.”384 By turning his attention away from 
foreign armies to armed individuals, Fries’s rhetoric turned backward to the dynamite bomb 
talking that infused Haymarket discourse in which a few pocketed bombs seemed to possess 
unlimited destructive power. In fact, Fries and West had published a near complete how-to 
mustard gas production manual complete with various chemical formulas, photographs of 
Edgewood factory machinery, and detailed schematics of the German production method – 
information that could teach terrorists how to become battlefield chemists just as well as WWI 
U.S. Army conscripts. In its most basic form, as a textbook in the vein of anarchist Johann 
Most’s Revolutionäre Kriegswissenschaft, Chemical Warfare could empower revolutionaries, 
terrorists, and less-industrialized states to manufacture mustard gas. Fries thus recommended 
strict governmental oversight of chemical agents to keep the destructive power out of 
communists’ pockets.  
 Fries and West did not just look backwards for rhetorical invention though. Their 
argument about the necessity of chemical weapons to deter others’ use of chemical weapons 
helped to propagate what would become an essential logic of atomic bomb discourse – 
deterrence – which relied on the simultaneous capacity to preserve and destroy. When they used 
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statistical arguments and different levels of amplification to prove that chemical weapons are 
both “very deadly” and a humane preservative force, they implied the symbolic uses of the Bomb 
to control international relations. By deterrence logic, the Bomb would not work most effectively 
by annihilating people across the earth; it would work best by never getting used, never shedding 
blood, never killing, but by sitting poised for destruction. Deterrence meant purveying a 
perpetual fearful appeal to force that would preserve life by dissuading humanity’s own self-
extinction. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Peaceful Bombs: Pragmatic Idealism in the Correspondence of Leo Szilard  
 
 
“Do not destroy what you cannot create.”385   ––Leo Szilard 
 
 Leo Szilard’s flash of insight in 1933 has become an atomic legend.386 As the Hungarian 
scientist waited for a red light and crossed London’s Southampton Row, his thoughts turned to a 
speech by nuclear physicist Lord Ernest Rutherford and to H. G. Wells’s 1914 novel The World 
Set Free. Szilard pondered how to break apart atoms to produce a vast amount of power. 
Rutherford said it was impossible. Wells imagined that it was. But in The World Set Free, the 
international proliferation of nuclear power and atomic bombs leads to global devastation and the 
subsequent creation of a world government. In Wells’s doomsday vision, “the whole world was 
flaring then into a monstrous phase of destruction. Power after power about the armed globe 
sought to anticipate attack by aggression. They went to war in a delirium of panic, in order to use 
their bombs first.”387 Owing to the ease of obtaining the “simple apparatus,” no institution could 
control the annihilation once it started. Wells wrote, “The power of destruction which had once 
been the ultimate privilege of government was now the only power left in the world—and it was 
everywhere.”388 So, when Szilard conceived how to create a nuclear chain reaction by dividing 
neutrons in 1933, the same year Wells predicted someone would make such a discovery, he 
conceived fission with a mental backdrop of utter destruction. Wells had taught him that the 
horrors of atomic war could overshadow the development of atomic energy, or make peace 
impossible. Despite such catastrophic predictions, Szilard became by his account, “obsessed” 
with the idea of fission.389 
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 His early work on fission as well as his political foresight helped to spur the Manhattan 
Project.390 Szilard’s most notable writing was an August 2nd, 1939 letter sent to President 
Roosevelt, through Albert Einstein’s mediation, and with Einstein’s signature. It resulted in 
Roosevelt setting up the Advisory Committee on Uranium and appointing Lyman Briggs to lead 
the investigation into nuclear energy’s potential. Later, as an important member of the Project’s 
Metallurgical Laboratory at the University of Chicago he constructed with Enrico Fermi the first 
atomic “pile,” or reactor, and worked on reactor cooling systems.391 Although he helped invent 
the Bomb and somewhat influenced its use, by the time of the Trinity test on July 16, 1945, 
Szilard had little political leverage left to direct scientific and governmental policy, though he 
still sought it avidly. In fact, his persistent attempts to influence policymakers to refrain from 
dropping the atomic bomb and to negotiate patent rights with the government were regarded by 
Manhattan Project managers as meddlesome and possibly treasonous. Chief of the Chicago 
Metallurgical Laboratory, physicist Arthur Holley Compton suggested to Gen. Leslie R. Groves, 
the military chief of the Manhattan Project, that the Army should spy on Szilard’s contrarian 
activities. Groves himself thought Szilard a “villain,” decrying “as far as I was concerned he 
might just as well have walked the plank!”—even as Groves conceded that the U.S. would not 
have produced the Bomb without Szilard’s insistence.392 
 Nevertheless, Szilard persisted. His advocacy helped to pass the Atomic Energy Act of 
1946, which granted control of atomic energy to the Atomic Energy Commission, a civilian 
group, rather than to the military.393 It also helped form the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
organized the Pugwash conferences that brought together leading international nuclear 
physicists, and founded the political action committee “Council for a Livable World,” which 
today still lobbies for arms control and raises campaign money for like-minded politicians. 
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Consequently, Szilard won the 1959 Atoms for Peace award with physicist Eugene Wigner. But 
through this all, Szilard found himself in paradoxical positions: his professional stake in atomic 
power tempered his capacity to vilify the horrors of atomic war, and his moral repugnance 
toward atomic war tempered his capacity to tout the weapon. From his earliest insight into 
fission in 1933 to the bombing of Hiroshima, Szilard depicted scenarios of atomic annihilation in 
order to make his research sound appealing to military and political leaders. At the same time he 
argued for a type of atomic preservation – the hopes that nuclear power might in some way deter 
aggression and sustain humanity with an unlimited energy source. His writings were thus 
paradoxical as he simultaneously sought to create the most powerful weapon imaginable and to 
save the world from wartime destruction. Szilard believed that an American Bomb would create 
“a more livable world.”394 Yet he helped manufacture a more killable world.395 As such, much 
like Thomas Malthus, August Spies, and Amos A. Fries before him, Szilard had historical, 
political, and technological aspirations that confronted the Malthusian Paradox.396 His life’s 
work was focused on developing a technology that might be the means by which humanity 
annihilates itself, or might be the means by which humanity preserves itself from annihilation. 
 His rhetorical negotiation of the Paradox is best observed in his correspondences – the 
letters and memos he wrote to scientists, politicians, and technocrats to spur research into nuclear 
fission and the U.S.’s pursuit of atomic bombs, to advise how to organize the Manhattan Project, 
to advocate how to use atomic bombs, and to advance the ultimate abolishment of the weapon. 
These documents circulated to a limited but influential audience of persons, often with the 
authority to implement recommendations or convey them to powerful politicians. More than his 
more public documents—from speeches to articles and fiction—Szilard’s letters and memos had 
direct import for the development of the atomic bomb in the American arsenal and in American 
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policy. They thus provide a glimpse into Szilard’s most consequential, historically speaking, 
rhetorical efforts to negotiate the Paradox. 
 I argue that Szilard confronted the Paradox in paradoxical fashion. Whereas Spies 
negotiated the Paradox by exploiting the instabilities of language and logic, and Fries and West 
attempted to stabilize them, Malthus relied on paradox throughout his correspondence. 
Specifically, Szilard asserted that he and other nuclear physicists best understood the full 
technical and political ramifications of atomic bombs, and therefore they should have enough 
political leverage to influence the militant or “peaceful” uses of atomic energy. As he attempted 
to gain a level of persuasive authority in between the realms of science and government, Szilard 
relied on paradox to do so. Paradox allowed him to seemingly hold not only two contrary 
positions at once, but two rhetorical ethoi—that of the “disinterested” scientist, on the one hand, 
and that of the wily political advocate on the other. Such a paradoxical ethos, I argue, not only 
buttressed Szilard’s argument for the scientific and political authority of the scientific 
community, but also enable him to negotiate the paradoxical rhetorics of nuclear deterrence and 
the “pragmatic idealism” that underwrote it.  
 The remainder of this chapter unfolds in three parts. First, I examine Szilard’s contrary 
ethoi. Second, I describe how he delved into deterrence policy debate – a debate itself fraught 
with paradoxical discourse – with his own version of “atomic bomb talking.” Third, I describe 
how Szilard’s rhetoric exhibited a logic of pragmatic idealism that his personal model of 
communication corroborated, and that his eventual advocacy of “minimal deterrence” 
exemplified. But all this, I suggest, was premised on the logic of fear. I therefore conclude by 
examining Szilard’s desire to instill fear of the Bomb in humanity. 
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An Appeal to the Disinterested Scientific Ethos, Impassioned Atomic Bargaining, and 
Building a Unified Scientific Voice  
 Szilard used the overarching logic that atomic bombs could bring both annihilation and 
preservation to situate scientists between scientific work and policy advocacy, and to carve out a 
legitimate scientific presence in politics. He was caught between two ideals, one scientific and 
the other political, that presented him with the difficult rhetorical task of convincing two 
disparate audiences about what they should do about atomic bombs. Szilard therefore faced a 
near impossible dilemma to persuade scientists that they should think more like politicians, and 
to persuade politicians to think more like scientists. While Szilard attempted to get nuclear 
physicists to maintain inconspicuous secrecy about the probable destructive results of their 
research, he provoked politicians to legitimate that research—only to aver that the government 
should abandon atomic bombs as counterproductively too destructive.  
 Among his scientific colleagues, Szilard argued for the importance of a disinterested 
scientific ethos for both political integrity and political effectiveness. But for Szilard, this 
disinterested ethos was elusive in his interactions with politicians and technocrats, with whom he 
was zealous, wily, and provocative. Such tension between his ethoi suggested a larger 
communicative tension between science and politics. Szilard seems to have recognized this 
tension, and his efforts to build a cohesive, authoritative, and collective scientific voice for 
nuclear policy debates can be understood as an ambitious attempt to resolve it. In a high stakes 
endeavor to devise wartime nuclear policy, where much chaos, complexity, and rhetorical 
instability competed with dogmatic categorical convictions and rhetorical rigidity, Szilard’s 
paradoxical rhetoric revealed a simple truth to both scientists and policymakers: they wielded the 
simultaneous capacity to annihilate humanity and to preserve it. Therefore, they should formulate 
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policy with utmost prudence, and only the unified voice of the scientific community offered the 
most knowledgeable voice for policymakers to heed. Szilard’s work on fission in the lab and his 
realpolitik work in policy debates thus helped ensconce the Malthusian Paradox as a bureaucratic 
and political problem at the highest administrative levels of governance. 
   
Disinterested Scientific Ethos 
 When Szilard corresponded with physicists in 1935 and 1936 regarding how they should 
share nuclear research, he urged “disinterest.”397 In Szilard’s usage, “disinterest” referred to an 
objective scientific freedom from any personal interests that could derive from experimentation. 
Physicists must, Szilard argued, remain aloof from base personal motives lest they appear 
mercenary. In a June 3, 1935 letter to physicist F. A. Lindemann Szilard, recommended two 
principles to remain objective toward fission: (1) physicists should keep their research secret, 
only sharing it with trusted colleagues, and (2) they should apply for patents only when they 
knew what their political or technological applications would be. These two principles, however, 
were more than recommendations; they indicated the type of scientific ethos Szilard wanted his 
colleagues to exhibit. 
 This ethos was especially critical before the powers of atomic energy. The military and 
financial ramifications entailed by releasing an inordinate amount of explosive energy did not 
seem to allow for much impartiality. But Szilard saw that displaying such an objective attitude 
could benefit physicists by later situating physicists as the best arbiters of how to use the 
products of their own invention, whether for annihilation amidst the chaos of war, or for 
monetary gain in a stable peacetime economy. In a May 27th, 1936 letter to physicist John D. 
Cockroft Szilard wrote, “If such multiple neutrons exist, we may envisage, if we wish to do so, 
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the theoretical possibility of an industrial revolution in a not too distant future. In that case 
patents might be used by scientists in a disinterested attempt to exercise some measure of 
influence over a politically dangerous development.”398 If physicists published fission theory too 
soon, a dangerous government could appropriate it – like that of Nazi Germany – or its industrial 
implications might not be apparent, which could stifle their careers. Constructing a disinterested 
ethos was thus, in part at least, a rhetorical strategy meant to pay off later, depending upon how 
history would unfold, with either political leverage regarding foreign policy or economic 
leverage regarding atomic power.  
 In one respect, this scientific ethos was a soft approach to moderate between malicious 
international politics and what Szilard saw as a general tendency among scientists to ignore the 
political ramifications of their research.399 In March, 1936, Szilard made this goal explicit in a 
letter to Enrico Fermi: “I feel that I must not consider these patents as my private property and 
that if they are of any importance, they should be controlled with a view of public policy.”400 
Regarding his theoretical fission patents, Szilard wrote to famed nuclear physicist Lord Ernest 
Rutherford the same day he wrote to Cockroft (May 27th, 1936): “I cannot consider patents 
relating to nuclear physics as my property in any sense whatever. It would seem that if such 
patents are important, they ought to be administered in a disinterested way by disinterested 
persons.”401 Other scientists, Szilard intimated, should have the same goal. In this way some 
measure of substantial control might be exerted over the political appropriation of their science.  
 But to achieve this goal, scientists needed to think in terms of politics and economics. 
The disinterested scientific ethos entailed for Szilard a political and economic appeal, and 
therefore it was not just a matter of “good science.” He described how the most direct action that 
nuclear physicists could take to gain political leverage was to eschew potential monetary gain 
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from fission. Refusing compensation would dissociate their work from business, politics, and the 
military, even though Szilard knew it would be bound to all three realms. “It would not seem 
right to me that physicists who take out such patents should derive financial or other privileges 
from them and some sort of disinterested control ought to be found, if industrial applications are 
considered to be of some importance,” Szilard wrote in the same 1936 letter to Cockroft.402 
Abandoning financial considerations meant nuclear scientists could work for the common good 
in politics without conflicting interests.  
 These positions were articulated as Szilard pursued atomic energy in a concerted and 
aggressive manner, with full awareness of its weapons application. Thus, even as he urged an 
impartial ethos, his ethical position, as one of the producers of atomic-bomb knowhow, was 
already precarious. Getting rich from a technology capable of destroying the entire world would 
corrupt any potential political wisdom they might gain from their unique technical knowledge. 
They would be seen as military-industrial partisans rather than sage intellectuals. For this reason, 
Szilard indicated that physicists might retain or gain traction over the political uses of fission by 
absolving themselves of profit. But as the atomic bomb moved from being a theoretical 
possibility to an imminent one, Szilard could not remain disinterested. He was deeply disquieted. 
The impartial attitude on the part of nuclear scientists that he had hoped would position him and 
his colleagues to save the world from ruin itself began to appear more and more precarious. With 
the annihilation or preservation of humanity in the balance, Szilard recognized that the 
disinterested scientific ethos was no longer rhetorically viable.  
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Atomic Realpolitik 
 In the 1930s, in addition to urging scientists to maintain a disinterested scientific ethos, 
Szilard had exhorted scientists to keep their research secret by adopting a form of “private 
publication.”403 But with the usefulness of their scientific ethos for gaining political clout cast in 
doubt, Szilard devised that releasing his research might be another way to leverage a place for 
both him and his science in government circles. His push for funding became more urgent after 
his joint fission experiments with Fermi in 1939 and the knowledge that Nazi Germany was 
pursuing an atomic weapon. He faced an overwhelming rhetorical task as he, an unknown 
foreign exile, attempted to insert himself into American politics as the expert on atomic bombs. 
He simultaneously argued that atomic bombs were a means to use annihilation to bring 
immediate peace, but the means to post-war peace would bring ultimate annihilation. 
Thenceforward, Szilard dropped his disinterested scientific ethos and became an impassioned 
advocate.  
 Szilard began to use the tactics of realpolitik—subterfuge, provocation, and threats—to 
navigate and influence political power structures to fund his research. He engaged in a risky type 
of atomic bargaining, insinuating that he would release information about how to build a 
catastrophic weapon (to scientific publications, other governments, or industry) if the 
government refused to back his work with official money and power. The implication of his 
threat was apparent: if the U.S. wanted to assure its own preservation in the face of a looming 
global war, then it needed to fund Szilard’s project. If the U.S. government would not fund him, 
then other entities, including Germany, could wield Szilard’s theory of nuclear power simply by 
reading about fission in respected physics journals.  
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 Szilard’s first foray into realpolitik with FDR’s government involved generating 
governmental interest in his research when there was little. On April 5, 1940, after his and 
Einstein’s joint letter to President Roosevelt failed to produce immediate funding, Szilard wrote 
to John T. Tate, editor of The Physical Review regarding his paper, “Divergent Chain Reactions 
in Systems Composed of Uranium and Carbon.” “I am anxious that this manuscript should not be 
sent to print until I have definitely heard from the Administration that there is no objection to its 
publication,” wrote Szilard.404 In fact, the government appeared to have zero interest in whether 
Szilard published the manuscript or not. Later, he reflected that “I had assumed that once we had 
demonstrated that in the fission of uranium neutrons are emitted, there would be no difficulty in 
getting people interested; but I was wrong.”405 Szilard hoped that by convincing Tate of the 
national importance of his research, he could use publication—more directly, the threat of 
publication—to push the administration to pay more attention. His major problem was thus 
generating interest in his research at the same time his priority was secrecy.  
 The next month, still waiting for the government to step in and fund a classified research 
project into fission, Szilard got Einstein to voice his appeal. As a foreigner and a political 
outsider who lacked a more straightforward means to make his recommendations known to the 
upper echelon of the U.S. government, he had few options other than using Einstein’s authority 
to obtain some political clout. In March, 1940, Einstein wrote to Alexander Sachs, one of 
Roosevelt’s scientific advisors and Szilard’s and Einstein’s presidential intermediary.  
 Dr. Szilard has shown me the manuscript he is sending to the Physics Review in which he 
 describes in detail a method for setting up a chain reaction in uranium. The papers will 
 appear in print unless they are held up, and the question arises whether something ought 
 to be done to withhold publication. The answer to this question will depend on the 
 general policy which is being adopted by the Administration with respect to uranium.406  
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Opaque when taken out of context of Szilard’s correspondence over the preceding year, 
Einstein’s reference to uranium policies alluded to Szilard’s initial attempts to get the U.S. to 
intercede in the world uranium market to retard German bomb research.407 Using Einstein as an 
intermediary, he wanted to begin influencing how the U.S. government acted toward the 
discovery of fission, especially regarding whether it would initiate the foreign policies necessary 
to guarantee the U.S. could secure uranium deposits instead of Germany. Szilard’s appeal, as 
conveyed by Einstein’s letter, elucidated his grander ambitions. He did not want to control only 
the first atomic pile’s mere documentation. He was interested in more than “holding his papers 
up” and secrecy. Szilard wanted to move from being a scientific expert to a policy advisor. 
 This ploy worked, as the Briggs Committee granted a modest $4,000 for his and Fermi’s 
experiments. The next month, in June of 1940, the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development [OSRD], under the directorship of Vannevar Bush, took over uranium research, 
which marked the first systematic stage of the U.S. government’s organization of the Manhattan 
Project. 
 Szilard’s and Einstein’s pressure had secured governmental interest in nuclear research, 
but in October, 1940 Szilard thought progress was still too slow and funding inadequate, so he 
increased the intensity of his provocation. He wrote to Prof. George B. Pegram chair of 
Columbia University’s Physics Department (where Szilard was supposed to begin his research) 
that the U.S. government had provided “no assurance that further support will be 
forthcoming.”408 Consequently, he suggested he might have to release secret nuclear patents to 
the Canadian and British governments.  
If Dr. Briggs does not see any objection I might apply for a secret patent in Canada and in 
England, which I would assign without financial compensation to the respective 
governments, but I shall, of course, refrain from doing this unless I hear from Dr. Briggs 
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that there would be no objection on his part or on the part of any other Government 
agency which is interested in this matter.409  
 
Short of handing the patents over to these foreign governments, Szilard proposed that if he still 
was without “adequate government support,” he would seek foundational support from 
Rockefeller or Carnegie, and that he was not above releasing the patents to industry.410 With his 
open willingness to disperse secret documents Szilard increased the pressure on the OSRD to act 
before they lost control of classified weapons research during wartime. Whether a direct result of 
Szilard’s gambit or not, the “Uranium Committee,” then under the direction of Bush and the 
National Defense Research Committee [NDRC], released $40,000 on November 1st for Szilard to 
build a Uranium-Carbon reactor. Thereby, his various attempts to bargain with the U.S. 
government to pay attention to the threat posed by fission, to fund fission research, to pay 
attention to the world’s uranium supply, and to maintain strict secrecy helped engineer the first 
chain reaction—which took place a year later at the University of Chicago. Szilard’s wily and 
somewhat risky political interventions succeeded in the sense that he had negotiated a small 
amount of political traction as he brought about the meshing of scientific, military, and political 
goals that would coalesce as the Manhattan Engineering District in August, 1942. 
 However, Szilard’s later attempts to use his newfound political voice within the scheme 
of the Manhattan Project met with less success. Having already used his knowledge of fission as 
a political bargaining tool, he attempted to do the same with General Leslie A.Groves, military 
chief of the Manhattan Project, with patents derived from his work on reactor cooling systems. 
As historian Richard Rhodes wrote, “Szilard had believed he would have equal voice in fission 
development. Since he had now been compartmentalized [in the Chicago Metallurgical 
Laboratory], his freedom of speech restrained, his loyalty challenged, he was prepared to actuate 
the only leverage at hand, his legal right to his inventions.”411 The Manhattan Engineering 
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District maintained strict control over all patents, and General Groves locked out Szilard for 
most of 1943 as he annoyed his supervisors with endless quibbling about the status of his 
patents.412 Bush suspected Szilard of careerism, wring to Conant in January 1944, “I think 
Szilard is interested primarily in building a record on the basis of which to make a ‘stink’ after 
the war is over.”413 After the war, Groves said Szilard was “the kind of man that any employer 
would have fired as a troublemaker,” and “What a pain in the neck that Szilard was!”414 
 Regardless of the personal enmity he garnered from his strong-arm tactics, Szilard had 
used the rhetorical tactics of realpolitik to strike a bargain that would have world-historical 
consequences not only as it helped spur the Manhattan Project and thus Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
but also as it inaugurated an era of nuclear deterrence, nuclear proliferation, and the ongoing 
threat of worldwide nuclear annihilation. In the face of so much looming disaster, Szilard turned 
to the collective wisdom of scientific “truth” to intervene in nuclear politics.  
 
The Collective Scientific Voice 
 When science confronted the problems of the Bomb, Szilard argued that it should do so 
as a unified body, a body not only certain of its scientific truths, but a body certain of its political 
convictions. He argued that the formation of a unified scientific front could underwrite policy 
with the truth of science. Szilard sought to solve nuclear problems by throwing the massed 
weight of a large group of intellectuals behind his policy work. The U.S. government would have 
to reckon with a formidable dissenting “body” of scientific brains. Szilard’s pursuit of a 
collective scientific voice of truth in a nuclear age was rooted in both his experience in Europe 
and his experiences in the Manhattan Project. As early as 1930, Szilard had strategized that a 
collection of elite, youthful thinkers that he called the “Society of the Friends of the Bund” 
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should convene to steer the course of European politics toward democracy.415 He thus envisioned 
that science was a key to political progress. Paradoxically, however, Szilard attempted to get 
scientists to use their scientific knowhow to dissent against the product of their scientific 
knowhow, to use their professional authority to demonstrate they may have been professionally 
mistaken to design the Bomb. Implicit in this paradox was a sense of scientific responsibility: the 
ones most responsible for creating the means of annihilation should be the ones to devise how to 
avoid annihilation. Szilard’s plan thus seemed to embody technological paradox in the scientific 
collective. 
 In fact, the collective ethos of science became an issue in the Manhattan Project, where 
Szilard worried about the compartmentalization of research. In a February, 1944 memorandum 
sent to Vannevar Bush, Szilard complained that scientists could not “form a well-founded 
opinion and even if they individually arrive at definite opinions they are not able to put collective 
recommendations on record.”416 In turn, “there can be no judgment on which the administration 
can base sound decisions.”417 As individuals, scientists had little to offer, Szilard indicated. 
Rather, the “collective recommendations” of scientists were vital to any policy decisions. Such 
collective judgments were not just a matter of “truth;” they were a matter of power. As Szilard 
further wrote to Bush:  
 If there had been a mechanism for putting this collective opinion on record it would have 
 been difficult for the authorities who were responsible for taking far-reaching decisions to 
 make the mistakes which were made because those in authority would have been faced 
 with the choice of following the collective recommendation of the scientists or taking the 
 full responsibility of going against a practically unanimous recommendation.418  
 
The U.S. government, however, did not want “science” to function of as a voice of power. In 
fact, to protect power and assure the success of the Manhattan Project, General Groves mandated 
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the compartmentalization of scientific minds, leaving a vision of the whole “collective opinion” 
for a select few.  
 Szilard’s failure to influence the Manhattan Project administration to stop 
compartmentalizing research and information did not halt his attempts to harness the collective 
opinion of scientists to influence the deployment of the Bomb, however. As the Trinity test 
approached, Szilard moved from recommending collective action to organizing it. Szilard 
appealed straight to President Roosevelt. In a memorandum from March 25, 1945, Szilard 
constructed a collective voice for his colleagues in opposition to deploying an atomic bomb.419 
He wrote, “many of those scientists who are in a position to make allowances for future 
development of this field believe that we are at present moving along a road leading to the 
destruction of the strong position that the United States hitherto occupied in the world.”420 
Instead of dropping the bomb, “science” recommended military restraint as the proper course. 
Szilard then described the exterministic scenario he wished to avoid. He wrote, “Under the 
conditions expected to prevail six years from now, most of our major cities might be completely 
destroyed in one single sudden attack and their populations might perish.”421 The gravity of the 
situation should have, according to Szilard, given decision-making authority to the collective 
body of “men who have firsthand knowledge of the facts involved, that is, by the small group of 
scientists who are actively engaged in this work.”422 By this logic, Szilard equated collective 
scientific knowledge with prudent political knowledge as the “true knowledge” of the Bomb. The 
nuclear physicists were singular people, advocating military restraint at a singular moment. 
Nobody else on the planet knew what they knew. According to Szilard, the U.S. government 
could assure its preservation in the face of speculative cataclysmic destruction only by heeding 
the collective recommendations of these physicists.  
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 The day after the Trinity test, Szilard drafted “A Petition to the President of the United 
States.” Recollecting his impetus to write it Szilard said, “I thought that the time had come for 
the scientists to go on record against the use of the bomb against the cities of Japan on moral 
grounds.”423 To convince Truman of a moral case, he used some of the same appeals to rational 
scientific consensus that he had used in the Roosevelt memo. In the petition’s cover letter that 
exhorted fellow scientists to sign Szilard wrote, “I personally feel that it would be a matter of 
importance if a large number of scientists who have worked in this field went clearly and 
unmistakably on record as to their opposition on moral grounds to these bombs in the present 
phase of the war.”424 The moral claim, he suggested, was founded in scientific knowledge about 
“responsibility.” “The fact that the people of the United States are unaware of the choice which 
faces us increases our responsibility in this matter since those of us who have worked on ‘atomic 
power’ represent a sample of the population and they alone are in a position to form an opinion 
and declare their stand,” Szilard continued.425 Szilard therefore defined the role of nuclear 
physicists as one of unequaled moral importance that carried with it a huge burden of 
responsibility. The petition’s cover letter advanced an embodied synecdoche in which the 
scientists represented the whole of the U.S. population. If the average citizen had zero political 
agency to alter atomic bomb policy, especially amidst the ultra-secrecy of the Manhattan Project, 
then the few citizens and exiles who did know were beholden to pressure the government for 
restraint and lucid deliberation about future consequences. Szilard thus took it upon himself to 
“form an opinion” for “we the undersigned scientists” and their truth-centered, rational 
brainpower in order to act in their behalf. Only sixty-eight scientists signed.  
 When Truman authorized dropping Fat Man and Little Boy on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
power once again seemed to rebuff the voice of scientific truth. Szilard nevertheless remained 
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resolute that their collective opinion could influence future deployment. That politicians 
sometimes listened to Manhattan Project scientists and kept them “on tap” gave Szilard some 
hope.426 In the Cold War, Szilard gave up neither his efforts to stem the arms race, nor his efforts 
to unite a body of scientists to fight the unethical uses of atomic energy betwixt the threat nuclear 
war and promise of nuclear deterrence.  
  
“A Melancholy Paradox:” Deterrence Theory and Szilard’s Atomic Bomb Talking 
 With the atomic bomb looming as what must have seemed an almost in indomitable 
global force, deterrence theory ensconced the Paradox as official foreign policy for the nuclear 
superpowers. A holdover from criminal justice and WWI chemical warfare arguments, 
deterrence became a pervasive ideology with the development of the Bomb.427 Nuclear strategist 
and critic Herman Kahn defined deterrence as the creation of a “reliable balance of terror.”428 
Albert Wohlstetter called it “a delicate balance of terror.”429 In Wohlstetter’s estimation, “If 
peace were founded firmly on mutual terror, and mutual terror on symmetrical nuclear 
capabilities, this would be, as Churchill has said, ‘a melancholy paradox;’ none the less a most 
comforting one.”430 “Deterrence” seeks to dissuade enemy attacks by promising annihilation as 
retribution, which, in theory, avoids war. Moreover, deterrence assumes that the more 
devastating the threat, the more powerful the deterrent; consequently, it can lead to weapons 
escalation. Deterrence relies on the same technology to simultaneously threaten humanity with 
annihilation and to preserve humanity from annihilation. Thus, political philosopher Gregory S. 
Kavka asserted that “Deterrence is a parent of paradox.”431 I would suggest the opposite: paradox 
is a parent of deterrence.  
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 Szilard speculated about deterrence even before the Trinity Shot, and his negative 
assessment of deterrence’s viability was at the center of his apprehension about the effects of an 
atomic bomb. Szilard’s advocacy for the atomic bomb—like that of a number of his scientific 
colleagues—was rooted in a concern about the intentions of Germany. He argued that the U.S. 
should rush to construct the Bomb to deter a catastrophic German offensive. “Nobody,” he wrote 
in a May 26, 1942 letter to FDR’s scientific advisor Vannevar Bush, “can tell now whether we 
shall be ready before German bombs wipe out American cities.”432 Nevertheless, Szilard never 
recommended using the atomic bomb on Germany or on any other enemy state. Rather, in 
keeping with deterrence, he envisioned that this most violent device might temper the extent of 
Germany’s war effort. 
 Szilard held that atomic deterrence could work in the short term with respect to Germany, 
but he predicted that deterrence would fail to maintain peace in the long term. In subsequent 
1942 correspondence to Bush (and other Project managers) he warned, “What the existence of 
these bombs will mean we all know. It will bring disaster upon the world even if we anticipate 
them and win the war, but lose the peace that will follow.”433 “Losing the peace” would mean 
atomic annihilation, since, as Szilard asserted, a deterrent based on an atomic arsenal would do 
little to stop states from pursuing their own nuclear weapons program. With nuclear parity, 
Szilard envisioned, deterrence would not work to absolutely halt war when one belligerent could 
still wipe out another before they had a chance to respond in kind. The massively destructive 
force of the Bomb might deter certain acts of violence, but wars would still be fought.  
 Regardless of these grave reservations about the long-term prospects for a deterrent based 
on atomic arsenals, Szilard participated in the extremes of language that would be used by later 
nuclear deterrence advocates, whether under the aegis of “massive retaliation” in the 1950s or 
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mutual assured destruction (MAD) in the 1960s. He rhetorically amplified the Bomb’s 
destructive power to the point that all people, civilization, and life on planet earth faced instant 
extinction.  
 Indeed, what would become the rhetoric of MAD brought all of humanity under its 
spectral mushroom clouds. Reflecting on the significance of each of its pivotal terms shows how 
this new form of “bomb talking” acted in tandem with technology to hold everyone hostage 
under a guise of force that seemed impossible to counter with either rhetoric or technology, 
which left only policy to preserve humanity. “Mutuality” indicated that nuclear powers agreed to 
acquiesce to the Bomb as the arbiter of foreign relations, and that they agreed that peace required 
them to threaten each other with catastrophe. “Assured” indicated that the agreement had 
attained a level of guaranteed inevitability and permanence among atomic powers. Stockpiles 
became the guarantor of the bargain. “Destruction” indicated the exigency that MAD sought to 
avoid, and thereby the policy adopted destruction as the primary stasis point to deliberate. In this 
way, MAD established the hyperbole of weapons rhetoric as official policy, such that MAD 
deterrence required “saturation parity,” and eventually “overkill,” a state of nuclear stalemate in 
which nuclear powers maintained an arsenal that could destroy the world’s population many 
times over.  
 Well before anyone proposed MAD, Szilard’s atomic bomb talking foreshadowed how 
the effects of failed deterrence would later be amplified in war discourse. Civilization was at 
stake, he argued in 1934, sounding like H. G. Wells: “The discoveries of scientists have given 
weapons to mankind which may destroy our present civilization if we do not succeed in avoiding 
further wars.”434 Eight years later, with the world embroiled in war, he amplified the Bomb’s 
destructive power as it got closer to completion. In a September, 1942 memo to Manhattan 
 
 
175 
 
Project personnel called “What Is Wrong with Us?” he described “a world in which a lone 
airplane could appear over a big city like Chicago, drop his bomb, and thereby destroy the city in 
a city in a single flash. Not one house may be left standing and the radioactive substances 
scattered by the bomb may make the area uninhabitable for some time to come.”435 
 In a 1945 memo for a meeting with President Truman’s soon-to-be secretary of state 
James Byrnes (the original draft of which he had written for FDR), Szilard argued for the global 
scope of the Bomb’s threat, the global scope of any measures to control it, and the ease with 
which enemy scientists could reproduce American results. 
From now on the destructive power which can be accumulated by other countries as well 
as the United States can easily reach the level at which all the cities of the “enemy” can 
be destroyed in one single sudden attack. The expenditure in money and material which 
is necessary to reach this level is so small that any of the major powers can easily afford 
it provided they adopt “modern” production methods.436   
 
The memo further claimed that if Russia obtained two tons of plutonium, it “would be sufficient 
to destroy all of our major cities in a single attack,” and “In case of war, all of our major cities 
might vanish within a few hours.”437 Szilard thus argued for the imperative of global controls on 
any and all atomic materials, controls that “would ultimately have to extend to every territory on 
earth.”438  
 In “A Petition to the President of the United States” that he drafted July 17, 1945 – the 
day after the Trinity explosion, Szilard reasserted the massive dangers of the Bomb. “The 
development of atomic power will provide the nations with new means of destruction,” he 
warned. “The atomic bombs at our disposal represent only the first step in this direction, and 
there is almost no limit to the destructive power which will become available in the course of 
their future development.”439 Even if the Trinity explosion at Alamogordo Air Force Base was 
huge, Szilard went further, envisioning an atomic future with “no limit,” one that would bring 
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“devastation on an unimaginable scale.”440 Again he argued for control, concluding, “If after the 
war a situation is allowed to develop in the world which permits rival powers to be in 
uncontrolled possession of these new means of destruction, the cities of the United States as well 
as the cities of other nations will be in continuous danger of sudden annihilation.”441 
 Yet, these assertions about the Bomb’s ominous future comprised not only the logic that 
made deterrence theory persuasive, but also provided the terminology of nuclear proliferation. 
Ironically, while Szilard warned policy makers against nuclear weapons, his exterministic 
language made the case for deterrence and proliferation by corroborating the magnitude of 
destruction promised by those who praised the power of the Bomb. The scale of destruction 
promised in words amplified the material stakes of violence. If every government possessed 
civilization-smashing weaponry, none would attack. The Bomb’s horribleness seemed like its 
most preservative function. 
 Such amplification brought Szilard squarely before the paradoxes of bomb talking. The 
preservation of civilization necessitated the ability to destroy it. Despite some umbrage, by 
Herman Kahn and others, that the hyperbolic magnitude of Bomb rhetoric did not match the 
magnitude of actual destruction the weapon could wreak, language like Szilard’s became the 
norm for atomic bomb talking.442 Descriptions of “large-scale extermination” and “sudden 
annihilation,” as Szilard wrote to his Metallurgical Laboratory colleagues in September 1945, 
soon became banal.443 Instead of dissuading his readers with these catastrophic scenarios, he 
offered policy makers and the military a compelling language by which to argue for the 
importance of nuclear weapons. Thus, as an early participant in nuclear discourse, Szilard 
paradoxically helped frame a nuclear strategy he would oppose. His subsequent letters and 
memos, in an era of foreign policy marked by the dominance of deterrence, represented a type of 
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historical, political, and technological damage control as he attempted, with varied success, to 
remain a relevant voice.  
 
The Pragmatic Idealism of Szilard’s Model of Communication  
 While Szilard pursued the goals of saving the world and making it more livable too, the 
grandeur of these goals entailed working toward them in small incremental steps. He advanced 
scientist-by-scientist, politician-by-politician, and policy-by-policy toward nuclear arms control, 
then reduction, then elimination. The rhetorical tactics that Szilard used to control nuclear 
information – appealing to a disinterested scientific ethos, impassioned political bargaining, and 
appealing to a unified scientific voice – were calculated according to the practical push and pull 
of negotiating the probabilities of atomic annihilation and atomic peace.444 For this reason, his 
everyday language displayed a tactical pragmatism that he exercised in the long and unfinished 
quest for peace. Thereby his rhetoric operated according to a logic of “pragmatic idealism” that 
empowered Szilard to be paradoxical – to simultaneously argue for and against atomic bombs. 
Szilard never wrote of pragmatic idealism, but his friend and colleague Jonas Salk identified its 
presence in Szilard’s work. Salk reflected, “In his special ways, through a quest for knowledge 
and through the force of his pragmatic idealism, he sought to create a more peaceful world.”445 
 Pragmatic idealism made Szilard’s bomb talking sound reasonable as he entered the 
manipulative world of political rhetoric where his scientific principles might not find traction. If 
one rhetorical tactic failed, he could pragmatically jettison it to pursue another tactic without 
undermining the final goal. I suggest that the logic of pragmatic idealism offered a rhetorical 
mode to negotiate the paradoxes of technology, not only to Szilard, but to other rhetors who 
confront technology that could both annihilate humanity or preserve it from annihilation. 
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Pragmatic idealism offers a way of thinking that keeps the polarized extremes of total 
extermination and permanent peace in mind without hampering day-to-day affairs. Szilard 
indicated this logical tendency in his work by conceiving an idealized concept of scientific 
language that functioned as a counterpart to pragmatic political language. With two realms of 
language conceptually opposed, Szilard formed an overarching rhetorical strategy that bridged 
the idealism of scientific communication with the pragmatism of political communication. 
 Two philosophers writing in different millennia about how practical rhetoric interacts 
with lofty goals, Aristotle and Nicholas Rescher, help elucidate Szilard’s communication model. 
Aristotle synthesized the squabbling of Plato and Gorgias over the definition of rhetoric by 
defining it as the counterpart of philosophical dialectic, which brought pragmatics and ideals into 
the same realm of activity. Further, Aristotle defined phronēsis as the action of a prudent 
individual who identifies the available means of persuasion as an act of creating a better world 
based on a lofty ideal.446 A prudent individual must balance the reasonable with the desirable, 
and the desirable with the practical.447 Many centuries later, Rescher named and began 
publishing a systematic description of pragmatic idealism as a philosophical school in 1992.448 
To describe how the usually differentiated concepts of pragmatism and idealism mingle Rescher 
wrote, “insofar as realism stands on [a] pragmatic basis, it does not rest on considerations of 
independent substantiating evidence about how things actually stand in the world, but rather it is 
established by considering, as a matter of practical reasoning, how we do (and must) think about 
the world within the context of the projects to which we stand committed.”449 This type of 
idealism derives from method and not substance, and thereby “facilitates acceptance” of objects 
within the context of ideal principles. Rescher did not intend to equivocate “realism” with 
“idealism,” but he did argue that these discrete epistemological and political concepts overlap by 
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informing each other’s development in practice. Szilard, for instance, held the conviction that his 
prudent actions bettered humanity both when he spurred nuclear research and sought to abolish 
its dangerous products, but he dissociated, to an extent, his ideals from his many attempts at 
policy intervention to make his arguments appear more realistic. Szilard never would have 
abandoned his ideals, while he did abandon rhetorical tactics when the argument warranted doing 
so. To paraphrase Aristotle and Rescher, Szilard’s rhetoric prudently pursued manufacturing a 
weapon capable of wreaking annihilation as a pragmatic way to achieve the desirable goal of 
world peace. He, as a matter of practical reasoning, rhetorically intervened in a political realm 
bent on implementing foreign policy based on exterminism as a means to attain his commitment 
to disarmament. Szilard’s pragmatic idealism was thus paradoxical. It allowed him to work 
toward producing the atomic bomb and work toward abolishing the weapon. 
 Szilard’s model of communication clarified the ideal way he intended to use language to 
pursue “a more livable world,” or in other words, how he would pragmatically work toward 
peace. The model of communication appeared in Szilard’s personal “10 Commandments,” which 
his literary executors claimed “reflect Szilard’s spirit like a portrait,” making it vital to an 
understanding of his rhetoric.450 The third commandment exhorted, “Speak to all men as you do 
to yourself, with no concern for the effect you make, so that you do not shut them out from your 
world: lest in isolation the meaning of life slips out of sight and you lose the belief in the 
perfection of creation.”451 For someone who helped create the Bomb, Szilard’s attitude about 
communication was dangerous. As an anti-rhetorical stance that rejected the importance of 
“effects,” he rejected the ramifications of the words he used to spur Bomb research. Once a 
scientist resorts to persuasion, he argued, he or she abandons truth for manipulation of effects, 
and loses anti-rhetorical superiority.  
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 Szilard did not really live according to this third commandment, because it referred to 
scientific communication, which he dissociated from political communication. This dissociation 
meant he could be quite concerned with the “effects” of political language without breaking his 
life philosophy.452 According to Szilard’s argument, politics can evade truth, and science can 
evade rhetorical effect.453 When politics enters the realm of science and science the realm of 
politics, science gets debased as truth becomes obscured by unsavory motivations. His 
voluminous political advocacy intervening in weapons and war policies belied his beliefs that 
scientists have little power and that he should ignore the “effect he made” when speaking about 
what he considered the truth. When science and politics collided, neither political rhetoric nor 
scientific clarity could devise the best policies in isolation from each other. 
 Szilard clarified his dissociation of scientific and political communication in the short 
story “The Voice of the Dolphins.” Regarding his efforts at arms control, he concluded that 
scientists would have a greater chance of solving the problem than politicians. According to 
Szilard, “when a scientist says something, his colleagues must ask themselves only whether it is 
true.”454 Furthermore, “Scientists rarely think that they are in full possession of the truth, and a 
scientist’s aim in a discussion with his colleagues is not to persuade but to clarify. It was 
clarification rather than persuasion that was needed in the past to arrive at the solution of the 
great scientific problems.”455 In this view of scientific communication, the only questions that 
arise are ones of truth and falsity, so communication consists of describing and conveying the 
results of research. Truth and science have neither political motives, nor persuasive purposes and 
“effects,” while rhetrickery infuses politics.456 
 Szilard’s model of communication somewhat resembled G. Thomas Goodnight’s 
description of the personal, technical, and public spheres.457 But whereas Goodnight argued that 
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the different spheres merge with each other and get co-opted as arguments and debates develop, 
Szilard resisted the idea that the technical speech of nuclear scientists could blend with the 
speech of wartime politicians and still retain any integrity. Scientists, according to Szilard’s 
rather Platonic conception of rhetoric, should avoid manipulating language for political purposes, 
because he asserted that if scientists used political language, they would degrade the truth of their 
research. Effects could be ignored, Szilard argued, because as a scientist, the only way other 
scientists would pay attention to him was if he spoke truth. To settle a scientific disagreement 
open and clear communication of information was key, and therefore the scientific model was 
preferable.458 
 Thus the main difference between politicians and scientists hinged on their differing 
regard for the truth in communication. In contrast to scientific communication, Szilard asserted 
that in the political realm, “when a politician says something, his colleagues must first ask, ‘Why 
does he say it?’; later on they may or may not get around to asking whether it happens to be 
true.”459 Szilard defined a politician as “a man who thinks he is in possession of the truth and 
knows what needs to be done; thus his only problem is to persuade people to do what needs to be 
done.”460 Szilard thus recognized that both politicians and scientists needed to rely on each other 
to devise atomic policy at a time when many politicians viewed outspoken scientists as meddlers. 
 Rather than abandon the fate of the world to politicians, Szilard attempted to import the 
truthful language of science into politics as a pragmatic way to fuse the truth of fission to 
political gambits for domestic and international power. Hence, Szilard’s communication model 
had import for his scientific intervention into nuclear policy as he sought to influence 
policymakers to adopt a more scientific mindset and a more scientific type of communication. If 
the different spheres of intellectual activity required different types of communication, then 
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when they met, it would entail different means to understanding, argumentation, and persuasion 
in order to deliberate. Szilard’s political interventions were therefore a type of rhetorical 
information control that attempted to bridge communication between scientists and politicians, 
and this bridge entailed rhetorical invention that would bring the two models into alignment 
when they, by necessity, had to interact. He needed to control the dangerous information in order 
to accomplish his varied goals of building bombs, keeping the science secret, and then abolishing 
it. Thereby, his language was partly based in the pragmatic engagement with politics and partly 
based in the ideal truth revealed by science.  
 For Szilard “the facts” of atomic fission provided a way to negotiate the conflict between 
political rhetrickery and scientific truth.461 In a 1943 conversation with Hans Bethe, Szilard 
recalled saying, “I am going to write down all that is going on these days in the [Manhattan] 
project. I am just going to write down the facts—not for anyone to read, just for God.” When 
Bethe asked “Don’t you think God knows the facts?” Szilard replied, “Maybe he does…but not 
this version of the facts.”462 Szilard recognized that in the political sphere, he could rearrange 
facts in myriad ways to present the competing political arguments without losing sight of the 
scientific principles that undergirded nuclear fission. Scientific facts and political facts did not 
match each other, but rather than being a constraint, the flexibility of evidence empowered both 
his pragmatism and idealism as he attempted to get the government to pay attention to his policy 
ideas. His self-proclaimed “addiction to the truth” should therefore not be confused with an 
addiction to factualness. Controlling how his correspondents interpreted “the facts” thus became 
a primary concern of Szilard’s interventions in nuclear policy. Aligning the facts of nuclear 
research, international political goals, and weapons deployment could serve both the truth of 
fission and amelioration of its devastating power 
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 Thus, Szilard argued that political language should become more scientific in order to 
avoid nuclear war. In “The Voice of the Dolphins” Szilard wrote about politicians who believed 
that “scientists should be on tap but not on top.” This dictum meant that “scientists must not 
concern themselves with devising and proposing policies; they ought to limit themselves to 
answering such technical questions as they may be asked. Thus, it may well be that the scientists 
gave the wrong answers because they were asked the wrong questions.”463 This attitude indicated 
to Szilard that politicians failed to understand the Bomb’s technical problems and therefore 
failed to grasp its political ramifications.464 Szilard claimed that political solutions would become 
apparent faster if politicians abandoned their exclusion of scientists from policy making to learn 
more about atomic bombs, and if they followed a scientific model of communication. He wrote 
that, “scientific problems had been solved with amazing rapidity because they had been 
constantly exposed to discussion among scientists, and thus it appeared reasonable to expect that 
the solution of political problems could be greatly speeded up also if they were subjected to the 
same kind of discussion.”465 Thus, politicians should aim for clarification rather than persuasion. 
Szilard told an audience, gathered to honor The Nation magazine in December 1945, that by 
aiming for clarification of the truth, politics could approach science in its quest for the 
impossible. Szilard said, “The crisis which is upon us may not find its ultimate solution until the 
statesmen catch up with the scientists and politics, too, becomes [like science] the art of the 
impossible.”466 While the Bomb had been an impossible sci-fi prediction, scientists found a way 
to materialize it. The new impossible task was avoiding annihilation. Remaining ignorant of the 
Bomb’s social, cultural, and political ramifications that scientists like Szilard predicted would 
not solve the problems that the weapon appeared destined to cause. 
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 After the Bomb, confronted with the sudden dominance of deterrence theory and nuclear 
proliferation in military and political policy, Szilard’s pragmatic idealism manifested during the 
Cold War as a moderate argument for “minimal deterrence” that met arms race advocates and 
abolitionists half way. His advocacy of minimal deterrence exemplified how his communication 
model functioned according to pragmatic idealism. Minimal, or minimum, deterrence holds that 
only a few bombs are necessary to deter enemy aggression.467 A median point between 
abolishment and overkill, it broke his ideal conception of a peaceful world because the strategy 
still relied on using the weapons he wanted to abolish. Although minimal deterrence looked like 
a defeat of his quest to abolish the Bomb, it was Szilard’s best effort at political cunning, a 
pragmatic, incremental step toward the goal.468 It was damage control for nuclear proliferation. 
Szilard’s version of the policy recommended both that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should mine about 
a dozen of each other’s cities to enable minimum level retaliation in the event of war, and that 
each state’s citizens should perform rigorous public inspections of each other’s weapons 
programs. His most famous iterations of the minimal deterrent argument appeared in fiction as 
“The Voice of the Dolphins” and “The Mined Cities” wherein about a dozen bombs provided 
“insurance” in the event of enemy hostility.469 Not only would such Bombs provide retaliatory 
insurance, but their continued existence would make sure that fear would dictate that policy 
decisions would be rational rather than rash. Fear should force decision makers to use restraint 
and caution. Szilard’s begrudging advocacy of minimal deterrence became more prominent in 
his writings as prospects for abolition declined in the 1950s and early 1960s. Minimal deterrence 
did not make arms control impossible and in contrast to the careening arms race, reducing 
nuclear stockpiles to small arsenals did appear like a significant step toward eliminating them in 
the long term.  
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 Thus, minimal deterrence contradicted his ideal goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, 
while it empowered his negotiations with Bomb-struck politicians. The argument for minimal 
deterrence ideally worked toward peace and pragmatically legitimated the weapon. Like the 
concept of WMD deterrence in general, the strategy was therefore paradoxical in the way it 
relied on the means to exterminate large populations to guarantee that those same populations 
would not get exterminated. Szilard just called for restraint and fewer atomic bombs to complete 
the task of deterring global war than those who advocated massive nuclear escalation and 
proliferation. In a sense, pragmatic idealism worked as a “failsafe” – it empowered entente 
without abandoning disarmament. If one tactic failed, the ideal was still safe, but new tactics 
needed invention in order to attain it. In the face of the overwhelming catastrophic destruction 
wrought in WWII and the 20th century, Szilard understood that no lone rhetorical tactic would 
end humanity’s reliance on atomic bombs. Therefore, a pragmatic idealism accorded Szilard the 
ability to pick and choose how best to negotiate the Malthusian Paradox.  
 
Conclusion 
 Szilard did not succeed in convincing Truman to refrain from bombing Japan. But the 
first atomic blasts still served a pragmatic purpose within Szilard’s desire for world peace. 
Szilard asserted that a demonstration of the Bomb’s destructive capacity would rally public 
support of lasting peace by embedding a powerful sense of dread and foreboding into people’s 
minds. In a January, 1944 letter to Vannevar Bush Szilard wrote, “If peace is organized before it 
has penetrated the public’s mind that the potentialities of atomic bombs are a reality, it will be 
impossible to have a peace based on reality.”470 Szilard waffled in 1944 and 1945 about whether 
the U.S. should destroy a populated or pre-depopulated city, but Bush ended up concurring that a 
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destructive demonstration was necessary to scare people into political pragmatism.471 Only by 
fearing the atom could citizens and politicians best choose how to control it. He wrote, “it will 
hardly be possible to get political action along that line unless high efficiency atomic bombs 
have actually been used in this war and the fact of their destructive power has deeply penetrated 
the mind of the public.”472 Irrespective of whether deterrence would succeed in the short or long 
the term, fear would dominate policymaking. The peace, though, would not last long according 
to Szilard, and the nuclear powers continued to skirmish and battle. The terror, though, lasted a 
bit longer than peace. 
 The first three atomic bombs—exploded at Alamogordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki—
presented humanity with a weapon to worry about. Anxiety about the bomb proliferated. People 
reported a rupture of perception that had to be surmounted. The Trinity test stunned its witnesses 
and seemed to make all other weapons obsolete. In the words of General Thomas F. Farrell, 
witness to the Trinity blast, “All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new 
age—the Age of Atomic Energy—and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into 
right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.”473 
Farrell was just one person of countless numbers who proclaimed the birth of a new era – “the 
atomic age.” Life magazine, for instance, stated that “Aug. 5, 1945 is the day men formally 
began a new epoch in their history.”474  Elsewhere, the same issue of Life declared, “In a fraction 
of a second on Aug. 5, 1945 American scientists not only destroyed Hiroshima, Japan, but with it 
many human concepts—chief among them our ideas of how to wage war,” and “what is to come 
transcends all man’s experience of what has gone before.”475 Szilard also placed great historical 
importance on nuclear physics, stating that Joliot’s discovery of neutrons “changed the course of 
history.”476 Even though it did not cause the majority of the war’s casualties and fatalities, the 
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Bomb provided the exclamation point to the conflict. The lasting impression left by the Bomb 
made the weapon seem deterministic of almost all aspects of subsequent life. 
 The weapon seemed to obtain more influence as a symbol than its actual limited 
deployment as a weapon would seem to permit. That one bomb produced so much power and so 
much destruction amazed everybody to the point of saturating culture. As a ubiquitous symbol, 
politicians could rhetorically “drop the bomb” as a commonplace symbol of Cold War politics. 
Thus, post-Bomb weapons rhetoric remained relatively static, adapting to the new weapon but 
exhibiting the same paradoxical traits of older versions of bomb talking. Regarding the Bomb’s 
iconicity, its apparent singularity is not rhetorical, not political, and not deterministic. Nuclear 
weapons rhetoric draws from and resembles the history of weapons rhetoric; the ultimate weapon 
has not produced peace through deterrence; and it shares technological “power” to impact and 
motivate people with devices that have much more presence to people’s everyday lives than the 
remote silos and submarines that store nuclear stockpiles. 
 Later bomb talkers, like President Eisenhower, could appropriate well-established 
paradoxical arguments for retaining and increasing a nuclear arsenal in the name of peace. And if 
Szilard’s quest for peace represented a minority opinion during WWII, that stance shifted as the 
Cold War ensued and it became official, if not actual, policy to use the weapon for peace rather 
than destruction. In the early Cold War, atoms were for peace, not war. Whereas Szilard desired 
to achieve peace through abolition, or at least reduction, and a real desire for disarmament, 
Eisenhower desired peace through escalation and threat and a false appeal to disarmament hopes. 
In both policy ideas the same paradoxical rhetoric of mass disaster mitigated the ideal of peace. 
According to Ned O’Gorman, “Eisenhower cast the nation on a mission for world peace even as 
he and others in his administration spoke of massive nuclear retaliation, added substantially to 
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the U.S. inventory of thermonuclear warheads, and introduced the nuclear ballistic missile to the 
nation’s arsenal.”477 And as Martin J. Medhurst noted, although Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” 
speech had explicit references to disarmament, that step toward atomic peace functioned as a 
psychological ruse.478 Thus Eisenhower’s policy further entrenched the ideology of deterrence 
and reiterated the Paradox anew: atomic peace meant enduring the permanent threat of atomic 
annihilation to avoid atomic annihilation. 
 The atomic bomb’s symbolic power has, perhaps, faded somewhat, replaced by new 
weapons and new threats. And despite the Bomb’s usefulness as a military, political, and cultural 
symbol, it did not alter the world as much as hyperbole suggested. Regarding the effect of the 
Bomb on politics, French social historian Raymond Aron argued that the Bomb did not cause 
any substantive change in international relations.479 It was just another weapon, a more powerful 
weapon to be sure, but just a weapon. During the Cold War states operated much as they had 
before Hiroshima. States did not cease to conduct their wars by other non-nuclear means. As 
such, the political significance of the Bomb was overstated in its capacity to wage destruction, 
win wars, or prevent wars, even as a monolith of foreign relations. The atomic bomb resembles 
most weapons in its purpose, if not their magnitude of destruction. In Chicago, a hand gun 
threatens death and chaos to high school students more so than a terrorist’s improvised dirty 
bomb, much less a Soviet-era ICBM. The “facts” of atomic bombs and all other weapons can get 
rearranged to tell a variety of paradoxical narratives about people’s future. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Conclusion: The Paradox Abides 
 
“The point is not that atomic weapons constitute a new argument. There have always been good 
arguments.”480  —Robert Oppenheimer 
 
 Robert Oppenheimer, speaking to Los Alamos scientists in late 1945, indicated that 
atomic bombs possessed a persuasive character beyond their technical capacity to destroy that 
both complemented their functional military purposes and integrated their sheer power with 
politics, culture, and society. The relative stability of weapons rhetoric affirms this inseparability 
of weapons and the language used to advocate and resist them. As the preceding chapters show, 
weapons rhetors tended to reiterate certain arguments and rhetorical tactics that have 
characterized how people communicate about weapons from ancient Greece to contemporary 
terrorism. Rather than being a conscious attempt by rhetors to delve into history and memory for 
inventive cues and commonplaces, the relative stability of weapons rhetoric derives, I have 
argued, from the ubiquitous presence of the technological conundrum that I call the Malthusian 
Paradox. The boon and doom of dangerous technologies confronts weapons rhetors with a 
significant restraint that they must negotiate lest they produce an incomplete argument that 
ignores the destructive aspects of weapons to tout their preservative power, or ignores their 
preservative aspects to tout their destructive power. Over time, the ways of describing, 
advocating, and resisting weapons have coalesced into an observable template of rhetorical 
choices that get appended and amended according to varying contexts. The hyperbole used to 
describe the destructive power of different weapons, for instance, is more or less plausible 
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depending on circumstances. While a dynamite bombing killed one person at Haymarket, one 
mustard gas shelling decimated an entire battalion at Ypres III, and the nuclear bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed hundreds of thousands of city dwellers, all three weapons were 
described as capable of destroying the entirety of human civilization. Such amplification fits a 
variety of political circumstances from instilling revolutionary fortitude in workers to justifying 
the “military-industrial complex.” 
 Yet, the constancy of weapons discourse does not present an insurmountable obstacle to 
rhetorical invention. It also frees rhetors to calibrate their rhetoric and arguments to new 
inventions, changing political contexts, and the sizes of populations that must be saved or 
annihilated in war. Unlike the seeming generic ubiquity of amplification and hyperbole in 
weapons rhetoric, other rhetorical and argumentative strategies, such as Spies’s cultivation of his 
own martyrdom, Fries’s and West’s unwavering faith in statistics, and Szilard’s deployment of 
scientific consensus, each fit the specific situations of their utterance and would not have 
translated well to different conflicts fought with different weapons. Despite its constancy over 
time, weapons rhetoric does not constitute a static discourse but a vibrant one, characterized by 
novelty as much as normalcy.  
 Yet, when weapons rhetors confront the Paradox again and again, certain overriding 
rhetorical strategies do emerge that depict a dominant network of WMD discourse. Weapons 
rhetoric helps the public to imagine weapons so that incongruous practical and ideal goals seem 
capable of equal, contemporaneous achievement. This discourse helps to constitute how 
individuals and populations understand how they live and think while designing, manufacturing, 
advocating, deploying, fearing, reviling, and resisting WMDs. The Paradox in this way 
contributes to the invention of shared technological and cultural condition across different times, 
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places, and contexts – a cultural condition characterized by the proliferation of new mass-
produced weapons capable of causing destruction on a theretofore unimaginable scale. This 
technological condition and these elements of weapons rhetoric have a continuing history. They 
neither originated nor ceased the moment everyone seemed to become terrified of an imagined 
global nuclear holocaust. The Bomb did not alter weapons rhetoric at first blast, and neither did 
the Bomb nor its rhetoric originate in tandem.481  
 The amplification, statistical proofs, metaphors, and fearful appeals to force, among the 
other tactics used by the figures in this study, appear and disappear into this complex process, 
arraying weapons with arguments. In this way, the dominant network of weapons discourse 
sometimes dominates all political discourse in a literal sense. This dominant discourse 
sometimes hijacks other political communication and makes it a weapon’s subordinate. If people 
believe weapons advocates, political expediency must be oriented around the likelihood of 
whether or not people will resort to killing each other with one of many weapons. WMDs 
thereby have sometimes become the justification for a wide range of U.S. foreign policies from 
Cold War maintenance and halting the Domino Effect in Vietnam to supporting Iraq and Afghan 
rebels with weapons before conducting wars of occupation against the former allies. Hannah 
Arendt wrote of how the means to extermination can dominate political discourse such that “the 
great political issue of freedom versus total domination is overshadowed by the fear of 
extinction.”482 Because the Bomb materialized a ubiquitous technological anxiety, the Bomb 
made extinction immanent and imminent and therefore the way people communicated about the 
weapon became a literal dominant network of discourse that extended influence into far-reaching 
realms of foreign and domestic policy. In a type of technological circular reasoning, the Bomb 
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became both the means of conducting foreign policy and the indispensible proof why to enact 
those policies. 
 This last point is a key element in the historical trajectory of weapons rhetoric from 
Malthus to Manhattan Project: although “deterrence” or other factors may have halted nuclear 
holocaust thus far, militaries remain free to annihilate populations with all other types of 
“conventional weapons.” The Bomb has not caused “total extinction,” and Omega Man fantasies 
remain the purview of science fiction. However, any one arbitrary population can obtain, with 
little difficulty, the means to annihilate an enemy population. The industrialized production of 
such weapons and the resultant massive arsenals deliver the means to exterminate people like 
rats or commit genocides. Witness Chemical Ali’s gas attack on the Kurdish city of Halabja in 
1988 and the Rwandan civil war. Weapons that now seem anachronistic, but which rhetors once 
touted as capable of wreaking enormous destruction, still retain the same power to kill regardless 
of new, more destructive weapons. The technical capacity of the Bomb to possibly end war is 
null even though it has empowered states to explode entire enemy states. 
 That technology and rhetoric worked together to enforce fear of agricultural growth, 
dynamite bombs, mustard gas, and MAD lends credence to Paul Virilio’s argument that 
weaponry and language globalize violence by conflating speed, time, space, and information. 
From Virilio’s perspective, technological improvements in weaponry and communication 
technologies get reflected in the language used to describe them so that language performs the 
function of weapons of mass destruction. He argued, “This is the very aim of strategic 
information: to morally and physically deny the adversary the chance to rework his hypotheses, 
by redefining the space he must cross or the time he has to live.”483 War, language, and 
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technology combine to appropriate all activities under the purview of a monumental history and 
make weapons appear deterministic above all else. 
 In the face of any new ultimate weapon-of-the-moment, this dominant network of 
discourse presents an all-encompassing, globalized ideology that sweeps all humans into the 
psychological and physical range of threatening technologies, defining what it means to be 
“civilized,” “human,” and “humane.” In turn, inventing machines that promise to both wreak 
destruction and ensure preservation comes to seem logical. The logics that underpin 
industrialization, overpopulation, total war, mass production, technological appropriation, the 
democratization of technology, deterrence, escalation, and mutual assured destruction come to 
seem sensible justifications for the management of populations’ collective fate, even when they 
appear logically incompatible. 
 Throughout the preceding analyses I have also endeavored to elucidate the constant 
tension between rhetoric and violence that weapons help to mediate. Whether one deploys 
weapons rhetoric, weapons, or both indicates the viability of an individual’s or group’s political 
agency. Thus, weapons rhetoric functions at the tipping point between communication and 
destruction. Weapons rhetoric is perhaps the most violent rhetoric short of committing actual 
bloodshed. And when weapons rhetoric pushes upon this intangible limit, those moments define 
the character of the conflict that ensues – how and when people will live or die. In one such 
moment, at Haymarket, Spies pushed his exhortations to dynamite the capitalist establishment to 
the maximum limit so that when the Haymarket bomb exploded, his bomb talking became 
coterminous with bomb throwing, regardless of whether he meant it to or not.  
 The limit that marks the difference between deploying rhetoric versus deploying weapons 
materializes the ever-changing balance between those who possesses the means to stop 
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threatening their adversaries and to begin attacking them, and those who do not. The viability of 
political agency seems to depend on the sometimes equal and sometimes unequal distribution of 
weapons between revolutionaries and governments. Since industrial mass production arose, new 
weapons that once may have seemed mysteriously controlled by large companies and 
governments became well-distributed across diverse populations. Hierarchical control dissipated 
as the sheer amount of production and their destiny in the consumer marketplace demystified and 
distributed them. In 1886, dynamite was thus both the weapon of choice for anarchists and the 
U.S. Army owing to its ease of manufacture and procurement. In the 1920s, Fries recognized the 
threat posed by chemical weapons in the hands of communists for the same reasons. The same 
goes for the Bomb. The Bomb is no longer the sole purview of state governments. While H. G. 
Wells’s predicted the ease of obtaining the “simple apparatus” in The World Set Free, the 
missing nuclear devices that disappeared with the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the diffusion of 
nuclear power technology, and the training of untold engineers and scientists have led terrorism 
policy experts to worry that, like the prevalence of dynamite in 1886, mustard gas in 1918, and 
ammonium nitrate and thiodiglycol now, the threat of nuclear power is everywhere.484 
 Thus, to review and update some of the rhetorical themes analyzed thus far, a glance at a 
few examples gleaned from “nuclear terrorism” discourse provides a final contemporary view of 
the Paradox’s ongoing vitality. American nuclear terrorism discourse tends to not stress the great 
boon of nuclear energy to humanity. Instead, the power of nuclear weapons to maintain U.S. 
military dominance is assumed, and the more crucial question has become how to re-configure 
deterrence as the most powerful means of annihilation becomes easier to obtain.  
 Testifying before the Senate in April, 2008, Under Secretary for Intelligence and 
Analysis Charles E. Allen spoke of a speculative terrorist bomb. He described how “an 
 
 
199 
 
improvised nuclear device will lack the sophistication of a state-developed weapon, might be 
produced one at a time, with simple or no safety or controls.”485 Allen denied the capacity of a 
terrorist to produce a nuclear device comparable to a “state-developed” one. Rather than 
threatening less destruction, though, Allen intimated that an “improvised” nuclear bomb presents 
an even larger threat owing to its simplicity. The lack of safety features and sophistication results 
in a powerful weapon that a terrorist or other political actor can obtain with much less difficulty 
than the complex models and protocols that go into producing a state’s stockpile. The 
“simplicity” of the mechanism thus defines the limit between rhetorical threat and physical threat 
that a terrorist is able to invent.486  
 As U.S. officials present their case against the depravity of nuclear terrorists, they have 
attempted to demonstrate the threat is credible enough to warrant a crackdown, yet not credible 
enough to warrant undue anxiety and fear.487 For this reason, when American politicians appeal 
to fear to justify the interminable “war on terror,” they often reiterate commonplace weapons 
hyperbole whether they mean to or not. According to Senator Joseph Lieberman, “The American 
people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon. . . . Black 
markets trade in nuclear secrets and materials. Terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal a 
nuclear weapon.”488 The scenario described by Lieberman remains neither “inevitable” nor 
impossible.489 Lieberman argued that the diffusion of complex technologies to disperse groups of 
people poses an immediate and serious threat to national safety. Lieberman turned the logic that 
democratizing technology should help humanity into a justification for the war on terror, 
because, he indicated, democratizing the Bomb undermines security. The boon of nuclear energy 
to humanity became once again its most “urgent danger.” Nuclear weapons, through their 
symbolic appropriation by terrorists, show that the most sophisticated and powerful weapons can 
spin out of governmental control when rendered “simple,” even as nuclear terrorism remains a 
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mere speculative catastrophe. The supposed simplicity and diffusion of nuclear bombs thereby 
became an ongoing justification for the tenacious pursuit and suppression of terrorist activities.  
 In a remark made by Senator Susan M. Collins about nuclear terrorism before Congress, she 
delved into the humane weapons debate to depict effects of a terrorist attack. She testified that, “A 
nuclear bomb is the ultimate terrorist weapon, causing an unimaginable amount of death, suffering, 
and horror – precisely the kind of frightening and inhumane outcome that terrorists seek.”490 Unlike 
Fries and West, who dissociated the humaneness and inhumanity of mustard gas by separating 
material and psychological effects, Collins combined them. The Scope of destruction caused by the 
“ultimate terrorist weapon” is “unimaginable” because of death and horror. The speculative result is 
“inhumane” owing to the sheer enormity of the possible explosion to inflict injuries on bodies and to 
inflict a national psychological burden. The symbolic and material effects of nuclear terrorism join 
together at a terrorist’s rhetorical and technological inventive limit. The nuclear threat of violence is 
terrorists’ most extreme rhetorical strategy and their most extreme violent action at the last range of 
their capacity to negotiate. Yet the U.S.’s nuclear stockpile guarantees that anyone who commits an 
act of nuclear terrorism could get annihilated in kind. For those fighting capitalist domination and 
U.S. foreign policy, victory in either battle would be a desirable “precise” political outcome of 
nuclear terrorism, whether rhetorical or actual. Escalation and deterrence continue to explode each 
other’s logic. 
 However, lest politicians give the impression that their governance cannot control this 
colossal predicament, U.S. officials have also downplayed the threat posed by nuclear terrorism, 
diminishing the effects of a successful attack. The U.S. government must convince citizens that a 
nuclear explosion will not be that bad. “It’s more survivable than most people think. The key is 
avoiding nuclear fallout,” said an anonymous official in December, 2010.491 This quotation refers 
to a government document, Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, published in 
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2010 by a diverse interagency policy task force.492 Overall the document emphasized the number of 
lives saved if people would shelter themselves from fallout in basements and cars. Seeking shelter 
from radiation will save lives, but the Bomb poses many more perils than radiation that must be 
survived. And like Fries and West sometimes ignored the deployment of mustard gas in tandem 
with other weapons in different contexts, this document’s emphasis somewhat dissociated the 
effects of radiation from the effects of the initial blast and other catastrophic hardships caused by 
a surprise nuclear explosion. By glossing over the devastation wrought by a blast and the chaos 
that would ensue, the government makes survival seem like a much more simple prospect than 
the scenarios depicted by Lieberman and Collins. A new radiation proof version of “duck and 
cover” has arisen, indicating that augmented amplification remains a commonplace of weapons 
discourse. Destructive power gets amped up and diminished to make the war on terror sound 
prudent. 
 The testimony of Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Jane Holl Lute before the 
United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on September 
15, 2010 indicated how government officials continue to simultaneously amplify and diminish 
nuclear terrorism’s potential destructive effects. She stated, “Few would disagree that the 
detonation of a nuclear device in a U.S. city would have devastating consequences. I don't need 
to itemize damage and casualty estimates for you.” She proceeded to cite an April, 2009 speech 
in which President Barack Obama “affirmed that terrorist acquisition of a nuclear weapon is the 
‘most immediate and extreme threat to global security.’” Despite the presence of innumerable 
other weapons available in far greater numbers, Lute and Obama amplified the threat to elevate 
the destructive power and probability of one nuclear incident over that of all other weapons 
available to terrorists. Yet, Lute turned to the technical and material aspects of nuclear terrorism 
to downplay the possibility that such an incident would even occur. In addition to obtaining 
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either HEU (highly enriched uranium) or plutonium, a state or non-state terrorist organization, 
according to Lute, “would also necessitate financial, technical, and logistical resources to 
construct or modify the device (in most cases), transport it to the target, perhaps across multiple 
international borders and by various modes of conveyance, and detonate; all without being 
detected.”493 This list of difficult and risky steps that a terrorist must take in order to commit an 
act of nuclear terrorism implied that such an undertaking has little plausibility of happening. 
People should be afraid, very afraid of nuclear-capable terrorists, but not so afraid that they live 
in a constant state of paranoia and convinced that the U.S. government can do as little to halt a 
nuclear terrorist as it did to prevent 9/11. Bluster, devices, and words intermingled in Lute’s 
testimony to create a mirage of semi-preparedness. 
 In sum, the long historical trajectory from Malthus to Szilard and beyond demonstrates 
that while discourse shrieks radical newness at the innovation of each device in an endless chain 
of dangerous technologies, certain rhetorical strategies and tactics have become commonplaces 
that appear in a disparate array of document types used by people from multifarious political 
perspectives. And the necessity of negotiating the ever-present problem of the Malthusian 
Paradox is one primary reason why weapons rhetoric demonstrates this consistency over time. 
Hence, the usefulness of longitudinal case studies to rhetoricians who seek an understanding of 
how rhetoric and argumentation function both in specific contexts and in chronological 
relationship to each other. From early 19th century anxieties about overpopulation and war to 
speculation about nuclear terrorism, I have endeavored to show how rhetorical forces have 
contributed to weapons development in tandem with actual machines and within ideological 
frameworks that brought people “before the bomb” in body and in mind. 
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 Although weapons advocates may downplay a weapon’s destructive power, the 
inventiveness of rhetoric, technologies, and ideas cannot hide what weapons reveal through their 
killing force – that people have justified reasons to question, wonder about, and fear weapons 
that could end up annihilating their worlds. The Paradox, as it confronts people with all of its 
myriad commonplaces, and quirks, contradictions, and complexities reveals an unappealing truth 
that even powerful individuals, like Maj. Gen. Amos A. Fries, struggle to control the 
simultaneous rhetorical and destructive forces of weapons. Much like the fraught tension at the 
limit between violence and rhetoric, the Paradox reveals how language can either fail to control a 
dangerous technology or to finally exercise control over one just at the moment when an ultimate 
civilization-smashing, exterministic force looms. At this palpable limit between war and peace, 
the Paradox demonstrates whether the action a rhetor must take is one of communal preservation 
or collective violence. To paraphrase Oppenheimer, there have always been good arguments to 
make more fertilizer and to make more explosives. 
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Afterword: 
 
 
Technē – Technology/Rhetoric/Philosophy 
 
 In order to delve into the complex relationship between weapons, rhetoric, and the 
Malthusian Paradox, I asked two primary research questions central to the concept of technē: 
How does technological invention influence rhetorical invention, and how does technological 
invention influence rhetorical invention? Technē grants greater insight into technology rhetoric 
than just an appraisal of either language or technological design, because its multifaceted 
inventiveness – characterized by technology, rhetoric, and as I will argue, philosophy – together 
transform and remake the human environment.494 The ancient concept of technē may have strong 
ties to paradox, as suggested by Janet Atwill, but in this afterword I turn my attention away from 
paradox and toward technē.495As intrinsic aspects of technological behavior the co-creative 
powers of technē mesh together and impinge upon each other – technology by making in the 
concrete and material sense, rhetoric by motivating people to innovate, produce, use, and resist 
technology, and philosophy by making in the ideological and conceptual sense. Together these 
varieties of invention function as intermediaries between the environment and its perpetual 
recreation through innovation.496 It is in this sense that technē functioned as a type of critical lens 
for my research. And it is as a critical lens, I suggest, that technē helps to explain how people 
control invention and how invention controls them. Technē persuades, and technē empowers the 
invention of machines and the concepts that make sense of them. Without the desirability of 
killing large numbers of enemy citizens fashioned by ideology, rhetorical appeals and 
mechanical functionality, hyperbolic depictions of WMDs, for instance, would undermine their 
own uses. In the remainder of this afterword, I first provide a historical gloss on technē‘s 
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etymology. Second, I discuss the theoretical background for this conception of technē by 
examining pertinent rhetorical and technology studies scholarship. I then expand the concept of 
technē to include philosophical invention by examining Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology. Thus, technē brings together three critical fields of inquiry that seek to understand 
the function of technology in society. 
 The Greek etymological roots of “technology” – technē and logos – point toward an 
understanding of the term that incorporates a wide range of activities requiring artistic skill and 
craft. According to rhetorician Richard Mckeon, the two terms must be united in order to 
understand and critique technology, and rhetoric provides their conceptual link as exemplary of 
both logos and technē. McKeon considered technē an integration of the inventive capacity of 
these two types of technai (technology and rhetoric) in order to define what he called 
“architectonic art.” The systematized organization of architectonic art is “an art of structuring all 
principles and products of knowing, doing, and making” that uses “a comprehensive form of the 
rhetorical device of ‘schematization,’” and such “comprehensive schematization” of behavior 
derives from both rhetoric and technology.497 McKeon explained the link between rhetoric and 
technology by noting that “The architectonic productive art in the age of ‘technology’ is 
obviously technology itself given a rhetorical transformation.”498 Rhetoric can be considered “the 
logos of technē” in the sense that it encompasses the interrelationship of the world-making 
capacity of language and the world-making preponderance of machines without abandoning the 
Aristotelian notion that rhetoric comprises both art and method, or “techno-logy.”499   
 Some rhetorical scholarship has recognized the complex interplay of rhetoric and 
technology, if not philosophy, and has taken up questions about materiality and rhetoric that 
suggest the usefulness of technē as a critical concept. Lloyd Bitzer, Michael Calvin McGee, 
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Celeste Condit, Kenneth Burke, and Carol Blair have all written about how bodies, material, and 
rhetoric interact to produce meaning. I suggest that extending and developing their research 
entails paying heed to how the functions and capacities of technologies complement and/or 
undermine the rhetorical tactics and strategies that support and challenge machines and systems. 
In contrast to many theories of materiality that conceptualize rhetoric as neo-Marxist ideology or 
forms of Foucouldian governmentality, and thereby move away from the artifacts to become a 
type of meta-materiality, technē keeps the material functions of technologies and their 
destructive effects close at hand. Yet, it still remains cognizant of inventive immaterial forces – 
the over-arching concepts of universal power and ideology. 
 Lloyd Bitzer’s famous definition of rhetoric provides a starting point to expand the 
rhetorical understanding of technē. By defining rhetoric as “a mode of altering reality, not by 
direct application of energy to objects, but by the creation of discourse which changes reality 
through the mediation of thought and action,” Bitzer emphasized that rhetors “create discourse” 
in specific “rhetorical situations” that the material environment “constrains.”500 Therefore, 
rhetors must pay heed to material contingencies in order to “change reality.” But emphasizing 
material contingency casts doubt upon Bitzer’s dissociation of the “direct application of energy 
to objects” from rhetoric, owing to the intricate melding of rhetoric and energized objects 
inherent in the concept of technē. I thus propose that uniting Bitzer’s negative, dissociating 
clause with the rest of his definition of rhetoric grants greater insight into technology rhetoric. To 
rewrite his definition in line with the concept of technē, rhetoric and the “direct application of 
energy to objects” work together as discourse and context impinge upon each other. 
 In contrast to Bitzer, Michael Calvin McGee argued for a more rigorous incorporation of 
materiality into rhetorical theory. According to McGee, a competent rhetorician will use “a 
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material conception of rhetoric, if only in formulary recognition of situational constraints on a 
would-be advocate’s choice of strategy and technique.”501 In order to provide plausible impetus 
to action, rhetorical invention must make sense in regard to material contingency, and McGee’s 
essay, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” called attention to how rhetorical critics should 
incorporate cognizance of the physical world into their theories. Because rhetoric is “an object, 
as material and as omnipresent as air and water,” rhetorical theory must appraise the impact of 
rhetoric’s physical properties.502 Therefore, McGee suggested that “a theory of rhetoric can be 
legitimate only when measured, directly and explicitly, against the objects it purportedly 
describes and explains.”503 Extending this assertion to technology rhetoric indicates that 
“measurement” must incorporate cognizance of mechanical properties in order to understand 
their influence on human behavior, so a rhetorician must take the specific design and 
functionality of a machine into account in order to consider the full rhetorical situation. 
 Celeste Condit and Jack Selzer made similar arguments about the importance of material 
context to rhetoric with implied pertinence to technology rhetoric. Condit argued that any 
rhetorical critique must include an adequate representation of materiality in order to prove its 
pertinence to human relations. She wrote, “The combination of object and process is necessary 
for understanding how it is that language has effects in the world—that is, for understanding how 
meaning is something real, something material, and not merely a function of disembodied spirit 
or mind.”504 She therefore suggested adding a “physical component” to the concept of historical 
materialism. Attention to technological functionality would accomplish Condit’s proposal. Jack 
Selzer concurred that “language is not the only medium or material that speaks.”505 Technologies 
“have explicitly coercive functions that rehearse the highly persuasive if less overt ways in which 
other material realities, cultural practices, and physical bodies shape and persuade,” Selzer 
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continued.506 To extend Selzer’s argument, technē calls for examination of both the material 
aspects technology rhetoric and of “the rhetorical character” of technology.507 
 Kenneth Burke also recognized the double movement between material and rhetorical 
world-making with his concept of recalcitrance. According to Burke, “A statement is an attitude 
rephrased in accordance with the strategy of revision made necessary by the recalcitrance of the 
materials employed for embodying this attitude.”508 Furthermore, “recalcitrance forces a speaker 
to revise their original statements to “induce cooperation.”509 If an audience’s cooperation 
becomes induced, then the rhetor has successfully melded language with the audience’s 
conception of material factuality. The recalcitrance of “Big Technology” forces rhetors, to an 
extent, to adjust their language in accordance with how people understand their relationship to 
machines, a relationship that is both material and ideological.510 
 Carole Blair made a similar argument regarding public memorial sites by describing how 
the physical construction of monuments guides human behavior. According to Blair, “These sites 
. . . suggest—sometimes prescribe—pathways for a visitor to traverse, and those pathways 
influence reception significantly.”511 The physical artifact thus determines human behavior to an 
extent, but of course the visitors at memorial sites need not traverse pathways in a pre-mapped 
pattern when they could choose to clamber over the stones instead. People appropriate artifacts 
for many uses non intended by their designers, as do rhetors who confront technology. 
 Technē thus takes up these rhetorical readings of materiality and extends them by calling 
for a specific focus on incorporating the functional design of technologies into criticism. 
Technology is persuasive, as technology critics have noted. According to Andrew Feenberg, 
“Technologies are not mere means to ends; they also shape worlds.”512 Langdon Winner 
concurred that technologies “are powerful forces acting to reshape [human] activity and its 
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meaning.”513 And if viewed from an overarching perspective, Kenneth Burke’s writing about 
technology indicates that it operates as a type of rhetorical force.514 Weapons are not mere tools 
with which to contextualize rhetorical events, but rather, the weapons and rhetoric are 
inseparable and cannot, I argue, be understood without each other. 
 Some technology critics, like Donald A. Norman, Oswald Spengler, and Langdon Winner 
have also pointed toward the usefulness of melding rhetoric, technology, and philosophy under 
the term technē. Norman’s distinction between “affordances” and “constraints” in The Design of 
Everyday Things indicates how design influences behavior. Norman asked, “How can design 
signal the appropriate actions?”515 To answer, he posited that “the natural constraints of objects, 
physical constraints…limit what can be done,” and “the affordances of objects which convey 
messages about their possible uses, actions, and functions…suggest the range of possibilities.”516 
A technology’s affordances and constraints limit its ability to suggest its rhetorical uses, and 
therefore technology impacts rhetoric by constraining and freeing the rhetor at the same time. 
Norman wrote, “The thoughtful use of affordances and constraints together in design lets a user 
determine readily the proper course of action, even in a novel situation.”517 In terms of technē’s 
inventive scope, the recalcitrance of physical design both limits a rhetor’s inventive capacity and 
opens up a limitless range of world-making opportunities.  
 Oswald Spengler’s Man and Technics advanced a similar formative notion of technology. 
Spengler defined technology, or die Technik, as “the tactics of all living. It is the inner form of 
the procedure of conflict, with which life is synonymous.”518 Rather than emphasizing only the 
artifact, his definition located the essence of technology in strategy and “tactics,” such that 
technology is a motivated “procedure.” Spengler refined his concept of Technik in an additional 
negative definition that also highlighted procedure: “Technics is not to be understood in terms of 
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the implement. What matters is not how one fashions things, but what one does with them; not 
the weapon, but the battle.” Furthermore, “There are innumerable techniques in which no 
implements are used at all,” such as diplomacy and “the technics of administration, which 
consists in keeping the State in form for the struggles of political history. There are chemical and 
gas-warfare techniques…Always it is a matter of purposive activity, never of things.”519 This far-
reaching conception of technology and technique as a type of purposive activity encompassed 
rhetoric as an active element of technical work when Spengler extended technology to include 
actions that are inherently persuasive, such as diplomacy. Spengler elaborated that “Technics in 
man’s life is conscious, arbitrary, alterable, personal, inventive.  It is learned and improved.  Man 
has become the creator of his tactics of living—that is his grandeur and his doom.”520 Therefore, 
die Technik is both mechanical and rhetorical in its construction of humanity’s technological 
condition. 
 Technology critics have also advanced the idea that technologies are inherently political, 
which further indicates the usefulness of conceiving rhetoric, technology, and philosophy as co-
creative. Technology impacts politics in tandem with rhetoric and philosophy as people 
deliberate dangerous technologies, the results of which alter how individuals confront states and 
how states confront people. Delineating the political effects of technologies is central to 
philosopher of technology Langdon Winner’s scholarship. In Autonomous Technology, he called 
for a type of “political technology,” to pay heed to both how devices are designed for political 
ends and to how devices can get appropriated, redesigned, and manipulated by politics.521 
Extending Lewis Mumford’s contention that two types of political technologies exist 
(authoritarian and democratic), Winner expanded the concept of “political technology” in The 
Whale and the Reactor to argue that all technologies have political characteristics, if they are not 
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“inherently political artifacts,” like the Bomb.522 Because an artifact’s design and functions open 
up a range of social activity, their use entails political ramifications, whether intended or not. 
Hence, technologies are imbued with political implications and contingencies in two ways. First, 
some artifacts are designed to influence a specific political issue; and second, some artifacts 
cannot exist without specific political and economic conditions.523 Winner concluded that 
tempering technological change with democratic wisdom would recognize the political character 
of technological problems, and thereby provide a path towards solving humanity’s technological 
problems.524 Technology’s politically motivated design and the political context in which 
innovation happens contribute to determining human behavior, and owing to their political 
nature, the physical makeup of technological artifacts imbues them with what seems like 
rhetorical force. According to Winner, “The issues that divide or unite people in society are 
settled not only in the institutions and practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in 
tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and semiconductors, nuts and bolts.”525 
Technologies thus motivate people to engage in political behavior, or not, much like rhetoric 
does. 
 I further suggest that because philosophizing resembles a type of skilled invention, it 
should be included under the umbrella concept of technē. Philosophy is not considered a 
traditional type of technē, but philosophy can be conceived as the skilled “art of forming, 
inventing, and fabricating concepts,” in the words of Deleuze and Guattari.526 Calling philosophy 
a type of technē is especially useful when examining dangerous technologies, because 
understanding either how a philosophical position helps to create a condition of society, or how a 
societal condition helps to inform its philosophical theorization, also leads to an understanding of 
a potential way to dismantle a problem and its philosophical counterpart with the same creative 
 
 
213 
 
forces.527 Technology scholar Andrew Feenberg argued that Heidegger, for instance, espoused a 
philosophy of technology that “constitutes a new type of cultural system that restructures the 
entire social world as an object of control,” and as a consequence of this technological world-
restructuring, “technology is not simply a means but has become an environment and a way of 
life.”528 Philosophy invents the world alongside rhetoric and technology, which demonstrates the 
material ramifications of philosophy as it participates in, for instance, the rationalization of 
WMD ideology. The failure of rhetoric to solve the complex dilemmas posed by dangerous 
technologies contributes to the widespread belief that technology has come to alienate, dominate, 
and overwhelm humanity in all aspects of life, including rhetoric. Technology has become a 
universal and insurmountable problem, which has become a common topos of technology 
discourse. Heidegger’s philosophy of technology exemplifies this perspective, but its explicit 
appropriation of technē indicates that attention paid to invention could help to reverse 
technological fatalism. For these reasons, philosophy deserves consideration as a type of 
technē.529  
 In “The Question Concerning Technology,” Martin Heidegger portrayed humanity as 
doomed to suffer technology’s apparent total domination of human life. Much like Ellul’s 
conception of “the technological society,” Heidegger argued that the ubiquity of technology in 
human affairs constitutes one of technology’s fundamental characteristics, and that the “essence 
of technology,” Gestell, “enframes” humanity within technology. Heidegger defined this “frame 
holding sway” as a process in which “the essence of man is framed, claimed, and challenged by a 
power which manifests itself in the essence of technology, a power which man himself does not 
control.”530 Heidegger’s conception of autonomous technology’s Gestell leaves humanity as 
mere “standing-reserve,” or a type of ordered living power supply to the technological order.531 
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 After asserting the futility of using language to solve technological problems, Heidegger 
later gave up hope that humanity could solve its technological predicaments, and turned to God 
for salvation.532 Ascribing accountability for technological change to divine power stripped 
instrumental rhetorical agency from people. Moreover, many examinations of weapons rhetoric 
seem to corroborate Heidegger’s assertion that rhetoric fails to alter the apparent domination of 
humanity by technology. Rhetorical scholarship has portrayed a bleak outlook for humanity in 
which rhetors, such as “Nuclear Freeze” proponents and nuclear power technocrats, fail to solve 
the complex dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons and energy.533 
 However, before he asserted that “only a god can save us,” Heidegger proposed that 
technē offers humanity a way of formulating a solution to technological problems. Although 
Heidegger’s religious turn abrogated his claims in “The Question Concerning Technology,” his 
previous philosophy of technology resurrected rhetorical force from technological subjugation, 
because Technē is inherent to both the creation of technological problems and their correctives. 
Despite the bleak situation faced by humanity, enframed by Gestell, Heidegger proposed that 
while “technology” is one materialization of “technē,” the two terms are not synonymous 
because technology refers to an end product, while technē refers to the inventive means that 
empowered the production of technology. Heidegger therefore argued that the only way to 
reorder humanity’s relationship with technology is to implement the non-technological essence 
of technology, technē, which could “come to presence” the “possible arising of the saving 
power.” Similar to artistic poiēsis, which was once “also called technē,” technē reveals, or 
“brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearing.”534 This creative revealing subjugated 
humanity to enframing technology, but the essence of technē is not in itself technical.  Therefore, 
technē has the potential to reveal another creative being in the world that is less technologically 
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menacing. Heidegger quoted poet Friedrich Hőlderlin to describe this dual function of technē: 
“But where danger is, grows/The saving power also.”535 In more concrete terms Heidegger wrote 
that, “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon 
technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, 
akin to the essence of technology, and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.”536 Artistic 
creation and knowledge, if forward looking, may therefore “presence” a solution to modernity’s 
technological enframing, which indicates that humanity can use the same inventive forces that 
have led to its subjugation to invent a way to free humanity. So, if technē is the solution, that 
solution must be communicated to others with rhetoric to presence being.537 Understanding the 
full range of technē that grants humanity the capacity to use rhetoric to invent solutions to 
technological problems would offer a more programmatic character to Heidegger’s rather vague 
theorizations about how to cure society of its technological ills. 
 In response to the fatalism and the overwhelming technological force posited by 
Heidegger, rhetoric offers one possible means to begin refusing, chipping away at, undermining, 
and attacking “the technological society.” Technology does seem to dominate society in many 
ways, but humanity retains some degree of autonomy from its machines and systems, such that 
the dark abyss of Ellul’s la technique and Heidegger’s Gestell appears abstract, a mere 
philosophical construction. People can refuse to believe Ellul’s thesis that all communication is 
“propaganda.” And if humanity must refuse “the technological society,” then it can use rhetoric 
to invent ways to do so. Janet Atwill asserted that this transformative power imbues technē: 
“Technē challenges those forces and limits [compulsion, necessity, and fate] with its power to 
discover and invent new paths.”538 And technē “makes intervention and invention possible,” she 
wrote.539 If the technē of rhetoric entails the “art of discovering the available means of 
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persuasion,” then in a society that appears wholly integrated with technology, that art must 
persuade people by both negotiating the philosophical and ideological concepts of human society 
that define it as “technological,” as well as negotiating the preponderance of machines.540 
Empowered by technē critics can help elucidate society’s responses to a world not yet 
universally subjugated to technology, but teetering on the brink. Rhetors have the freedom to 
resist the technological system and reveal that resistance to others rather than waiting around for 
a god to save humanity. 
                                                 
494 Steve Fuller anticipated the pertinence of technē to both rhetorical scholarship and Science and Technology 
Studies [STS] by calling for a rhetorical intervention into technology studies. In Philosophy, Rhetoric, & the End of 
Knowledge, Fuller posited that injecting STS with a deeper understanding of rhetoric will result in technology 
scholarship more relevant to all academic disciplines. Fuller’s argument points toward the concept of technē by 
describing both rhetoric and the quest for scientific and technological knowledge in terms of their creative capacity. 
Fuller explained that, “the idea that the ultimate ground for the ‘Knowledge is Power’ equation is rhetorical. For the 
thread that connects the history of science from the Greeks to the present day is that people come to be convinced 
that particular forms of knowledge are embodied in the world—in skillful people and crafted goods—and are, in that 
sense, the hidden sources of power over the world” (115). 
495 Janet Atwill has pointed out how the concept of technē has close ties to the Paradox. She wrote, “If tychē is 
identified with fate, then technē would be one of fate’s most threatening adversaries—or humankind’s most 
beneficial ally” (Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed, 94). Also see Atwill’s Rhetoric Reclaimed for an extensive etymology 
of the term technē, and a history of its usage. 
496 Richard Doyle developed a sense of the movement between technology and communication in a theory of 
material rhetoric that he terms “rhetorical software.”  He drew attention to “the relational and material interactions 
that make possible the emergence of scientific statements.  While highlighting the textuality of scientific practices, 
the term avoids a textual determinism: as any user of software knows, software is usable only within a network of 
hardware” On Beyond Living, 7. 
497 McKeon, “The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age,” 2. 
498 McKeon, “The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age,” 12.   
499 McKeon, “The Uses of Rhetoric in a Technological Age,” 13. In Metaphysics, Aristotle linked technē and logos 
to help define human existence.  He wrote that, in addition to experience, “the human race lives also by art [technē] 
and reasoning [logos]” (689 [980b]). Also see George A. Kennedy’s appraisal of Aristotle’s rhetoric in the 
introduction to Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 12-13. 
500 Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” 60. 
501 McGee, “A Materialist’s Conception of Rhetoric,” 29.  McGee used a nuclear explosion and radiation analogy to 
describe the situating of rhetoric in materiality (39). 
502 McGee, “Materialist’s Conception,” 26. 
503 McGee, “Materialist’s Conception,” 26. 
504 Condit, “The Materiality of Coding,” 336. 
505 Condit, “The Materiality of Coding,” 338; and Selzer, “Habeas Corpus,” 8. 
506 Selzer, “Habeas Corpus,” 8. 
507 Selzer, “Habeas Corpus,” 9. 
508 Burke, Permanence and Change, 255. 
509 Burke, Permanence and Change, 258-259; and Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, 43. 
510 For an analysis of Burke’s rhetorical concept of Big Technology, see Hill, “The Human Barnyard.” 
511 Blair, “Contemporary U.S. Memorial Sites as Exemplars of Rhetoric’s Materiality,” 47. 
512 Feenberg, Transforming Technology, 124. 
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513 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 6. 
514 Hill, “The Human Barnyard.” 
515 Norman, Design of Everyday Things, 82. 
516 Norman, Design of Everyday Things, 82. 
517 Norman, Design of Everyday Things, 82. 
518 Translation mine. In German: “Die Technik ist die Taktik des ganzen Lebens.  Sie ist die innere Form des 
Verfahrenss im Kampf, der mit dem Leben selbst gleichbedeutend ist” (7).  Jacques Ellul’s concept of la technique 
comes close to paralleling Spengler’s concept of die Technik, because both authors referred to the pervasive ordering 
of all aspects of human life. In their perspective, technology comprises not only machines, but also systems, 
techniques, and designs. 
519 Spengler, Man and Technics, 10-11, emphasis his. 
520 Spengler, Man and Technics, 30, emphasis his. 
521 Winner, Autonomous Technology, 333. 
522Mumford, “Authoritarian and Democratic Technics”; and Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 34. 
523 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 22. 
524 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 55. 
525 Winner, The Whale and the Reactor, 29. 
526 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy? 2. 
527 Elaine Scarry wrote about the influence of objects on ontological production and the influence of ontological 
production on objects: “The imagination’s object is not simply to alter the external world, or to alter the human 
being in his or her full array of capacities and needs, but also and more specifically, to alter the power of alteration 
itself, to act on and continually revise the nature of creating.”  The Body in Pain, 324. 
528 Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, 7-8. 
529 Furthermore, one of Heidegger’s students, Greek Philosopher Kostas Axelos, used Heidegger’s “The Question 
Concerning Technology” as impetus to theorize his own philosophy of technology based on “the logos of technē.” 
Alienation, Praxis, & Technē in the Thought of Karl Marx, xv and 331. 
530 Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” 107. 
531 Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, 17. 
532 Heidegger, “Only a God Can Save Us,” 107. Ellul did the same. See “On Dialectic,” 297 and 308; and Ellul, 
“Nature, Technique, and Artificiality,” 268. 
533 See Farrell and Goodnight, “Accidental Rhetoric”; Fisher, “Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm”; 
Goodnight, “On Questions of Evacuation and Survival in Nuclear Conflict”; Hogan, The Nuclear Freeze Campaign; 
and Ivie, “Metaphor and the Rhetorical Invention of Cold War ‘Idealists.’” 
534 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 32 and 34. 
535 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 28 and 34. 
536 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 35. 
537 In Being and Time, Heidegger asserted that “Aristotle’s Rhetoric must be understood as the first systematic 
hermeneutic of the everydayness of being-with-one-another,” indicating that rhetoric functions to communicate 
alterations to typical human behavior (130).  Cliff Christians argued in “Ellul on Solution” that for Ellul’s solution to 
become a feasible challenge to “the technological society” it must be communicated to others in order to induce 
others to also adopt a viable solution. 
538 Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed, 48. 
539 Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed, 96. 
540 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 36 [1355b]. 
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